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1. Introduction 
 
“La femme n’existe pas”, said Jacques Lacan – woman does not exist1. Pondering about 
the superficially misogynist phrase, it certainly becomes clear that there is indeed a 
place that woman is not allowed to enter – where she literally cannot “exist” – which 
can best be labelled the Symbolic Order as the counterpart to the more feminine, 
elusively provisional structures of the Imaginary and its pre-Oedipal bliss. Bluntly 
assessing Lacan’s statement from a traditional viewpoint, steeped in the firm belief in 
hetero-normativism and the validity of hierarchical, binary oppositions, it seems indeed 
logical that woman, as a frail, eternally intangible category, tied to nature and 
irrationality, cannot claim her place within the Symbolic Order, understood here as a 
cultural, masculine realm informed by the discourse of paternal language. 
 However, when attempting to question the soundness of or challenge this 
paradigm that allocates men and women their places in society, tons of only too 
justifiable questions arise. These are only some of the questions coming to my mind: 
Why is it that men and women are ascribed those essentialist, rigidly framed roles they 
cannot possibly escape? Are the principles governing Imaginary and Symbolic Order 
respectively truly that strict and self-contained, or are there tiny gaps and fissures to be 
detected, discrepancies and ruptures that might testify to a fundamental cacophony 
deeply rooted within the long established hetero-normative categories? Why is it that 
woman is not allowed, or indeed not able, to secure herself a stable position within the 
Symbolic Order, and are there any possibilities for her to challenge or re-structure this 
mythically essentialist order? 
 Taking Lacanian psychoanalysis as a starting point, my diploma thesis mainly 
concerns itself with ways of living in and strategies of opposition to the Symbolic Order 
as the realm of patriarchal order and logic, and the perpetually beckoning promise of the 
Real as a reminder of the once blissful unity of mother and child that the heroines of 
literary and non-literary texts to be analysed will forever strive to regain. Furthermore, I 
am trying to investigate whether an attempted return to this maternally connoted stage 
(also known as the semiotic chôra) really constitutes a defeat for the woman, which 
                                                 
1 That woman does not – or cannot – exist within the Symbolic Order is just my interpretation of Lacan’s 
quotation in order to illustrate what I am aiming at; however, it can be aptly employed in the sense that 
“woman“ as a ready-made category does not exist and constantly escapes definition in a phallogocentric 
language.  
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necessarily surfaces in death and/or the expulsion from the Symbolic Order. This leads 
me to the question regarding possible and feasible means of opposition that might 
undermine or even weaken the male order, such as embracing madness, enigmatic 
language and the abject, which may permit female empowerment within a thoroughly 
paternal culture.  
 For my analyses, I will seek to portray a continuum of texts, regardless of their 
mediality and socio-historical context, taken from different periods and genres wherein 
women are confronted with the dilemma of self-development within the Symbolic 
Order, and try to solve or oppose this problem in distinct ways. The primary texts under 
consideration are Edgar Allan Poe’s short tales “Eleonora” and “Morella”, William 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Alfred Lord Tennyson’s “The Lady of Shalott” as well as 
Angela Carter’s short story “Wolf-Alice”, taken from the Bloody Chamber collection of 
revised fairy tales. Additionally, I am going to forward readings of visual culture by 
focusing on Pre-Raphaelite paintings by William Holman Hunt, John William 
Waterhouse and Dante Gabriel Rossetti.  
Starting with the tales written by Poe, I have to admit that these provide fertile 
soil for introducing antithetical conceptions of femininity and the discourse of binary 
oppositions; thereby constituting a perfect beginning for this thesis. In particular, 
“Eleonora” serves as an ideal illustration of both the semiotic and the symbolic realm, 
represented by the Valley of the Many-Coloured Grass and the “strange city”, 
respectively. “Morella”, on the other hand, shall provide an example of how versions of 
femininity are constructed and ascribed to woman in order to secure the existence of the 
Symbolic Order and punish transgressive behaviour. The analysis revolving around 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet shall center on the iconography and madness of Ophelia, in 
particular on the ways in which these are linked in representational culture allotting 
Ophelia the role of the mad bride and one of the first of literature’s canon of 
madwomen, which is why I chose to include an extensive elaboration on Ophelia’s 
latent revolutionary potential and the ways wherein hegemonic culture seeks to silence 
those. While in Hamlet, gendered categories seem relatively fixed and straightforward 
(although Ophelia provides means to lay bare contradictions and silences within the 
paternal order of Elsinore), Tennyson’s poem “The Lady of Shalott” exhibits some 
more revolutionary potential as the eponymous protagonist attempts to overturn 
dichotomies, uttering a desperate cry for self-realisation that will remain unheard as 
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ultimately, gender constructions are safely re-installed and left intact as they are and 
always have been. I believe this text to constitute a highly symbolically charged 
illustration of how semiotic and symbolic, or Imaginary and Symbolic Order, interact 
with and bleed into one another, and to epitomise the ultimate failure of attaining the 
Real, which is always beckoning, but still deferred endlessly, beyond hope or 
realisation. Following these literary and canonical texts, I will continue to scrutinise 
paintings by the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood framing the woman as spectacle in visual 
representation that has amongst others helped to found and foster woman’s role as 
helplessly passive victim or desirably virginal maiden “killed into art”, ever ready for 
conspicuous consumption. As befits the topic, I chose to include paintings by Hunt, 
Waterhouse and Rossetti that served as illustrations for the 1857 Moxon edition of 
Tennyson’s poems, and arranged them in a sequence that seems to trace the Lady’s 
journey away from her semiotic island, towards freedom and death. As an appendix to 
this chapter, Elizabeth Siddall’s sketch of the Lady of Shalott shall be investigated as 
this piece of art aptly demonstrates a woman’s reply to male hegemonic culture. Finally, 
the thesis is going to conclude its practical investigation with the analysis of Angela 
Carter’s “Wolf-Alice”, combined with an elaboration on Kristeva’s notion of the abject 
as a perfect example of female empowerment and healthy sexuality at the limits of the 
Symbolic Order. I felt it to be crucial to include at least one contemporary text, and 
settled for Carter’s tale as it exhibits, as the analysis will show, an enormously 
progressive and outstandingly unconventional potential concerning its approach to 
female psychosexuality.  
 Prior to subjecting the above mentioned texts to closer scrutiny, concepts and 
methodologies meant to function as epistemological lenses shall be introduced and 
explained. Amongst those, the tripartite model of Imaginary, Mirror Stage and Symbolic 
Order expounded by Jacques Lacan, as well as Julia Kristeva’s concepts of semiotic and 
symbolic, the semiotic chôra as a space of female opposition and the notion of the 
abject, can be counted. So as to able to fully grasp the texts’ often contradictory 
potential for interpretation, it will become indispensable to apply a certain degree of 
eclecticism, meaning that various concepts employed within the branches of feminism, 
psychoanalysis or structuralism will have to be considered and adapted to my purposes. 
By drawing upon diverse models and methodologies, I hope to paint a polychromous 
picture of the subversively powerful or desperately futile ways in which women interact 
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with the patriarchal discourse, either deriving empowerment, strategies of resistance, or 
withdrawing from the Symbolic Order into the Real via madness and death. 
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2. Theoretical Background – Concepts and Methodologies 
 
2.1. The Feminist Enterprise 
Since the main part of my thesis revolves around the conception of literary and artistic 
female figures, the roles they are interpellated into, and the means whereby they seek to 
escape or oppose these rigidly framed roles, it seems apt to open the theoretical chapter 
with a reflection upon feminist theory. Essentially, I plan to briefly introduce the 
feminist agenda and some of its key figures in order to elucidate certain concepts and 
motifs that shall sustain the interpretations pertaining to the practical part of this paper. 
In particular, French Feminism shall be mentioned, which relates to my analyses in so 
far as it strongly feeds upon questions of identity, language and psychoanalysis playing 
a pivotal part in the conception of the characters I am going to scrutinize. Questions and 
problems encountered particularly within this strand prove to be perfectly applicable to 
the works I have chosen as my primary data. In general, feminism opens up a whole 
new dimension for the discussion of my selected texts, and partly aids in trying to 
account for the eternal submission of woman to man. 
Since a thoroughly complete elaboration on the beginnings of feminism and its 
agenda would be beyond the scope of this thesis, the theoretical part shall be opened 
with a quote by Simone de Beauvoir, who understands feminists as women or men ‘[…] 
fighting on specifically feminine issues independently of the class struggle […] fighting 
to change women’s condition […]’ (qtd. in Moi Politics 91). In particular, Beauvoir 
sheds light on the fact that women have been dragged into the object position and even 
have internalized the dominant discourses themselves (Moi Politics 92). As the labels 
“feminist” and “feminine” have been mentioned above, it seems apt to try to establish 
boundaries between these terms that are conflated far too often. Toril Moi regards 
feminism as a political label, ‘[…] committed to the struggle against patriarchy and 
sexism […]’ (Feminist 117); whereas “female” denotes a set of biological 
characteristics. Matters are more complex with regard to the term “feminine”, which 
Moi delineates as a socio-cultural construct, at the same time however finding fault with 
the elusiveness of this definition2. Though, in the same instant, Moi rightly questions 
the validity of establishing a “proper” definition, for this very step would entail playing 
                                                 
2 ‘It would seem that any content could be poured into this container; it does not read like a ‘proper’ 
definition’ (Moi Feminist 123). 
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directly into the hands of patriarchy. By the same token, Monique Wittig ‘[…] feels it is 
imperative to write female experience […]’, but simultaneously ‘[…] aims ultimately to 
eliminate the very notion of “woman”’ (Griffin Crowder 118) since this would 
eventually re-inscribe and thus confirm the dialectical image of “man” and “woman” 
that is sought to be deconstructed for a feminist agenda. 
French feminism, generally defined as a more eclectic approach, feeds upon 
post-structuralist and psychoanalytic theory, ‘[…] taking as its starting point the insights 
of […] Lacan, Foucault and Derrida’ (Barry 120). Essentially, this branch seeks to 
deconstruct fundamental concepts like identity or femininity, defining them as 
patriarchally informed categories produced by means of discourse and language (Babka 
198) that ‘[…] have no meaning outside the historically determined discourse of our 
patriarchal culture’ (Griffin Crowder 118). As key figures representing the French line, 
Julia Kristeva, Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray can be named; all of whom shall be 
introduced more elaborately in subsequent sections. 
Probably the primary concern within the feminist agenda, according to Peter 
Barry, consists of ‘[…] exposing what might be called the mechanisms of patriarchy, 
that is, the cultural ‘mind-set’ in men and women which perpetuate[s] sexual inequality’ 
(117). To be more precise, one could speak about testing underlying patterns and modes 
of discrimination against women wrapped in the coat of hierarchically organized binary 
oppositions. Within feminist theory, such oppositions are viewed as the very source 
from which inequalities and internalized stereotypes spring. Indeed there is broad 
consensus that a “natural” division between men and women does not exist; the division 
taken so often for granted proves to be historically constructed in order to secure the 
domination of one group over the other (Cameron 23). French feminists take up these 
impossible notions in order to play with the patriarchal concept of fixed identity; even 
more so, they ‘[…] embrace their attributes of otherness and absence incarnate, using 
them as the point of departure for a radically disruptive feminism […]’ (Müller 22), a 
school of thought giving birth to concepts such as deconstruction or gender. Academics 
like Kristeva or Cixous indeed seek to manipulate and pervert the prevailing roles 
provided for women in order to generate a wholly different, subversive position 
countering male hegemony. Ultimately, the goal of French feminism seems to be the 
achievement of supplying women with the promising possibility of an alternative life 
outside the Symbolic Order (Müller 23). 
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So as to challenge restrictively essentialist dichotomies, the biologically 
determined “sex” was confronted with the new, less stable category of “gender”. 
Contrary to the concept of sex3, gender can be seen as a more fluid, heterogeneous and 
also enabling term, whereby ‘[…] sexual difference is not considered as a given […]’ 
(Mills intro 3). Attached to gender is the extremely liberating notion that adjectives like 
‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ do not denote male or female bodies, respectively, but are 
thought of as applicable to whatever biological sex the person has (Butler Gender 6). 
While some feminists have uttered doubts about this concept, fearing that gender might 
erase ‘[…] the political edge of feminism […]’, other critics have celebrated the refusal 
to prioritize some factors over others which is refused within gender studies (Mills intro 
4). As interactions between language and different discourses socially produce gender, 
it is potentially prone to change and proves an ever fluctuating notion without any 
conventionally fixed meaning (Spaull 118). This idea as expressed here possibly 
embodies a means to question the institution of patriarchy per se, indeed the system 
which presupposes the organization of power on the basis of sex (Spaull 117).  
 However, the boundaries that could have been said to keep sex and gender apart 
have become increasingly fuzzy. The concept of sex, once considered being a biological 
given, becomes itself subject to feminist scrutiny4. Ruth Wodak’s assertion that ‘[i]n a 
social construction perspective not only gender, but even sex is seen as a socially 
developed status […] sex is understood more as a continuum […]’ (intro 3), entails on 
the one hand that pairs like man and woman or masculinity and femininity have become 
obsolete; on the other hand, it undeniably cries for the advent of innovative models of 
sexuality. Possibly, such an alternative model not only of the conceptualization of the 
sexes, but even of the very basic concepts our worldview is built upon, can be found in 
Angela Carter’s “Wolf-Alice”; which is why the discussion of the concept of gender 
appeared to be of primal significance to this chapter.  
In the second half of my theoretical introduction, I shall make accessible Freudian 
and Lacanian psychoanalysis, which are both necessary in order to sustain possible 
interpretations and analyses I shall propose later on. I will start by illuminating Freudian 
                                                 
3 Conventionally – though differing from one culture to another – used to refer to ‘[…] the anatomical 
differences between men and women, to sharply differentiated bodies, and to what divides us rather than 
unites us’ (Weeks 101) 
4 see Judith Butler’s justified questions, ‘And what is sex anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, 
or hormonal [...]? Does sex have a history? Does each sex have a different history, or histories?’ etc 
(Gender 6-7). 
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theory that has paved the way for the Lacanian model of Imaginary and Symbolic. As 
has already been maintained, psychoanalytic theory has ever since played a pivotal role 
within feminism; Barry takes as the starting point of this twisted relationship Kate 
Millet’s critique of Sigmund Freud (125). I will review Freudian theory only in so far as 
I consider it to bear relevance to the analysis of my primary data; to be more precise, I 
am going to briefly introduce dream interpretation, repression and the psychic 
apparatus, motifs that can be said to be latently prevalent in the poems and stories I am 
going to deal with. 
 
2.2. Freudian Psychoanalysis 
As regards dream interpretation, Freud distinguished two dream contents; the latent and 
the manifest one (Freud Unbehagen 31). The manifest content comprises pictures and 
scenes appearing in dreams, which are remembered the morning after; whereas the 
latent dream content encapsulates the actual meaning behind. So in order to arrive at an 
interpretation of one’s dreams, one has to reverse the dream-work and decode the 
manifest symbols. Freud identified three main mechanisms of distortion, which are 
condensation, displacement and symbolism; the latter proving to be the most fruitful 
approach with respect to this paper. As a matter of fact, Freud was convinced that 
almost every symbol runs back to a repressed sexual element; a Phallic or a female 
symbol (Lahmer 226). To be more precise, Freud saw the phallic symbol represented by 
things that are long, erect and able to penetrate (Landry 95). The female symbol is 
preferably symbolised by objects endowed with a cavity in which something else can be 
put or filled. Freud also suggested topographical features like valleys and canyons as 
symbolising the female (Landry 95-96). As has been already stated, symbols are 
connected with repressed ideas. “Repression” itself denotes the containment of ‘[...] 
unresolved conflicts, unadmitted desires, or traumatic past events [...]’ which are ‘[...] 
forced out of conscious awareness and into the realm of the unconscious’ (Barry 92-3). 
Via sublimation, this repressed material finds an outlet, but is disguised as something 
noble, e.g. an ‘[...] intense religious experience[...]’ (Barry 93). Persons incapable of 
coping with repressed material might have to face what Freud labelled repetition 
compulsion: they will have to re-enact a past scenario again and again until they find a 
way to break successfully with the past and overcome a probably traumatic experience 
(Freud Lustprinzip 228). 
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This two-part model of the psyche was later substituted by a tripartite model; 
whereby the psyche was divided into id, ego and super-ego. First of these three 
instances emerges the id; it contains inherited and basic drives and is completely ruled 
by the pleasure principle (Freud Unbehagen 7).  The two basic impulses it houses are 
Eros and Thanatos, the life and the death drive, which are inextricably linked: ‘[i]n den 
biologischen Funktionen wirken die beiden Grundtriebe gegeneinander oder 
kombinieren sich miteinander [...] Dieses Mit- und Gegeneinanderwirken [...] ergibt die 
ganze Buntheit der Lebenserscheinungen’ (Freud Unbehagen 11)5. Since the id is 
developmental on the first level, it is anterior to the ego, the part of our personality 
brought to the fore during socialisation. Its major task is to mediate between id and 
super-ego and reconcile their wants with what is accepted in and required by society 
(Freud Unbehagen 7). Hence, the ego acts according to the reality principle. Parental 
and social influences trigger the formation of a third part of the psyche, called the super-
ego. The super-ego is deemed a moral instance diametrically opposed to the id. 
Concluding, Freud states: ‘Eine Handlung des Ichs ist dann korrekt, wenn sie 
gleichzeitig den Anforderungen des Es, des Über-Ichs und der Realität genügt, also 
deren Ansprüche zu versöhnen weiß‘ (Freud Unbehagen 8)6. Another milestone brought 
up by Freud was the perception of the psychosexual development. Basically, he claimed 
that the sexual life does not start with puberty, but soon after birth (Freud Unbehagen 
15). There is a strong case that children derive pleasure from various body parts; the 
first being the mouth. This first phase is superseded by the anal phase, which is in turn 
replaced by the phallic phase. The phallic phase marks the height of the psychosexual 
development; afterwards, the period of latency sets in, which is generally viewed as a 
quiet period. It is only after this “break” that the fourth and last stage emerges, the so-
called genital phase (Freud Unbehagen 16-9).  
Approximately coinciding with the libidinal and the ego development between 
the age of three and five, the universal phenomenon – if Freud is to be believed – of the 
Oedipal complex sets in. Starting simultaneously with the awakening of the sexual 
drive, it is primarily marked by a strong, though unconscious desire directed toward the 
parent of the opposite sex that goes hand in hand with the wish to eliminate the parent 
                                                 
5 ‘In their biological functions, the two basic drives work against or complement one another [...] this 
synthesis, or antagonism [...] comprises the colourful spectrum of living’ (my translation). 
6 ‘A deed is accepted by the ego, if it manages to satisfy the needs of id, super-ego, and reality; that is, if 
it succeeds in meeting their respective requirements’ (my translation). 
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of the same sex. This inclination results from castration fear or penis envy experienced 
by boys and girls, respectively. In order to successfully overcome this oedipal phase, the 
inappropriate sexual desires have to be suppressed and identification with the parent of 
the same sex takes place. The opposite sex is only rediscovered as a partner of the 
sexually matured individual. 
 Beheld from a Freudian perspective, sexual difference assumes a pivotal role 
within the process of coming of age, possessing the very means to trigger reactions and 
evoking symptoms. Contrastively, Jacques Lacan refers to sexual difference as ‘[…] 
purely symbolic opposition […]’ that can neither be sufficiently explained nor 
theoretically fully grasped (Pluth 70); thereby drawing upon the hypothesis containing 
the impossibility of a sexual relationship. 
 
2.3. Psychoanalysis à la Lacan – Imaginary, Mirror Stage and Symbolic Order 
The subsequent sections dealing with Lacanian conceptions such as Imaginary, Mirror 
Stage and Symbolic Order can be considered the most important points inherent to the 
theory part. Undeniably, the analyses that shall be carried out are most strongly 
informed by the Lacanian distinction between Imaginary and Symbolic Order, as well 
as by universal notions of desire and loss prevailing in different shapes and guises in the 
texts I have chosen to examine. I felt Lacanian psychoanalysis to be absolutely 
fundamental to this paper as the characters to be introduced all seem to experience a 
universally rather crucial moment – possibly the Mirror Stage – that triggers either their 
downfall or empowerment. Furthermore, the texts under consideration seem to exhibit 
distinct conceptions of Imaginary and Symbolic Order that serve to explain the 
prevalent structure and order, as well as gender relations and character development. 
Jacques Lacan’s most striking contribution to psychoanalytic theory can be 
suggested in consisting of his ability to draw together distinct strands of thought. His 
extraordinarily fusional theories extend from fields like the Hegelian informed Master-
Slave dialectic to Saussurean structuralist notions concerning language and the 
unconscious, wherein his central topoi – ‘[…] lack, alienation, separation and 
threatening violence […]’ are carefully interwoven (Bendle 73). Most noticeably, Lacan 
radicalizes Freudian theory by shifting the key emphasis on the phallus as the master 
signifier firmly rooted within the Symbolic. Whereas childhood in Freudian terms is 
suggested to be ruled by “polymorphous perversity”, Lacan demonstratively elaborates 
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on the omnipotence of order, existing prior to birth, only waiting to accord the infant his 
unavoidable lot (Althusser 27-28). First and foremost, Lacan proposed a mechanism 
split into two parts, or realms, which he labeled the Imaginary and the Symbolic, 
respectively. The tradition from the first stage into the second one is initiated via the 
mirror phase, which provides for socialization and the acquisition of language to take 
place. As regards the concept of the Mirror Stage, Lacan is deeply indebted to Henri 
Wallon, whose experiments on mirror experiences executed with children and animals 
are said to have elicited the formulation of Lacan’s own theories (Barzilai Lacan 74). 
Basically, what Wallon achieved to prove was that human intelligence outbalances the 
biologically determined motoric advantages of animals (Barzilai Lacan 78). Lacan 
reformulates and appropriates Wallon’s theories to such an extent that he feels no need 
to insist on a physically present mirror generating the ego formation.  
Even before the infant develops a sense of self, it lives in a realm Lacan labeled 
the Imaginary (Barry 109); the child, experiencing itself as ‘[…] diffused and 
undifferentiated from the world’ (Millard 156) lives in a pre-oedipal, blissful 
relationship with his mother, who serves as the only identification figure: ‘Die Mutter 
stellt anfänglich für das Kind nicht etwas dar, was es als abgetrennt von sich 
wahrnehmen könnte, da es sich noch nicht als Einheit mit sich selber spürt’ (Widmer 
30)7. An “Imaginary” relationship can thus be delineated as a symbiosis wherein each 
party believes to complement the other (Pluth 73). Furthermore, the relation between the 
child and its mother can be seen as dualistic; marked only by presence or absence of the 
mother (Althusser 26). The mother embodies both the person with whom the infant 
relates most closely as well as the first object of love and desire, a hypothesis whereon 
Irigaray grounds the argument that the placenta is ‘[…] the first house to surround us 
[…] like some child’s security blanket […]’ (Irigaray Reader 40). It follows that the 
proper name then cannot be taken as our real name, being ‘[…] slipped on to the body 
like a coating […] an extra-corporeal identity card’, thereby replacing the first original 
“name” we have been given, the irreducible mark of the navel (Irigaray Reader 40)8. 
This context particularly offers itself as fertile soil for explaining what Lacan termed the 
“Real”; summed up by Gerda Pagel in the following manner: ‘Es bezeichnet […] die 
                                                 
7 ‘Initially, the mother cannot be perceived as a being separate from the child, as it cannot yet experience 
itself as a unified being’ (my translation).  
8 To be given a name, however, provides for the integration into the Symbolic domain: ‘[f]or Lacan, 
names, which emblematize and institute this paternal law, sustain the integrity of the body’ (Butler Bodies 
72). 
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Erfahrung des Seins in seiner primären Undifferenziertheit und Posivität […] In ihm 
fallen Innen und Außen, Phantasie und Realität, Ich und Anderer zusammen’ (59)9. 
Independent of Symbolic and Imaginary, the Real can be defined as a state governed by 
the pleasure principle, where any possible form of lack or discontentment is glossed 
over, making it appear perfect. Inextricably intertwined with Imaginary and Symbolic, 
the Real can be likened to an ‘[…] agency that sutures the two […]’ (Berressem 21) 
were one to imagine those realms as topological surfaces. In so far as the Real is said to 
“edge” with Julia Kristeva’s concept of the abject, it simultaneously disrupts the 
surfaces of the psychic spaces and thus provides not only the dream of fulfillment and 
unity, but also subversive potential that the female characters in the texts to be analysed 
dream to acquire and appropriate for the aim of finally reaching completion. This wish 
goes along with an unconscious desire for death as ‘[…] material dissolution through a 
regression to a state before the Imaginary […]’ (Berressem 23), an elusively indefinite 
feeling possibly triggered by sights of the abject. 
The beginning of socialization, however, demands a repression of the desire for 
the mother and the maternal body as channel to the blissful merging with the Real, and 
encourages the child to ‘[…] enter into the desire of/for the father […]’ (Irigaray Reader 
40), a transition which is most substantially marked by the acquisition of language 
(Eagleton Intro 15). Already the infant senses insuperable troubles arising, as soon as 
the mother does not attend to any seductive attempts. It follows then that her desire must 
be thwarted, or not directed towards the child at all, a severe discovery that alters the 
rules of the game for good (Pluth 74). 
The immediacy sensed during the relationship with the mother is violently 
disrupted during the oedipal moment, as the father penetrates the Imaginary bliss in 
order to bring the gift of language (Althusser 26). This crucial developmental step is 
achieved via the Mirror Stage. Granting the infant a successful transition from the 
Imaginary into the Symbolic, the Mirror Stage primarily fulfills the role of elucidating 
the subject position, the function of the Ego, to the child (Lacan Schriften I 63). This 
psychologically decisive momentum occurs at the age of about six months, when the 
child recognizes its own image in the mirror and is thus rewarded with a unified, 
                                                 
9 ‘It designates the experience of being in all its primary indifference and positivity [...] it is the site where 
inside and outside, imagination and reality, I and Other, collapse’ (my translation).  
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coherent image of itself. What previously had been the so-called mutilated body10 is 
now being transformed into a thoroughly structured and sensually perceptible entity 
(Hopf 22). Jubilatory gestures and facial expressions accompany what Lacan has termed 
the ‘Aha-Erlebnis’ (Lacan Schriften I 63). Seeking for answers and explanations 
concerning this newly arrived stage, the child turns questioningly to the mother – it 
requires a third instance to confirm what the child experiences (Widmer 28). The 
mother’s gaze confirms the child’s expectations about the separateness of the two up to 
now unified beings (Millard 156). Other than conceiving of itself in realistic terms, the 
infant perceives itself as complete and perfect, which is why the Mirror Stage can be 
said to suggest illusory pictures about selfhood (Widmer 28). Contrarily to reflecting a 
preexisting entity, the mirror acts as a frame for an ideal projection, thereby allowing 
the infant to compensate for his motoric shortcomings via a visually coherent sense of 
self (Butler Bodies 74-75). A deceptive, narcissistic universe reflects only the ideal 
configuration of the imago of the doppelgänger (Lacan Schriften III 59). In this respect, 
Lacan deviates from Wallon’s theories, which seem to envision a lighter view of the 
world, putting the emphasis on playful elements11; whereas Lacan foregrounds sinister 
Hegelian aspects that picture the ‘[…] encounter between the subject and the other as a 
[…] life-and-death struggle for recognition […]’ (Barzilai Lacan 81). Observed from a 
darker angle, the Mirror Stage embodies the desire for compensatory fulfillment of the 
lost unity, a completeness the child will forever strive to find and eventually hope to 
regain in language (Hopf 32). Confined within a hopelessly traumatic stage of 
alienation, the child gradually realizes that not only the mother, but also the father can 
impersonate an instance granting security and wholeness. It is hence lured away from 
the maternal body and invited to replace this desire with the belief in the word 
(Ragland-Sullivan 63). By embodying the instance of language, the father provides for 
the independence of the child, which goes hand in hand with the separation from the 
mother (Widmer 35). Yet by metaphorically severing the umbilical cord, that is, by 
entering into the incestuously amatory union of mother and child, the father rescues the 
child from the mother’s desire – the development of a subject position depends on the 
repression of the ‘[…] pre-individuated incestuous pleasures associated with the […] 
maternal body’ (Butler Gender 45). This proposition leads to a re-consideration of the 
                                                 
10 “Le corps morcelé“ in the French original 
11 “Where is Mommy?” (Barzilai Lacan 84) 
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role of the mother, which Lacan does not read as fully positive. What the intrusion of 
the father truly amounts to is the disengagement of the infant ‘[…] from the psychical 
dangers of fusional identification, from wanting to be the mother’s phallus, from 
striving to fill completely the place of her lack’ (Barzilai Lacan 201). Viewing the 
father not as an intruder, but also as the savior logically hints to the contentious nature 
of the maternal function. Other than rewarding the baby with the possibility of assuming 
a subject position, she – albeit unconsciously – transforms her child into the phallus she 
desperately desires to make up for her lack (Barzilai Lacan 2). The renunciation to 
fulfill this utility enables the child to gain access to the ‘[…] dimension of language and 
law where the symbolic phallus prevails’ (Barzilai Lacan 201). Now that the Mirror 
Stage has come to an end (which occurs, according to Lacan, at the age of 
approximately 18 months), the child first experiences what Henry Sullivan has termed 
‘desire as lack’, the ‘[…] first pure signifier of lack […]’ being the phallus (45). 
The Symbolic Order the child has entered into completely restructures and 
rewrites its life; announcing ‘[…] the beginning of socialization, with its prohibitions 
and restraints […]’, in other words, the child is introduced into a ‘[…] world of 
patriarchal order and logic’ (Barry 109) entailing the abjection of the maternal body 
(Seet 146). The Symbolic Order forces the child to sacrifice the Imaginary structures in 
order to make room for the paternal language. The rules and taboos being installed are 
regarded as vital for the continuation of the patriarchal order as they protect ‘[…] the 
subject from falling into the violent, abject enjoyment [jouissance]’ (Berressem 26) that 
might empower the subject enough to throw into question and fiercely oppose the Law 
of the Father. Therefore it appears indispensable to shepherd the subject into language, 
the instance founding the separations whereon the Symbolic Order is built (Berressem 
27). Furthermore, the acquisition of language allows for making desires explicit, 
entering into social exchanges (Millard 156) as well as witnessing the introduction of 
the sexual division (Apollon 118). As regards the latter point, it is viewed as an 
achievement of language to accord the ego a sexed position, and, by fixing that highly 
arbitrary position, to secure the stability of the otherwise disintegrated ego (Butler 
Bodies 138). However, believing in the omnipotence of language will prove to be just 
another fatal fallacy: initially convinced that language might embody the means to solve 
life’s riddles, the subject will sooner or later realize that ‘[…] the major function of 
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language is not to find answers, communicate, or provide information, but to project 
narcissism, protect egos, mask jouissance12, negotiate desire’ (Ragland-Sullivan 69).  
Notwithstanding language’s actual function, linguistic units like words or 
phrases are superimposed upon visual, acoustic, tactile or olfactory impressions (Fink 
123); notions that can no longer be expressed in the Symbolic and therefore undergo 
repression and ultimately silencing. Lacan comments on this procedure with the words 
“le mot est la meurtre de la chose”13, alluding to the actuality that words unavoidably 
replace things (Miller 30). Elaine Millard accords the Imaginary feminine traits, since 
the child adopts the language carrying ‘[…] authority and self possession which Lacan 
designates as male’ (156-157). The law which to abide by is now called “Nom du père”, 
which designates the possibility to symbolically refer to an omnipotent position (Hopf 
38). The arrival of this stage witnesses the phallus becoming ‘[…] the organizer of the 
world […]’ (Irigaray Reader 38). Importantly, Lacan explicitly distinguishes between 
penis and phallus14; whereby the latter metaphorically points to the “Law of the Father”, 
thus being linked to the Symbolic Order – the very order that is represented by the 
Father (Hopf 39). The penis on the other hand, assuming the power position in the 
relationship between the two sexes, constitutes the object endowed with phallic value 
(Widmer 96).  
Although a quite stable border can be drawn between phallus and penis, it is still 
the male body that acts as the site of desire; as desire is seen as utterly dependent on the 
experience of having a penis. Once again, it is the man who sets the standard; by this 
means both picturing female sexuality as a blank space, a negation, and secondly, 
assimilating it to the man’s (De Lauretis 23). Teresa De Lauretis mockingly, albeit with 
a sober undertone, sums up conventionally defined psychoanalytic views about female 
sexuality in the following statement: 
Leaving home, she [the girl] enters the phallic phase where she comes face to 
face with castration, engages in uneven battles with penis envy, and remains 
forever scarred by a narcissistic wound, forever bleeding […] her transformation 
                                                 
12 The complex term of jouissance in Lacan maintains its original associations  - ‘[...] sexual climax, 
excessive enjoyment, legal ownership [...]’, and can as well be compared to the Freudian notion of ‘Lust’. 
However, Lacan broadens the range of meaning by understanding jouissance as ‘[...] more excessive, 
perverse, murderous even enjoyment [...]’ (Rabaté 27). 
13 ‘The word murders the thing’ (my translation). 
14 Mervyn F. Bendle quotes Rycroft, who identifies the penis as an anatomical term; contrastively, the 
phallus constitutes an ‘[...] anthropological and theological term referring to the idea or image of the male 
generative organ [...] the phallus is an idea venerated in various religions as a symbol of the power of 
nature’ (79). 
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into woman will take place; but only if she successfully negotiates the crossing, 
haunted by the Scylla and Carybdis of object change and erotogenic zone 
change, into passivity. 131-32. 
 
With all possible monsters defeated, all obstacles crumbled, the woman finds her reward 
in motherhood, her one and only biological destiny (De Lauretis 132). While De 
Lauretis’ allegorical little tale admittedly captures rather Freudian tendencies, Lacan 
sees both boys and girls as affected by the Symbolic Order; notably during the last 
oedipal stage, the stage of castration. Whereas the little boy has to learn that he is not 
yet endowed with the same rights as the father; but that he will one day when he is 
grown up; the little girl has to accept that she will never have the same rights as a man 
for her lack of a phallus (Althusser 29-30). To some extent, both sexes experience the 
phenomenon of irreconcilable lack; the only difference being the depth of the impact on 
the formation of a healthy subject position. Girls will necessarily encounter the 
irretrievable loss of the maternal body; and will be reminded of their shortcomings 
twice as much as boys, since they are to discern that the position intended for women 
within the Symbolic Order is but a subsidiary one (Hopf 83). Boys are able to partially 
reconcile this lack due to their possession of the anatomical penis (94). This is how the 
male sex organ – the penis – becomes a phallic object, which to lose the man will 
constantly fear15. It has to be remarked, however, that castration also needs to be 
considered in a more figurative sense than merely cutting off the testicles. Jean-Michel 
Rabaté suggests a link to Platon’s Symposium, wherein Aristophanes’ allegory 
concerning the second halves also evokes castration; it instills an insatiable desire in 
humans to unite with their second halves in order to be one, thereby bridging the void or 
lack constantly experienced16 (144). 
Castration fear is not in the same way experienced by the girl17, who, having 
accepted that nature did not furnish her with the same organs, can strive for 
completeness either by identifying with the imago of the mother, or by identifying with 
                                                 
15 Stuart Schneiderman points out that the primal scene of man’s castration fear occurred when the boy 
was confronted with the uncanny image of his own genitals in his mothers’ hands (157). Ellie Ragland-
Sullivan elaborates on this perceived calamity as following: ‘Having seen visible proof that the other sex 
has no penis, he [the man] bears witness to the fantasy he can lose his, be castrated imaginarily’ (59); and 
thus becoming, in Butler’s terms, like the woman, whose ‘[...] position is constituted as the figural 
enactment of [...] punishment’ (Bodies 102). 
16 ‘Nachdem nun so die Natur entzweigeschnitten war, ging sehnsüchtig jede Hälfte ihrer andern Hälfte 
nach [...] strebend aus zweien Eins zu machen und die Natur zu heilen, die menschliche‘ (Platon 
Gastmahl 57-58). 
17 At this point, Lacan distinguishes between two “impossible positions”, namely being the Phallus and 
having the Phallus (Butler Gender 44). 
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the phallus itself. Being the phallus here means supplying that which men are not; thus 
indirectly becoming the phallus’ absence and lack (Butler Gender 44). Put another way, 
the female body is stylized as ‘[…] the primordial object of desire […]’, thus becoming 
the alleged key to ‘[…] secret truths, the answers to enigmas […]’, which Ellie 
Ragland-Sullivan classifies as ‘[…] attributes of the phallus qua lack […]’ (60). In this 
context, she launches the term of the ‘sexual masquerade’, a societal illusion providing 
the basis whereon gender fictions are enacted18. By sexually desiring the female body, 
the man – in Freud’s opinion – reassures that he has never encountered homosexual 
desire in the slightest instance, and therefore can never be accused of having grieved 
over its loss (Butler Gender 71). Additionally, Freud sees the boys’ repudiation of the 
maternal body and the ensuing growing identification with the father as grounding in 
the fear of becoming effeminized, and to be thus associated with homosexuality (Butler 
Gender 59).  
Notwithstanding all the postulated (and admittedly constructed) differences, both 
sexes undergo the phallic stage; during which the clitoris or the penis, respectively 
acquire phallic value. The fear of castration decreases as the phallic stage gradually 
fades, and the belief in reaching a stage of ideal completeness is overcome (Hopf 96). 
So ultimately, both boys and girls have to submit to the order of the Symbolic, 
inevitably confronted with the fact that neither sex can be the phallus, nor completely 
attain the potency of the phallus (Hopf 94). Due the above outlined emphasis on the 
phallus, Lacan has been falsely taken for a ‘phallocrat’ by feminists like Cixous or 
Irigaray (Ragland-Sullivan 53); while in truth Lacan shifted the focus from the Freudian 
father to the mother: ‘[…] human desire cannot find its place without questioning its 
link with the mother’s desire […] it is the mother who can open up the realm of the 
‘Desire of the Other’’ (Rabaté 13). Similarly, one faces the risk of running into 
difficulties when assessing the ambiguous role of the phallus. Opponents of the 
Lacanian school of thought claim that the enduring emphasis on the phallus inevitably 
casts woman into the role of man’s eternal inferior, evoking distortedly romanticist 
visions; whereas defenders argue that Lacan’s view of woman as pursuing ateleogically 
informed pleasures sheds light on woman’s potential to escape the trap of signification, 
                                                 
18 ‘Scents, intimate details, and resonances surround female bodily orifices with a supposed essence of the 
feminine [...]’, whereas ‘[t]he masculine [...] signifies a search for knowledge, authority, or prestige’ (76). 
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as her jouissance is located outside and beyond the limits of the Symbolic order (Bendle 
85). 
 
2.4. Death and Psychosis 
Successful socialization is however always connected to ceaseless separation and loss, a 
constant yearning for the primordial harmony with the mother enjoyed in the Imaginary. 
This suffered loss accounts for the fact that death comes to be seen as the ‘[…] ultimate 
object of desire […] the recapturing of the lost unity, the final healing of the split 
subject’ (Moi Politics 101). Death is posited as the only means to revert to the blissful 
union once felt, for to statically remain in the Imaginary would necessitate the subject 
becoming psychotic and ‘[…] incapable of living in human society’ (Moi Politics 100). 
Lacan defines the psychotic subject as a person who has willingly rejected the Law of 
the Father19 in order to not have to break with the maternal body and lose the prospect 
of reaching an uttermost level of satisfaction. The psychotic feels the world around him 
irreversibly crumbling and collapsing due to a lack of stable foundations on which to 
rely on. The admittedly wanting guarantee for an assuring and comfortable stability in 
language – usually redeemed through myths and beliefs – casts the psychotic into a 
profound crisis, leading him to question all that he has taken for granted or probably 
held dear. As satisfaction can only be momentarily attained, a state of ‘[…] lack and 
loss […] producing a kind of low grade dis-ease or even anxiety’ gains the upper hand 
(Ragland-Sullivan 55). According to Willy Apollon, the psychotic subject ‘[…] chooses 
to consider the default in language as a failure or an evil of the human condition […]’ 
(119) and dedicates himself to the immense task of mending the world of language; 
albeit on a self-constructed and thus unhappily delusional basis. This irrationally 
irrefutable belief in the absolute necessity of fulfilling this Sisyphean task can only ever 
be effectively overcome via psychoanalytical treatment (Apollon 122). 
Otherwise, the deliberate withdrawal from the Symbolic Order would entail 
developmental regression, manifest in the use of fragmented, disordered language: 
‘Dieser [Sprachzerfall] zeigt sich als Delirium, Wahn, Konkretismus, Halluzinationen, 
                                                 
19 Lacan in this context launches the technical term of “foreclosure”, which Slavoy Žižek defines as ‘[...] 
exclusion of a certain key signifier [...] from the symbolic order, which trigger[s] the psychotic process’ 
(205). 
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oder in Form abgebrochener Sätze’ (Widmer 127)20. Likewise, Kristeva refers to the 
cases of borderline patients, whose disintegrated language purposely eludes order and 
logic, with the prospect of repulsing the Law of the Father. This surfaces in a retreat into 
the pre-Mirror Stage, and eventually, by ‘[…] echoing infantile discourse’ (Barzilai 
Lacan 238), amounts to psychological deterioration wherein the individual remains 
frozen in a childlike state. To sum this up, the subject reluctant to enter the Symbolic 
Order finds itself caught between the devil and the deep blue sea; having to choose 
between two mechanisms of rejection: either becoming a psychotic or regaining 
freedom and unity in death (Hopf 60). This last supposition applies especially to 
Ophelia, whose only hope to escape the order that has driven her into madness is death. 
The dissolution of life within the Real constitutes, however, the hope of all heroines, 
except for Wolf-Alice, probably. 
Now that the Lacanian agenda has been presented in apt detail, the last point of 
this theoretical introduction shall be concerned with Julia Kristeva’s notions of semiotic 
vs. symbolic, an adaptation of the Lacanian distinction between Imaginary and 
Symbolic Order, and the semiotic chôra. Kristeva’s concepts and suppositions deserve 
mentioning in so far as they provide an additional methodological tool needed for 
analysing the primary material. Her semiotic chôra can be understood as exactly the 
space wherein the female opposition that is already hinted to on the titular page is 
carried out. Furthermore, semiotic and symbolic can be claimed to latently show up in 
the stories, paintings and the poem to be considered, as well as the different aspects of 
language they denote that surface on the linguistic level. 
 
2.5. Kristeva’s Semiotic Chôra as Space of Opposition 
Julia Kristeva’s concepts of semiotic and symbolic assume a crucial function within the 
analyses to be carried out in the practical part, as they denote the very oppositional 
realms that tales like “Eleonora” or poems like “The Lady of Shalott” are built upon. 
Those realms inform the texts with meaning, bleed into one another and, to some extent, 
lead the characters to take the steps they do. This is why I feel the need to provide a 
thoroughly researched elaboration of Kristeva’s semiotic chôra and her relation towards 
the Lacanian legacy, as well as her adaptations and appropriations of Lacanian notions 
                                                 
20 ‘This [decline of language] manifests itself as delirium, delusion, [Konkretismus], hallucinations, or in 
the form of broken sentences’ (my translation). 
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that need to be outlined first. It would indeed appear unfeasible to elaborate on 
Kristeva’s work without previously mentioning Lacanian theory; to which secondary 
literature unsubtly testifies. This admittedly twisted relationship has already been 
extensively discussed within the academic field; among numerous other scholars, Toril 
Moi emphasizes the heavy commitment of French feminism to Lacanian theory 
(Politics 99). Anna Babka somewhat extends this by hinting to the fact that Kristeva 
borrows not only from Jacques Lacan, but also reflects and benefits from the work of 
Derrida, Hegel and Freud, especially as regards the development of subject positions in 
connection with language (204). Teresa De Lauretis connects the names of both 
scholars only in parenthesis as she discusses “Desire in Narrative”, but still sees Lacan’s 
Imaginary and Kristeva’s semiotic as inextricably linked within the practice of language 
(149). Mary Eagleton most explicitly comments upon the interrelation of the afore 
mentioned concepts, implying that Lacanian theory sows the seeds for the development 
of Kristeva’s “semiotic” (Intro 15).   
 By now it should have become clear that Julia Kristeva is heavily indebted to 
Jacques Lacan, yet, as Bettina Schmitz points out, it needs to be remarked that she 
appropriates and modifies his concepts for her own purposes, endowing them with her 
‘[…] specific tenor […]’ (70). Her notion of the semiotic can be said to be 
corresponding to the Lacanian Imaginary, being a feminine space dominated by fluidity 
and sensory impressions21. To be more concrete, the semiotic resists explicit labeling 
and orderly structures in so far as it ‘[…] comprises structures that are still provisional 
and ambivalent’ (Schmitz 74) and therefore cannot be assigned concrete qualities. Being 
ruled rather by bodily drives22 and emotions, the semiotic can be linked with the pre-
Oedipal realm anterior to paternal language (Moi Politics 161) and in this respect 
assumes traits Lacan accords the Imaginary. Its greatest strength – and consequently its 
greatest potential for subversion – obviously grounds in the fact that the semiotic ‘[…] 
knows no sexual difference […]’ which triggers ‘[…] a weakening of traditional gender 
divisions […]’ (Moi Politics 165). Therefore, the semiotic can be claimed to carry 
faintly subversive notions as it is both ‘[…] plenitous and powerful, sensual and 
disruptive […]’ as well as a constant ‘[…] source of voluptuous energy’, notions that 
                                                 
21 Comp. ‘[…] drive charges, energy flows, affect pulses […]‘ (Margaroni 85) 
22 ‘[…] the basic pulsions of which Kristeva sees as predominantly anal and oral […]‘ (Moi Politics 161) 
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are placed against the paternal law within a discourse anterior to the harrowing 
separation of mother and child (Müller 25). 
If, as evidence allows, the semiotic can be viewed as an equivalent of the 
Imaginary, Lacan’s Symbolic Order can be seen as corresponding to Kristeva’s 
symbolic, which she associates with a space of ‘[…] authority, order, fathers, repression 
and control […]’ where the ‘[…] self is fixed and unified […]’ (Barry 123). Another 
way to put it would be to claim that the symbolic embraces just the notions of 
patriarchal order that seem to be irrevocably imprinted on Lacan’s Symbolic Order. As 
a matter of fact, Imaginary and Symbolic Order exist in a state of continuous mutual 
interaction, which holds true for Kristeva’s semiotic and symbolic just as well. 
Although existing prior to language, the semiotic necessarily prefigures linguistic signs 
that are generated within the symbolic, in so far as the ‘[…] semiotic drives […] initiate 
the constitution of meaning […]’ (Schmitz 75). It has already been mentioned that the 
structures of the semiotic are still provisional and forever fluid; nonetheless, they can be 
considered indispensable for the foundation of language meant to take place across the 
thetic barrier. Thus it can be maintained that semiotic and symbolic are interwoven into 
a non-hierarchically determined dialectical relationship wherein one party complements, 
depends upon and ceaselessly floats into the other (Schmitz 75). Peter Barry proposes a 
comparison with conscious and unconscious, on which he elaborates in the following 
manner: 
The symbolic is the orderly surface realm of strict distinctions and laid-down 
structures through which language works […] But ever-present is the linguistic 
‘unconscious’, a realm of floating signifiers, random connections, 
improvisations, accidents, and ‘slippage’ […]’ 123-24. 
 
Taking Barry’s analogy as a starting point, it seems only justifiable that on an overall 
level, Kristeva defines symbolic and semiotic not as ‘[…] different kinds of language, 
but [as] two different aspects of language […]’ (Barry 123), connecting them with the 
orderly structures of prose and the elusive, slipping qualities of poetry respectively. 
Within texts, the semiotic components may be claimed to surface as contradictions, 
gaps, disruptions or absences, which will be subjected to closer scrutiny in the practical 
part (Müller 25). 
The last theoretical concept that shall be outlined before closing the theoretical 
section concerns the notion of Kristeva’s semiotic chôra, a “master term” in both 
contemporary French philosophy and Kristeva’s work in particular (Grosz Space 112). I 
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hold it to be absolutely necessary to include the concept of the chôra into the theoretical 
chapter as the chôra constitutes the very space from where heroines like Eleonora or 
Wolf-Alice draw their inspiration and subversive powers. Taking on different shapes, 
like the home wherein the little Morella is enclosed, or the tower that serves as the 
Lady’s home and prison, the chôra in my thesis can probably be best understood as the 
space where female opposition can thrive and be – if possible at all – enacted. 
Basically, the chôra is conceived of as an elusive, maternally connoted space of 
opposition, wherein the subject is free to move, thereby gathering the potential to 
disrupt and subvert the Symbolic Order. Rather than perceiving the chôra as a space or 
notion, one could speak of a subject-object and space-time continuum (Babka 205), 
which seems to be more in line with Kristeva’s understanding of the term. So as to shed 
more light on the expression “chôra”, the etymology needs to be considered as well. 
Kristeva refers back to Plato, who in Timaion employs the term chôra, partly keeping its 
original meaning “womb”23. In an extensive article on the Platonic chôra and its 
adaptations, Thomas Rickert notes that in classical antiquity, the term “chôra” was used 
to denote space and place synonymously (254). Whereas this explanation sounds fairly 
concrete, it is infinitely harder to define Plato’s appropriation of the term. Probably the 
statement that the chôra cannot be satisfactorily defined, that it resists labeling and 
materiality – and exactly for this reason, eludes any attempt of naming via language – 
comes closest to what both Plato and Kristeva might have had in mind24. Having no 
shape or matter itself, the chôra cannot be confined by any determinate qualities 
available within the verbal realm (Rickert 256). Rather than allotting material traits to 
the chôra, one could concentrate on what it does, which Grosz understands as ‘[…] to 
hold, nurture, bring into the world […] Not to procreate or produce – this is the function 
of the father […] but to nurse, to support, surround, protect, incubate […]’ (Space 115). 
Any eager efforts of Rickert to provide something of a definition still leaves us on shaky 
ground25, which is why Plato’s understanding of the chôra needs to be abandoned for 
                                                 
23 ‘Welche Bedeutung ist ihr ihrem Wesen nach beizulegen? Am ehesten die folgende: dass sie alles 
Werden in sich aufnimmt wie eine Amme‘ (Platon Timaios 87). 
24 ‘Sie muss man immer als dasselbe bezeichnen, denn sie tritt unter keinen Umständen aus ihrem eigenen 
Wesen heraus, nimmt sie doch immer die Gesamtheit der Dinge in sich auf, und [...] sie nimmt niemals 
irgendwie und irgendwo eine Gestalt an, die einer der hereinkommenden Dinge ähnelt […]‘ (Platon 
Timaios 91); ‘Deshalb ist es notwendig, dass dasjenige, was alle Formen in sich aufnehmen soll, frei von 
allen Bestimmungen sein muss [...]’ (Platon Timaios 93). 
25 ‘Indeed, chôra’s nonplace frames the gap sundering the Forms from the physical world as well as 
providing passage between them’ (Rickert 258, emphasis in the original), ‘[...] there remains something 
elusive about the chôra, something about it that resists determination [...] the chôra also recedes, 
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now, allowing for Kristeva’s chôra to be introduced. Seeking to negotiate the aporia 
concerning the chôra in an attempt to transform its potential into a possibly 
interpretative tool, Kristeva views the chôra as  
[…] a preverbal realm prior to and distinct from the symbolic realm, one that is 
subversive of the symbolic’s masculine, overly rational character […] The 
semiotic chôra includes emotions, sensations, and other marks and traces of 
psychical and material experience. Rickert 260-61. 
 
Offering up a possible, yet probably slightly Utopian alternative to phallogocentrism, 
Kristeva proposes a feasible way of connecting the subject with the body, especially as 
regards the maternal body. Thus, the chôra does take on some qualities that appear to be 
feminine, sometimes even faintly motherly26 - in so far as the chôra precedes language 
and the father (Kristeva Desire 133). Although dismissing materially existing labels, it 
seems that Kristeva attempts to shed light upon the mystery invoked by Plato; though 
formless and intangible, her chôra is referred to as being transverbal and transhistorical 
(Margaroni 84), which indeed conjures up the impression of a space-time continuum 
mentioned earlier. Furthermore, Kristeva highlights three qualities the chôra embodies: 
motility, errancy, and transfer. This in-betweenness is what moves Kristeva to associate 
the chôra with femininity, which constitutes one of the greatest problems ascribed to the 
chôra. Butler raises the well-founded question whether the maternal body Kristeva 
obviously has in mind is ultimately to be revealed as another patriarchal construction 
(Gender 93)27. As a counterargument, Kristeva openly states that she flatly refuses to 
reduce the maternal body to biological reproduction28 and that it is indeed a socialized 
body she links with the chôra (Margaroni 95). Still, the chôra remains one of Kristeva’s 
most problematic notions, retaining a smack of a romanticized, mystically feminine 
realm ultimately founded on a Utopian enterprise (Margaroni 79). Derrida especially 
finds fault with the feminine connection – associated with qualities such as nursing, 
passivity and virginity – supposing that such an assumption would adumbrate an 
anthropomorphic character, thus specifying exactly that which cannot (and, as is 
                                                                                                                                               
declining to leave its imprint on things just as it declines to take on the qualities of the things it receives’ 
(Rickert 259, emphasis in the original). 
26 Derrida regards the chôra – or khora, as he wishes to call it – as ‘[…] matrix, mother, receptacle, nurse 
[…]‘, all of which can conventionally be understood as female traits (Rickert 264). 
27 ‘[…] what passes as “maternal instinct“ may well be a culturally constructed desire which is interpreted 
through a naturalistic vocabulary’ (Butler Gender 91). 
28 Notwithstanding her use of the term “pre-Oedipal mother“, Kristeva holds this figure as one 
encompassing both masculinity and femininity (Moi Politics 165). 
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repeatedly stated, should not) be grasped. However, Kristeva cannot be blamed for this, 
since it is already in Plato’s text that the chôra is thought of as “receptacle” and “nurse”, 
which are indeed both sexually coded terms (Derrida 23). 
 In order to stress the enduring importance of Kristeva’s work for both theory and 
this thesis, this section shall be closed with a quotation by Toril Moi: 
The criticisms leveled […] against Kristeva’s politics should not be allowed to 
overshadow the positive aspects of her work. Her commitment to thorough 
theoretical investigation of the problems of marginality and subversion, her 
radical deconstruction of the identity of the subject […] have opened up new 
perspectives for further feminist enquiry’ Politics 172. 
 
It is precisely this “feminist enquiry”, this opportunity to assess both verbal and visual 
texts from a psychoanalytical, feminist angle with special focus on the semiotic chôra, 
that is meant to be carried out in the main part of this thesis. This kind of enquiry allows 
me to assess canonical texts, such as Shakespeare’s Hamlet from a very specific angle 
that foregrounds those aspects that have been previously neglected, but that are of 
singular importance to the task I have set myself. Amongst others, hidden facets such as 
Ophelia’s use of language or her resistance on a socio-linguistic level may be placed at 
the center of attention, allowing for a somewhat distinct interpretation or outcome. By 
focusing on details that possibly have already been mentioned by scholars, but not 
further elaborated upon, a much closer or indeed individual analysis may be carried out. 
Also, giving prominence to seemingly supplementary details provides the means to shed 
light on aspects of Lacanian psychoanalysis, such as discovering the moment of the 
crossing of the thetic barrier in a painting. To detect and analyze tiny gaps and fissures 
or contradictions within texts may as well lead to new detections concerning the 
relationship between the sexes, woman’s submission to man, and further allows asking 
for possible reasons. Ambiguously received and complex concepts such as Kristeva’s 
chôra undoubtedly need to be incorporated into my theory part, as I find that notions 
such as these serve to illuminate those questions I have set myself at the beginning. 
Indeed I now hope to answer, or provide possible answers for the following questions: 
How does female resistance manifest itself in texts taken from various ages and genres? 
How can psychoanalytical stages of development be captured within a picture? What 
means do authors need in order to capture that which cannot be labeled? How are 
ambiguous notions of gender roles and relationships intertwined into texts? 
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3. Saint and Sinner, Angel and Whore – Antithetical Conceptions of 
Femininity in Edgar Allan Poe’s “Eleonora” and “Morella”  
 
For one thing, readers of Poe will have almost certainly noticed that the universally 
acknowledged topoi of beauty, death and obsession run through his stories like a red 
thread29. Basically, the preponderance of his female heroines can be said to emerge 
from the so-called ‘[…] Poe-canon of idealized femininity: frail, consumptive and 
doomed to die young, or already an embalmed corpse on show on a secret catafalque for 
the mad, deeply devoted poet’s worship only’ (Müller 67)30. Furthermore, a 
predominantly structuralist arrangement can be quite safely assumed to govern his tales 
and poems; an organization that all too often presupposes natural connections between 
woman, nature and poetry and man, culture and prose, respectively. In this respect, the 
distinction of Imaginary and Symbolic Order, or semiotic and symbolic is introduced; 
the basis of all oppositions whereon the narrative is fleshed out. The problem of such 
allegedly natural or inborn differences creating a mythical gap between men and women 
is encountered quite frequently in other poems and stories I am going to elaborate on. 
Especially a quite stable division between semiotic and symbolic realms, which seem to 
be conflated with men and women, appears to form the backbone of my texts. In order 
to fully grasp the weight attached to the concept of dichotomies within the realm of 
cultural studies – and to enhance a profound understanding of the analyses I am going to 
forward in this and the following chapters – it seems indispensable to trace the origin of 
dualities back to the analysis of myths expounded by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-
Strauss. Lévi-Strauss issued the claim that each text – regardless of its cultural, 
geographical or temporal context – could be subjected to scrutiny with the particular 
aim of detecting ‘[…] repeated motifs and contrasts […]’ as well as ‘[…] dyadic pairs 
[…] of symbolic, thematic, and archetypal resonance […]’ (Barry 45). Lévi-Strauss 
further defined the dyadic pairs and figured out certain characteristics: ‘La plus 
importante est que les individus se définissent, les uns par rapport aux autres, 
                                                 
29 Kennedy sees Poe’s fascination with death and beauty as grounding in the conjunction of the most ‘[...] 
essential elements of desire: irresistible loveliness and the impossibility of its preservation or recovery 
(67). Furthermore, he identifies a latent repetition compulsion in Poe’s works as the story of the dying 
maiden could never be finished for good: ‘[…] it could only be rewritten, over and over, obsessively, like 
the repetition of some hideous drama of revivification’ (Kennedy 88). 
30 Indeed, Poe was heavily criticised for his poetical alignment of beauty and death, as this correlation 
suggested a state of complete passivity to be occupied by the woman, which led to accusations of 
misogyny (Bronfen 89).  
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essentiellement, d’après leur appartenance ou leur non-appartenance à la meme moitié’ 
(Lévi-Strauss Parenté 83)31. Having clarified that the halves of the pairs could only be 
understood in relation to one another, he also proved their inequality. Both halves are 
invested with certain values, which is taken for granted until it is forgotten that these 
constructions were man-made and not God-given. Thus what initially constituted an 
arbitrary allocation of characteristics to the two sexes that ‘[…] situated the individual 
within the poles of nature and culture, self and society, sex and sexuality only later 
became a psychological reality, and not the other way around’ (N. Armstrong 13). As 
Lévi-Strauss continues, ‘[d]ans notre système de parenté, […] le terme père a une 
connotation positive en ce qui concerne le sexe, l’âge relative, la generation […]’ 
(Anthropologie 48, emphasis in the original)32. This comes as little surprising; since 
applying this supposition to modern Western societies will surely verify that 
androcentrism is more common than egalitarianism or even gynocentrism (Sheldon 
226). Since it is the man who conventionally sets the standard, the woman finds herself 
mechanically placed within a rigidly pre-established role that allows for nothing but 
defining herself in relation to the man. Furthermore, the woman will encounter the 
impossibility of developing a positively connoted (semantic) space of her own, since 
that is already occupied by the man (Spender 20). This inequity the two sexes find 
themselves encumbered with starts with childhood plays that socialize girls and boys 
into internalizing different roles (Coates 13) and manifests itself most obviously at the 
level of language: the woman ‘[…] must signify that the norm, the positive, does not 
apply […]’, and thus inevitably becomes ‘[…] a lady doctor, a female surgeon, a woman 
lawyer, or else, in less prestigious occupations, a waitress, a stewardess, a majorette’ 
(Spender 20, emphasis in the original). These linguistically marked forms conjure up the 
impression that it is “natural” or God-given that the man assumes the unmarked form, 
‘[…] that the world is male unless proven otherwise’ (Spender 20), and that hence 
women are ‘[…] trespassing on male territory’ (Reddington 244). Eventually, this 
unsubtle claim can be traced back to Virginia Woolf, who already pointed to the 
inextricable link between gender and the use of language (77). Another instance that 
testifies to the phenomenon of accepting man as the norm can be found within Freudian 
                                                 
31 ‘Essentially, individuals define themselves, the ones in relations to others, by their sense of belonging, 
or not-belonging to the same half’(my translation).  
32 ‘In our system of relationships, the term father has a positive connotation concerning sex, age, and 
generation’ (my translation).  
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theory which presupposes female sexuality as being the deviant one (Eagleton Intro 
19)33; a motif that shall play a surprisingly weighty role – though appearing as a 
seemingly insignificant detail – in Poe’s “Morella”. Spender elaborates on this problem 
by demonstrating how this asymmetry was further enhanced, claiming that ‘[…] there is 
no name for a sexually healthy female’34; that she truly becomes a devouring, castrating 
monster bereaving the man of his physical and psychical potency. Paradigms that 
accord women either the role of the virgin or the whore seem to have been carried to 
new extremes in 18th and 19th century literature, cultivating the virtue of a woman up to 
a fetish. The woman herself becomes a blank page, readily waiting for pre-fabricated 
roles, all of which are severely adhering to the prevalent hetero-normative discourse, to 
be written on her. Leading “anti-lives” as mere fantasies or projections, literary heroines 
achieve to regain their integrity but in death, where the promise of wholeness, of the 
Lacanian Real, and independence of the male subject, is at last granted to her. Even 
conforming to established roles is unraveled to be illusory – a lesson that Eleonora has 
yet to learn – since men’s demands to women prove to be incompatible with reality.  
The fate of Poe’s heroines is so strictly pinned down that an escape seems 
indeed impossible: either the woman is lifted to the venerable position of a virgin, a 
purely higher being35 (Eleonora), or demonised as the monstrous feminine (Morella), 
luring the hero to his downfall or death. Either way, the woman is set up in a particular 
‘[...] position[...] of meaning, fixe[d] [...] in a certain identification. Represented as [...] 
spectacle-fetish or specular image [...] woman is constituted as the ground of 
representation [...]’ (De Lauretis 15). Probably the most beloved “specular image” that 
man has created for woman can be found in the omnipresent vision of the angel; be it 
‘[...] divine Virgin [...]’, ‘[...] domestic angel [...]’ or a bitter-sweetly alluring 
incorporation of Goethe’s ‘[...] eternal feminine [...]’ (Gilbert and Gubar 20-21). 
                                                 
33 Felman remarks in connection to this dilemma that ‘[f]emale sexuality is thus described as an absence 
(of the masculine presence), as lack, incompleteness, deficiency, envy with respect to the only sexuality 
in which value resides’ (136). 
34 While engagement in extensive sexual intercourse is considered normal for men, the attempt to do the 
same necessarily backfires for women: while sexually active men are ‘virile’ and ‘potent’, sexually active 
women are ‘nymphomaniacs’ or ‘bitches’ (Spender 175). As a reason, Spender posits the deplorable fact 
that ‘[…] women have not been in charge of the language and […] there are no words for sexual 
behaviour which encode the experience from the female perspective’ (178), thereby alluding to the 
impossibility of aculturally and unbiasedly perceiving the differences between the two sexes. 
35 Halliburton’s explanation, ‘[...] the god-figure is presented through the eyes of the lowly. It is 
contemplated, in other words, much as God or an image of God is contemplated by a believer in real life’ 
(137), aptly grasps the extent to which Eleonora is deified by the narrator. She is heaved upon a pedestal 
whereon she can be beheld, but assume no active role. 
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Anyhow, the angel woman seems completely void of agency, leading a life wholly 
dedicated to the welfare of others, neglecting any personal desires for fear of becoming 
a selfish monster. Hers is an ‘[...] anti-story of selfless innocence [...]’ based utterly on 
the paradigm that pleasing her husband in turn may – and indeed, must – please her 
(Gilbert and Gubar 23).  
The supposition on which this chapter shall be built upon is that Eleonora, 
equated with youthful frailty and an almost preternatural femininity, has no place in the 
Symbolic Order due to her rigidly framed role as angel woman, and therefore, as a last 
resort, withdraws from this order via death in order to gain her inner peace and 
salvation. To specify this assumption further, it can also be claimed that Eleonora’s 
poetic beauty cannot be satisfactorily rendered in a predominantly masculine literature 
boasting of phallogocentric language, and that consequently, Eleonora eludes the text, 
which figuratively represents the Symbolic Order36.  
 
3.1. Woman/Nature/Poetry/Semiotic, Man/Culture/Prose/Symbolic 
That Eleonora ‘[...] resists being defined by means of words [...]’ (Lopes 41) – words 
adhering to a pervasively paternal language – surfaces in the narrator’s falling back 
upon poetic language when describing his beloved. It appears strikingly bewildering 
that though Eleonora’s beauty is worthy of immeasurable praise, she is yet never 
suitably described; her portrait is composed of partial features that the reader may 
assemble in his mind. Paying minute attention to facial features, Poe ‘[…] relies heavily 
on sensory imagery […] particularly sound, sight, touch and smell’ (Fletcher 113) so as 
to transmit an idea of Eleonora’s otherworldly flair. Even more so, a ‘[…] semantic 
similarity […]’ (Stankiewicz 72) between Eleonora’s facial features – traits to which 
Poe dedicated particular attention (Bland Crowder 181) – and natural phenomena seems 
to be presupposed on the behalf of the narrator. Reiterating that her beauty is unearthly 
and ungraspable, Poe implies that Eleonora ‘[…] stands for “the Idea of Beauty”, the 
mediatory principle through which the divine is known to men […]’ (Wilbur 139). She 
is therefore not an ordinarily attractive human being, but an essence coming from the 
world of Ideas, reminding the hero’s soul of ‘[…] its first condition’ (Wilbur 139). As 
prosaic language apparently does not do justice, Poe resorts to poetic language, the only 
                                                 
36 Elisabete Lopes proposes this argument in an article about Poe’s allegedly unrivalled “Ligeia”, whose 
uncanniness and beauty escapes any attempt of verbal representation. This hypothesis can as well be 
applied to Eleonora, as shall be proven in this chapter.  
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mode wherein the female can be aptly represented37. The comparisons between the 
blatantly feminized landscape and Eleonora’s facial features function like a verse refrain 
in the tale (Wilbur 141). Not surprisingly, the conventional association 
woman/nature/poetry and man/culture/prose is upheld and runs like a red thread through 
the tale. Actually, this might account for why Eleonora cannot break free from her 
overly narrow-minded angel-of-the-house-role; the dichotomies are so strictly 
established that the threshold cannot possibly be crossed. Being so strongly associated 
with the landscape, Eleonora’s body becomes the site where nature and femininity 
inescapably conflate38; so that ultimately no other option than to fade from the text and 
to merge with the natural world is left for her.  
The first so-called “refrain” tells the reader that ‘[f]rom the dim regions beyond 
the mountains at the upper end of our encircled domain, there crept out a narrow and 
deep river, brighter than all save the eyes of Eleonora […]’ (Poe Eleonora 224), 
immediately conjuring up Cixous’ proposition of water as the incarnation of femininity. 
The woman becomes an absence, an object of study, a geographical map ready to be 
interpreted. The narrator is unable to enter, to possess this country – Eleonora’s body – 
and therefore seeks to describe it in analytic, rationalistic terms. His attempt of grasping 
and, as a consequence, of transfixing Eleonora in time is structured into a voyeuristic 
description, which intends a “natural” link between the winding river and the gentle 
curves of the hips, the outlined arcs of breasts. Whereas the mountains can either be 
seen as instances of phallocentrism or metaphorical breasts, the creeping-out river most 
probably can be linked to bodily fluids, which imply reproduction and birth, thereby 
establishing a maternal connection39. The narrator advances in his raptures, 
proclaiming, ‘[t]heir bark [of fantastic trees] […] was smoother than all save the cheeks 
of Eleonora […]’ (Poe Eleonora 225). The flatteries approach their summit when 
                                                 
37 Poe frequently relies on heightened vocabulary and rhetorical devices like alliteration – “soft sighs” 
(229) – metaphors – “the loveliness of Eleonora was that of the Seraphim” (226) and rhetorical questions 
– “for what was she but a child?” (228) when it comes to describing feminine qualities. 
38 A reason for why the man ascribes nature to the woman may be found in the fact that nature is 
ephemeral and therefore mortal: ‘Natur aber ist sterblich, während der Geist den Naturgesetzen enthoben 
ist, also auch dem Gesetz des Todes’ (Rohde-Dachser 117). Hence, man associates himself with culture, 
spirit and reason, in order to make himself believe he could evade the powers of death. Likewise, Simone 
de Beauvoir has found that ‘[...] woman has been made to represent all of man’s ambivalent feelings 
about his own inability to control his own physical existence, his own birth and death. As the Other, 
woman comes to represent the contingency of life, life that is made to be destroyed’ (Gilbert and Gubar 
34).  
39 Garai labels water a ‘[…] maternal element […]‘ (14) in so far as it is regarded as the origin of life. De 
Vries suggests the likeness to bodily fluids - ‘[…] blood, saliva, semen […]’ (493) – and, in a broader 
sense, the likeness between femininity and fluidity. 
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Eleonora’s traits are deemed superior to those of gods: ‘[…] a lulling melody more 
divine than that of the harp of Aeolus – sweeter than all save the voice of Eleonora’ 
(Poe Eleonora 226). One gains the impression that Eleonora has to passively accept her 
deification, her role and her destiny. Being rigidly placed within a male dominated 
framework, Eleonora cannot possibly gather any subversive potential; the only feasible 
way for her to escape patriarchy is to withdraw into her personal semiotic chôra wherein 
she is shielded from masculine power exertions.  
 When talking about himself, however, the narrator applies a somewhat prosaic 
and sober language: ‘We will say, then, that I am mad’ (Poe Eleonora 223), sounds like 
a straightforward, rationalistic conclusion, both orderly and logical, allowing little room 
for diverse possible interpretations. Secondly, the narrator eagerly attempts to accord his 
life a highly structured frame, introducing a binary configuration to the tale as well as to 
his life: 
I grant, at least, that there are two distinct conditions of my mental existence: the 
condition of a lucid reason – not to be disputed, and belonging to the memory of 
events forming the first epoch of my life – and a condition of shadow and doubt, 
appertaining to the present, and to the recollection of what constitutes the second 
great era of my being. Poe Eleonora 223. 
 
This fairly philosophical elaboration testifies to the eternally patriarchal struggle for 
control and order, a strong desire for assigning explicit labels to whatever might be 
categorized and reasonably grasped.  
 As regards Ermengarde, the tale’s only other female character endowed with a 
proper name, the patterns used to describe Eleonora are as well applicable to her. 
Ermengarde’s arrival observably comprises the narrative’s turning point. Straying from 
descriptions of the city, the strange, albeit undoubtedly masculine realm the narrator 
finds himself in, and dreamy recollections of his beloved Eleonora, the narrator 
unexpectedly reports,  
‘Suddenly these manifestations they ceased, and the world grew dark before 
mine eyes, and I stood aghast at the burning thoughts which possessed, at the 
terrible temptations which beset me; for there came from some far, far distant 
and unknown land […] a maiden to whose beauty my whole recreant heart 
yielded at once […]’ Poe Eleonora 230. 
 
This chillingly lyrical statement exhibits both archaisms (“mine eyes”) and rhetorical 
devices like alliteration (“terrible temptations”) and anaphora (“and the world […] and I 
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stood” (emphasis mine)). Furthermore, the “and” inducing the sentences is reminiscent 
of Biblical language (Wilbur 141). Both antiquated language and poetic conventions 
evoke connotations of some higher truth that surpasses the hero’s understanding. Thus it 
seems only logical that Ermengarde must come from some place detached from the 
everyday world the hero is part of. Woman is hence rendered man’s other, inhabiting an 
unspecified realm evading patriarchally informed (geographical) labels. 
 
3.2. The Angel of Death 
Assessing the tale from a psychoanalytical angle informed by Lacanian structures in this 
second subchapter, one may assert an equation between the Valley of the Many-
Coloured Grass and the Imaginary. The naively blissful time spent in the valley – ‘Hand 
in hand about this valley, for fifteen years, roamed I with Eleonora […]’ (Poe Eleonora 
225) evokes images of youthful happiness sprinkled with playful elements, where the 
boundaries between self and other are still blurred, allowing for ideal identification to 
take place. The passage further testifies to an innocent union with nature, no hints about 
sexual love are given. The pre-oedipal momentum determining this stage is witnessed as 
Eleonora’s mother is mentioned: ‘Thus it was that we lived all alone, knowing nothing 
of the world without the valley – I, my cousin, and her mother’ (Poe Eleonora 224). 
Imaginary traces protrude in so far as Eleonora’s mother is insignificant for the 
narrative’s further development; notably, she is not even given a proper name, but only 
referred to as “mother”, the term which encapsulates both her social role and her 
biological function. This prelapsarian inexperience – knowing nothing of the outside 
world – reminds one of the infant whose worldview depends upon presence or absence 
of the mother. After this statement, the mother indeed becomes an absence, since she is 
mentioned no more. Actually, one is tempted to speculate about the disturbingly odd 
fate of this enigmatic character. Does she stay in the valley? If so, we might legitimately 
ask why she does not mourn her daughter’s death; or, if she dies before Eleonora, why 
this deserves no mentioning at all. Indeed it appears as if she would dwindle away, no 
longer deemed important for the further progress of the narrative. 
 ‘A change fell upon all things’ (Poe Eleonora 226) hails the arrival of the Mirror 
Stage in the valley. The moment meant to change everything for good occurs when the 
couple sits beneath the trees – thus, the scene can be claimed to be dominated by the 
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phallic power40 – looking peacefully and tightly embraced at its reflection in the river. 
Regarding their own images, they draw ‘[…] the God Eros from that wave […]’ (Poe 
Eleonora 226), which suggests that they are engaged in autoerotic contemplation. In this 
flash of self-recognition, the subject positions of the couple as lover and beloved take on 
shape (Fink 122). At the same time, this scene subtly alludes to the myth of Narcissus 
who fell in love with his own image and therefore rejected the love of the nymph 
Echo41. Further developing this hypothesis, one could then ask whether the 
contemplation of the mirror-imago in effect disguises an unconscious death wish. Is 
Eleonora already aware of the fact that she, as a girl, will never be able to leave the 
Valley of the Many-Coloured Grass, and thus willingly chooses death, rather than 
endure a psychotically static existence in the valley? Truly, the image of the happy 
couple mirrored in the river proves to be a fallacy. 
 The third stage irretrievably arrives after Eleonora’s death. Nature becomes 
uncanny, as if mourning the severed ties to Eleonora: ‘[…] there sprang up […] dark, 
eye-like violets, that writhed uneasily […]’ (Poe Eleonora 228). These violets hint to 
the Gothic atmosphere42 typical for Poe; the violets seem to haunt the narrator with their 
watchful eyes, “writhing” as if in great pain, “uneasily”, since salvation is beyond reach. 
Utterly submerged in melancholy, a feeling Elisabeth Bronfen links to the inability of 
accepting the death of a beloved person and the negation of loss (97), the protagonist 
seemingly has to sever with the valley reminiscent of Eleonora. Unable to live with his 
memories, to cope with the desire that cannot be fulfilled, the protagonist leaves the 
valley for good in order to live in the city, at the ‘[…] gay court of a king […]’ (Poe 
Eleonora 230), which could be considered as a microcosm reflecting a patriarchally 
hierarchical order. Also the ‘[…] mad clangour of arms […]’ (Poe Eleonora 230) 
evokes associations of a male dominated realm due to its traditional connections to 
                                                 
40 The scene wherein the innocently childish affection transforms into sexual love has attracted quite a lot 
of attention among scholars. While D.H. Lawrence dismisses the imagery as bearing little authenticity 
(‘The symbolism of Poe’s parables is easy, too easy, almost mechanical.’ (97)), Woodberry praises 
precisely this straightforwardness: ‘[…] symbolism has seldom been more simple and pure […] more 
absolute master of the things of sense for the things of spirit than in this unreal scene’ (qtd. in Poe 
Eleonora Collected Works 635). 
41 Narcissus indeed anticipates his fate – which is to be death – when proclaiming: ‘Ante […] emoriar, 
quam sit tibi copia nostri!’ (Ovid 391). 
42 ‘Die Landschaft tritt hier selbst ganz an die Stelle der Seele, sie wird ihr eigenster Ausdruck. Aus dem 
Zusammenklang von Landschaft und Gemütsstimmung wird geradezu ein Gleichklang‘ (Wolff 23). 
Likewise, Pease talks about an […] air of pastness […]‘ (187) that seems equally suitable in this context.  
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army and war. Perceptibly, the Imaginary bleeds into the Symbolic, as the narrator 
confirms ‘[…] the radiant loveliness of women […]’ (Poe Eleonora 230) in the city. 
 With respect to the current state of affairs, it appears that Eleonora has submitted 
to her fate, which had been revealed to her by some unknown entity: ‘[s]he had seen 
that the finger of Death was upon her bosom […]’ (Poe Eleonora 227). She seems to 
have resigned, withdrawn from representation into a realm just as indefinably 
mysterious as her own person.  
Rethinking the highly restrictively patterned role of the angel woman, one is 
indeed enticed to conclude that there might have been no other choice, that death was 
designated in the poorly developed script of her life from the beginning. As Gilbert and 
Gubar have rightly and necessarily deduced as regards the role of the domestic angel, a 
woman without prospects, without agency, without occupations or own will is already 
dead. However desirably stylised the angel’s excessively lauded self-surrender might 
have been, ‘[…] to be selfless is not only to be noble, it is to be dead’ (25). Re-assessing 
Eleonora’s role within the Valley of the Many-Coloured Grass, and further, within the 
tale, there seems to reside at least some truth in that statement, as her life, her “anti-
story” in truth constituted nothing more than ‘[…] a life of death, a death-in-life’ 
(Gilbert and Gubar 25). Considering this fact, Eleonora’s begging uttered prior to her 
death acquires to a certain extent a wholly new meaning: ‘She grieved to think that, 
having entombed her in the Valley of the Many-Coloured Grass, I would quit for ever 
its happy recesses […]’ (Poe Eleonora 227, emphasis mine). Surely, what Eleonora 
fears is a betrayal on her lover’s part after her death; what the plea really amounts to, 
however, is that she has been dead and “entombed” all along, that she has, quite frankly, 
endured a ‘[…] posthumous existence in her own lifetime’ (Gilbert and Gubar 25). 
Reframing the angel of the house as an angel of death, Gilbert and Gubar quote Welsh 
saying that ‘[…] the power of an angel to save implies, even while it denies, the power 
of death’ (26). As I do not wish to leave this crucial statement speculating about the 
inextricably connected powers of life and death unnoticed, it shall be figuratively taken 
up in the next chapter, at the heart of which the ambiguity of death – is it truly a defeat 
or merely a retreat? – lies. The question, then, shall revolve around such arcane 
conjectures as the very nature of Eleonora’s “powers of death”.  
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3.3. The Sweet Heroine and the Vicious Bitch43 
Given Eleonora’s exceedingly normative role as sweet, modest and submissive, and – as 
will follow – Morella’s wicked, unruly behaviour ‘[...] as a source of horror and 
disruption threaten[ing] the symbolic order, generating chaos and catastrophe, mayhem, 
madness, and murder’ (Seet 145); suspicions as to the antithetical conception underlying 
Poe’s heroines can be fairly certainly confirmed. Eleonora as angel has access to 
ghostly, even deathly powers – a supremacy she uses for the good – which are exactly 
the same powers that are deliberately and more fully exploited by her uncanny sister, 
the monster-woman, ‘[…] a magical creature of the lower world […] threatening to 
replace her angelic sister […]’ (Gilbert and Gubar 28). Indeed it can be safely claimed 
that self-assertive Morella seems to challenge all that which Eleonora stands for. 
Completely immersed in the attempt to measure up to her lover’s picture of 
herself, Eleonora is utterly absorbed by the role she has been allotted. Morella on the 
other hand categorically refuses to merge with the part of the submissive, handsome 
angel of the house, only at the expense of becoming the other extreme, the female 
uncanny. To a certain extent, Eleonora and Morella can be viewed as antagonists, 
Eleonora impersonating the powers of love44, while Morella is suggested to be a 
metaphysical incarnation of Death itself. Furthermore, when paying closer attention to 
the constructions of femininity prevailing in the texts, it can be claimed that Eleonora in 
typological terms represents the ‘[c]lassical body which is monumental, static, closed, 
and sleek […]’ (Russo 63), while Morella’s genotypic features unmistakably evoke 
associations of the grotesque body. Bearing resemblances to this type, her body ‘[…] is 
open, permeable, and ambiguously gendered’ (N. Armstrong 183), which ultimately 
allows for a terrifying, “unhappy” ending. Morella deliberately withdraws from being 
placed within a paternally constructed scheme; she ‘[…] resist[s] confinement in that 
symbolic space by disturbing it, perverting it, making trouble, seeking to exceed the 
boundary […]’ (De Lauretis 139), which on the one hand endows her with subversive 
power, but on the other hand prepares for her death, since refusing a role can be read as 
tantamount to refusing to live in the Symbolic Order. The following chapter shall chase 
this supposition through Poe’s tale, proving that the disturbance Morella enacts exposes 
                                                 
43 This heading feeds upon Gilbert and Gubar’s assertion that ‘[...] throughout most male literature, a 
sweet heroine inside the house (like Honoria) is opposed to a vicious bitch outside’ (29).  
44 ‘In “Eleanora“ [sic], Poe implies that the new love, Ermengarde, is a reincarnation of the dead wife; the 
spirit of Eros, too, is immortal upon the earth‘ (Gargano 263). 
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her as a potential threat to male authority, which in turn casts her into the role of the 
monstrous-feminine and constructs her as the abject body. 
From the beginning it is plainly stated that attraction, but not love, ties the 
narrator to his wife Morella: ‘With a feeling of deep yet most singular affection I 
regarded my friend Morella […] my soul […] burned with fires it had never before 
known; but the fires were not of Eros […]’ (Poe Morella 39). In the same instant, the 
element of the uncanny comes into play; her mental powers are immense, as is the scope 
of her knowledge she irresistibly dazzles and captivates her husband with. Indeed, 
Morella seems to boast an immeasurable wisdom, but possesses none of Eleonora’s 
angelic features. Her cold hand, the ‘[…] unearthly tones […]’ issuing from her lips 
when she would ‘[…] rake up from the ashes of a dead philosophy some low, singular 
words […]’ (Poe Morella 40) lend her a ‘[…] halo of uncanniness’ (Lopes 41) that the 
narrator both fears and desires to decipher. The traditionally unfeminine traits – like the 
low voice – his wife exhibits to an ever greater degree make the narrator grow pale and 
shudder. Morella’s mysterious aura increases, until her husband seems to be completely 
under her spell. Lopes aptly suggests that ‘[m]etonymically, she becomes the text that 
the narrator cannot read nor grasp its meaning […]’ (46). Inevitably, a reversal of roles 
seems to take place; Morella wields the phallic power conventionally designated as 
male, thus drifting still further away from any readily available feminine roles, and 
forcing her husband to give up on his manliness and to completely become her 
phallus45.  
 Even paternal reasoning fails him; any desperate attempt of his to figure her out, 
to categorise and label the being he has married only feeds her already superior 
powers46. Probably the fact that the nature of their relationship remains somewhat 
indeterminate and changing – first, the narrator acknowledges having become her pupil 
and thus having implicitly agreed on a submissive role; then, he watches his wife with 
mounting horror and torment, secretly wishing for her death – proves to be nail in both 
their coffins. In order to regain his manliness, Poe’s protagonist falls back upon 
prefabricated constructions, or rather, myths, of femininity so as to be able to conceive 
of his wife in conventional terms. Necessarily, he reverts to the prototype of the 
                                                 
45 ‘Identifiziert sich der Mann mit dem Phallus der Frau, wird er zu ihrem Kind und verliert dadurch seine 
Männlichkeit‘ (Widmer 97). 
46 ‘She knows that, in his resistance to her, he tries to use reason to deny an unalterable fact of the 
universe. In effect, she tells him that in his unwillingness to understand the nature of their necessary 
relationship, he paradoxically persecutes himself and falls more completely under her sway’ (Lopes 264). 
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monstrous feminine, that which threatens any systematic patriarchal order due to its 
unconventional and ungraspable nature.  
 
3.4. The Heroine with a Thousand Faces – Versions of Femininity 
In an elaboration on patriarchal myths of femininity, Christa Rohde-Dachser reasonably 
accounts for the necessity of coherently formulated roles that women are inserted into 
by men: ‘Die so konstruierten Weiblichkeitsentwürfe enthalten deshalb mit großer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit das im menschlich-männlichen Universum Abgewehrte, sei es als 
das Verbotene, Verpönte […]’ (99)47. These schemata, founded on indispensable 
irrationality, allow the man to use the woman as a container for all that is unwanted and 
despised by society48. Thus he is able to self-consciously declare what he is not: 
‘Weiblichkeitsmythen haben so auch eine die männliche Geschlechtsidentität stützende 
und das bestehende Geschlechterverhältnis legitimierende Funktion‘ (Rohde-Dachser 
100, emphasis in the original)49. Assuming what woman might represent, ‘[...] makes 
her containable within his imagination (reduced to his size) but also produces her as a 
mystery for him to master and decipher within safe or unthreatening borders [...]’ 
(Grosz Bodies 191). Finally, the protagonist discovers a receptacle for all his fears, 
ethically inappropriate wishes and illegitimate desires. He needs no longer participate in 
the master-slave relationship Morella has introduced, and can renounce the initial 
delight he has taken in the common studying of ‘[...] mystical writings [...]’ (Poe 
Morella 39). Having previously escaped definition, Morella may from now on be 
viewed in the light of the female uncanny, ‘[...] her preternatural traits [...] ascribe her 
the role of the monster’ (Lopes 44). From this point onwards, it can be safely claimed 
that Morella appears as the monstrous feminine: ‘[a]nd thus, joy suddenly faded into 
                                                 
47 ‘These constructed versions of femininity comprise in all probability those characteristics that 
human/man repulses; be it forbidden, or frowned [...]’ (my translation).  
48 Elisabeth Bronfen further elaborates on and tries to account for hegemonic ideas that foresee 
inextricable ties between woman and nature: ‘Eines der prägnantesten Beispiele [...] ist die Gleichsetzung 
der Frau mit Natur, denn als Körper ist die Frau zugleich auch Allegorie für die Gefährlichkeit sexueller 
Lust, unkontrollierbarer Leidenschaft und Spontaneität. Tatsächlich gibt es zwei „Kulturmütter“, von 
denen eine Vielfalt weiblicher Typen abgeleitet ist – die Versucherin Eva und die heilende Jungfrau 
Maria. Diese stehen nicht nur in einem diametralen Gegensatz; beide sind, was noch entscheidender ist, 
Quelle der Kultur, indem sie gleichzeitig mit Aspekten des Todes gleichgesetzt werden und somit auch 
die Grenze und den Endpunkt eben der Kultur bezeichnen, die sie entstehen lassen‘ (100).  
49 ‘Thus, myths of femininity serve to strengthen the male identity and legitimate the prevailing gender 
relations’ (my translation). 
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horror, and the most beautiful became the most hideous, as Hinnôm became Gehenna’50 
(Poe Morella 40). In this terrifyingly Gothic scene, binaries are reversed, that which is 
known and appreciated as familiar becomes alien and uncanny (Russo 33), hence 
aggravating the terror latently intertwined into the story. Comfortable spaces like home 
and hearth provide the very source of terror, a ‘[...] safe and dangerous [...]’ (Russo 36) 
other space, semiotic insofar as meaning is continually slipping and elusive.  
Morella is no longer simply the wife; she becomes the vampire, the witch, the 
woman as monstrous womb, the woman as bleeding wound, the woman as possessed 
body, the castrating mother, the woman as life-in-death51. Whatever the role may be that 
is allotted to her, the resonating overtones are almost always of an archaically sexual 
nature. Firstly, Morella’s immense wisdom and the guidance she enacts over her 
husband as “pupil” are ‘[...] likely to bear an allusion to sexual experience, [...] a 
common trope in many Gothic plots, where the pursuit of knowledge appears strongly 
associated with sexual initiation’ (Lopes 43). As an ancient temptress, ‘[...] other sexual 
behaviors [...]’ reside in her ‘[...] as archaic forms that are both powerless and terrible’ 
(N. Armstrong 183). This may in all probability account for the power she exerts, the 
temptation she radiates, but cannot feasibly be posited as the sole reason for her 
monstrosity. Creed, however, offers a viable explanation for the dangers Morella 
potentially exhibits; her supremacy is said to ground in castration anxiety she is able to 
invoke in the male (intro 2). Indeed, Morella figuratively castrates her husband by 
controlling him psychically, as he shockingly reports, ‘[...] the time had now arrived 
when the mystery of my wife’s manner oppressed me as a spell’, and, later confesses, 
‘[...] I met the glance of her meaning eyes, and then my soul sickened and became giddy 
with the giddiness of one who gazes downward into some dreary and unfathomable 
abyss’ (Poe Morella 41). In order to unravel the source of these male fears, Creed draws 
upon Susan Lurie, who challenges traditional views by claiming that ‘[...] men fear 
women, not because women are castrated but because they are not castrated [...] woman 
is physically whole, intact and in possession of all her sexual powers’ (intro 6).  
                                                 
50 Poe alludes to the myth of the transformation of the “Valley of the Children of Hinnon” into the 
nightmarish “Gehenna”, which ‘[…] is usually now translated H E L L […]’ (Hobbes, 313). 
51 Barbara Creed suggests these archetypal roles women are meant to occupy (apart from the above 
mentioned also the amoral primeval mother, the woman as beautiful but deadly killer, the aged 
psychopath, the monstrous girl-boy, the non-human animal, the woman as the deadly femme castratice) to 
have ‘[...] evolved from images that haunted the dreams, myths and artistic practices of our forebears 
many centuries ago. The female monster, or monstrous-feminine, wears many faces [...]’ (intro 1). 
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As much as the presence of an antagonistic force is necessary for the 
perpetuation of the Symbolic52, it is the same preternatural, truly “monstrous” powers 
that ultimately bar Morella from a safe existence within the Symbolic Order, the 
foundations of which she attempts to shake. Her sickness and especially her pregnancy 
allow her to be casted into the role of the abject, and thus be repelled by her husband 
once and for all. Her exclusion from the Symbolic Order is vital for him in order not to 
lose his position and to secure the hierarchical order Morella-as-abject has managed – at 
least temporarily – to ‘[...] subvert, shock and disorganize [...] from within’ (Berressem 
29). 
Basically, Morella can be classified as abject in so far as she continuously 
disrespects borders53; she is both heavenly and devilish, sublime and uncanny, gentle 
and dangerously authoritative54. This infuriating indeterminacy is conventionally 
allotted to woman’s very nature as both angel and monster; thus, the twin sisters (here 
embodied by Eleonora and Morella) have melted into a single, though incoherent image. 
Morella has not replaced and devoured Eleonora, but literally become one with her: 
‘[...] the monster may not only be concealed behind the angel, she may actually turn out 
to reside within (or in the lower half of) the angel’ (Gilbert and Gubar 29, emphasis in 
the original). Judging by this quote, it is again female sexuality – to be more precise, the 
female genitals – that evoke existential angst in men. Finally this may as well account 
for Eleonora’s angelic halo that has in her ‘[...] alienation from ordinary fleshly life [...]’ 
(Gilbert and Gubar 24) never been dirtied by sexual desires or worse, encounters. 
Morella incessantly oscillates between these above outlined states of being, alternately 
showing one of her many faces, never taking up a secure position; thereby driving her 
husband to the brink of madness. Her metaphorical rebirth as madwoman seems only 
too justified as the constant sexual repression and damnation to half-presences or 
absences women had to endure necessarily had to find an outlet. Progressing from the 
                                                 
52 ‘[...] fiction depended on bringing forth some monstrous woman to punish and then banish from the 
text [...]’ (N. Armstrong 165). 
53 Creed maintains that ‘[…] that which crosses or threatens to cross the ‘border‘ is abject […] the border 
is between the normal and the supernatural, good and evil [...] or the monstrous is produced at the border 
which separates those who take up their proper gender roles from those who do not’ (11). Although her 
analysis refers to gender roles in horror films, the elaboration can as well be applied to Poe’s tale, due to 
its rootedness within the Gothic (horror) genre. 
54 Gargano continuously refers to Morella as a being that fluctuates between diametrically opposed states: 
he calls her ‘[…] an agent of an eternal will‘ (259), a ‘[…] celestial and fatal spirit […]‘ (260), a ‘[…] 
gentle temptress […]‘ (261), ‘[…] both victim and siren […]‘ (264), and finally states that ‘[…] Morella’s 
affiliation with the divine is shown by her willingness to forgive the man who cannot love her’ (264). 
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margins of the socially acceptable, Morella’s fashioning as monster testifies to a loss of 
identity, gender roles and finally to a loss of categories witnessed at the end of the 
poem, which can be interpreted as potentially progressive. 
Secondly, Barbara Creed argues that ‘[...] when woman is represented as 
monstrous it is almost always in relation to her mothering and reproductive functions’ 
(7), which to a certain extent holds true for Morella55. Though her pregnancy does not 
deserve any mentioning until childbirth has taken place, it is this very scene that most 
intensively associates her with the monstrous womb, the primal mother, the very source 
of man’s existential angst. The deathbed scene again witnesses a reversal of binary 
oppositions as the man becomes the passive spectator, reporting Morella’s decay with 
almost pathological interest in minute detail (Lubbers 39). Morella as incarnation of the 
abject body is both grotesque and threatening in that her body has considerably changed 
its shape and thereby disputed the notion of the ‘[...] clean, disciplined body that 
respects borders’ (Gear 322). The horror experienced by the narrator can most 
necessarily be traced back to the act of birth itself, and the bodily fluids that come with 
it, since these phenomena prove to be far beyond his control56. Elizabeth Grosz 
supposes male fears of fluidity as grounding in  
[...] the permeability of the body, its necessary dependence on an outside [...] 
They [bodily fluids] attest to a certain irreducible “dirt” or disgust, a horror of 
the unknown or the unspecifiable that permeates, lurks, lingers, and at times 
leaks out of the body [...] They resist the determination that marks solids, for 
they are without any shape or form of their own [...] Body fluids flow, they seep, 
they infiltrate; their control is a matter of vigilance, never guaranteed. Bodies 
193-94. 
 
In a similar manner, Poe’s narrator is obviously unable to deal with the ‘[...] revulsion 
and curiosity [...]’ (Gear 326) aroused by the sensational transformation; he cannot 
reasonably grasp, let alone explain, what is going on at the moment as the spectacle he 
reluctantly witnesses ‘[...] def[ies] common language; like the abject, [it] exist[s] at the 
place where meaning collapses’ (Gear 326). Morella’s body, particularly in its state of 
                                                 
55 ‘Birthing is perhaps the most terrible abjection of all, as a feminine body produces amid blood and 
amniotic fluid a child connected to its mother via the umbilical cord’ (Kilker 58), a connection as 
unfathomable as irretrievably denied to men and children. Creed elaborates on the hypothesis of why men 
need to dissociate themselves so strongly from the act of birthing: ‘Her [the woman’s] ability to give birth 
links her directly to the animal world and to the great cycle of birth, decay and death. Awareness of his 
links to nature reminds man of his mortality and of the fragility of the symbolic order’ (47).  
56 ‘The womb represents the utmost in abjection for it contains a new life form which will pass from 
inside to outside bringing with it traces of its contamination – blood, afterbirth, faeces’ (Creed 49). 
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pregnancy, latently hints to the “grotesque”, and therefore becomes a ‘[...] central 
source of abjection’ (Creed 49). Putting Morella in the subsidiary position of the abject, 
however, entails the ‘[...] activity of exclusion [...]’ (Creed 9) crucial for ensuring the 
stable perpetuation of the Symbolic Order57. After having given birth to a daughter, that 
is, figuratively having produced a ‘[...] unique blend of fascination and horror’ 
(Braidotti 81, emphasis in the original) that connects the female body to the monster, 
Morella becomes the ‘[...] most sickening of wastes [...] a border that has encroached 
upon everything’ (Kristeva Horror 3), the corpse. Death seems to be the only too logical 
consequence, seen as a punishment for the danger Morella has brought with her. As a 
human being, her powers had been too vast for them to be contained within the 
patriarchal order; as the grotesque or abject body respectively, she could be 
marginalised and finally expelled from the Symbolic Order. In this respect she follows a 
long tradition of metaphorical monsters, ranging from Spenser’s Errour to 
Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth and Swift’s Goddess Criticism that can be traced back to 
the mother of all women and women-monsters, the mythology’s first outlaw and 
outcast, Lilith. What unites all these more or less allegorical women is the fact that it is 
ultimately always the body (particularly the sexed female body) that is tied to 
monstrosity and deformation, an ‘[e]mblem of filthy materiality [...]’ (Gilbert and Gubar 
29); a dream, once become physical, fleshly and real, turning into an abyssal nightmare. 
 
3.5. The Return of the Repressed – Eleonora’s Evasion, Morella’s Migration 
Considering the factum that Hélène Cixous’ interpretation of the Lacanian Imaginary 
understands itself as a feminine space wherein ‘[…] all difference has been abolished’, 
it seems undoubtedly justified to ask whether the death of a female protagonist – be it 
Eleonora, Morella, Ophelia or the Lady – really signifies the complete overpowering of 
woman by an ever victorious, omnipotent patriarchy. Furthermore, Cixous avers that 
water – assuming an exceedingly symbolic character both in Hamlet and “The Lady of 
Shalott” – can be said to signify the ‘[…] feminine element par excellence […]’ for it 
offers the ‘[…] comforting security of the mother’s womb’ (Moi Politics 117, emphasis 
in the original) and thus relates to Lacan’s notion of the unification experienced by 
                                                 
57 ‘While the male body signifies form and integrity, and is clearly differentiated from the world, 
woman’s body possesses none of these characteristics. The mutable nature of women’s bodies is made 
most clear during pregnancy [...] It is woman’s fertilizable body which aligns her with nature and 
threatens the integrity of the patriarchal symbolic order’ (Creed 50). 
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mother and child. Simultaneously to signifying death as a way of melting with the 
primal state and pleasures of the Real, water embodies life and birth, the entrance from 
within the semiotic womb into the symbolic existence as the ‘[…] bursting water sac 
accompanies the birth pang and announces the onset of delivery’ (Seet 149). Thus it 
appears that water forms the backbone of existence, either violently donating or gently 
dissolving life. The rational conclusion of this sketch could then be that death in water 
provides for the regaining of the lost unity with the pre-Oedipal mother and a final 
attainment of the state of the Real. Prior to discussing Shakespeare’s Hamlet or 
Tennyson’s “The Lady of Shalott”, Poe’s tales “Eleonora” and “Morella” shall be 
reverted to. Despite their display of conventional versions of femininity, one may detect 
tiny gaps and contradictions inherent to the stories when applying concepts expounded 
by Lacan and Kristeva as epistemological lenses.  
Having been unable to enter the Symbolic and to secure herself a valid subject 
position therein, Eleonora has withdrawn from this very order into what one could call a 
naturally connoted semiotic realm. Death has not predictably put an end to her 
existence; still, she lets her lover partake of her presence via ‘[...] the sounds of the 
swinging of the censers of the angels […]’, ‘[…] streams of a holy perfume […]’, ‘[…] 
indistinct murmurs […]’ and ‘[…] the pressing of spiritual lips upon [his] own […]’ 
(Poe Eleonora 229). These descriptions of Eleonora’s protectiveness and her vigilant 
visits possibly entice one to reconsider the bonds that, according to Kristeva, link the 
chôra with the maternal body. After all, Eleonora’s visits do convey a strong sense of 
motherly affection directed toward the left lover. As if he could not cope with the loss 
of his beloved and his loneliness, the protagonist’s beloved wants to make sure that 
nothing will harm him; in particular during the dark and shady hours of the night. 
Where exactly Eleonora now resides and how this condition could be imagined 
remains – as befits the semiotic – unspecified. Thus, Eleonora’s supernatural 
elusiveness has increased considerably, she is ‘[…] not an object of passion but the 
angelic spirit whom first he knew […]’ (Wilbur 139). Presumably, Eleonora has moved 
from physical existence into a subject-object-continuum conceived of as one of the 
chôra’s “characteristics”. On the one hand, Eleonora can be said to be her own master 
now – a subject that decides to move between the spheres; yet on the other hand, she is 
still the “object” of her lover’s desire. 
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 Truly, it is the man who benefits most from the current situation, however 
miserable his lot may seem to him. After having been rewarded with nocturnal visits, 
metaphysical manifestations of Eleonora’s anxiously watchful soul, the narrator is able 
to experience the gift of love once again. While Eleonora is no more than a memory, 
Ermengarde appears as a physical, sexed body; and in marrying her, the narrator can 
experience the sexual fulfillment that was denied to him in his previous relationship. 
One could even argue in Freudian terms that the character Ermengarde functions as a 
materialization of the narrator’s repressed sexuality. Beheld from this angle, 
Ermengarde is not a serious, round character, but merely a narrative device providing 
for the hero’s psychical recovery. Anyway, it becomes obvious that he egoistically 
clings to the pleasure principle; seeking joy in wedlock and ignoring the sincere vows 
he had given to his dead love. He attempts to attain satisfaction by giving and taking 
love; furthermore, he seeks to experience happiness through the love of beauty (Freud 
Unbehagen 114). This pursuit of aestheticism may well compensate for his loneliness, 
but does not provide safety against potential sufferings – for instance, he may be 
punished for breaching his oath. However, it is Eleonora who grants a happy ending by 
liberating her lover from the promises given in the Valley of the Many-Coloured Grass. 
Thus one is enticed to conclude that Eleonora has found her inner peace, the fulfillment 
of the long lost pre-oedipal unity in death and is now able to altruistically release her 
beloved. 
 Another interpretation holds that Eleonora’s soul has transmigrated into the body 
of Ermengarde; considering the substantial similarities shared by the two women. 
Adhering to this version, one could further argue that Eleonora has not been defeated by 
death at all, but has been rewarded for her exceptionally mature decision and given a 
second chance to find completion. Either way, one is forced to grant Eleonora at least a 
tiny quantum of the notion concerning the powers of death expounded by Gilbert and 
Gubar. Although still more angelic than in her lifetime because probably residing in 
Heaven, Eleonora may have found a way to defy death by either visiting her lover or 
being reborn in the shape of Ermengarde. The logical conclusion then seems to be that 
no woman is fully angelic; that every girl – however modest, pure and polite she may be 
– does offer at least a glimpse of cunning when it is least expected. 
 Despite having conceded certain powers to the helplessly fragile maiden 
Eleonora, I do not attempt to read the tale’s ending as a predominantly positive one. 
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Admittedly, Eleonora’s death maintains its ambiguous notions. Not really defeated 
because having either matured in Heaven or returned to her lover, Eleonora still cannot 
defy the Symbolic Order. At the end of the day, she is still more purpose than person, 
more scheme than subject; first having been placed within a narrowly framed role, then 
elevated to a superior entity granting the hero’s happy ending, which is to be enjoyed 
without a whiff of guilt.  
Notwithstanding their intently framed roles as archetypal antipodes of angel and 
demon, Morella and Eleonora do share a common feature, namely that death has not put 
an end to their existence. Morella’s return either testifies to an instance of 
metempsychosis, her soul having transmigrated into the body of her daughter, or – as 
has been suggested by relying on popular Gothic motifs – alludes to vampirism, 
whereby the mother feeds upon the daughter.  
 Another attempt to unveil the mystery surrounding Morella’s existence draws 
upon the metaphysical-transcendentalist components and superstitions (Poe Morella 
Collected Works 221) prevalent in the story. Beheld from a philosophical angle, Poe’s 
tale revolves around the ‘[...] principuum individuationis, the notion of that identity 
which at death is or is not lost for ever [...]’ (Poe Morella 41, emphasis in the original). 
In other words, the narrator truly grows obsessed with the question whether ‘[...] the 
individual identity [is] extinguished by death’ (Gargano 261). Poe implicitly raises the 
Lockean question whether two persons can be the same person ‘[...] if they have the 
same consciousness, thinking, and personality’ (McCarthy 150). Thus it seems fairly 
predictable that following this restlessly truth-seeking elaboration, a rebirth or return 
from the dead has to take place. This defiance of paternal laws, which has triggered her 
expulsion from the Symbolic, indeed bestows subversive potential upon Morella; 
consequently, death cannot be seen as her defeat58. Morella initiates her husband into 
the world of dark magic and forbidden, mystical scripts, only to make him understand 
that their content is beyond his intellect. As an observably superior being, she possesses 
the ability to enter ‘[...] doors that vision and philosophy promise to open but that 
remain, maddeningly for him, forever locked’ (Gargano 261).  
Morella’s immense knowledge, her comprehensive powers, her vengeful return 
from the dead, her unconventionally unfeminine traits as well as the psychical authority 
                                                 
58 Gargano suggests that Morella ‘[…] cannot really die because she is Death itself‘ (262), an 
interpretation which would lend her an even greater because darker character. 
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she exerts as a means of controlling her husband, could all be viewed as potentially 
transgressive; would the narrative not ultimately fall back upon traditional patterns that 
reaffirm the arbitrary association of woman with mortality and nature. As Morella 
displays the first signs of decay, her husband interestingly explains this as a common 
fate destined for the weaker sex, which in turn needs to be pitied for its frailty59. 
Compassion merely arouses for fear of ephemerality and mortality, as ‘[...] Morella 
represents to the intellect of the narrator the menace and certainty of recurring death and 
human insufficiency’ (Gargano 262). Morella shares with Eleonora the aspect that 
focuses on a fusion of nature and femininity, as her death scene inevitably bears witness 
to: 
But one autumnal evening, when the winds lay still in heaven, Morella called me 
to her bedside. There was a dim mist over all the earth, and a warm glow upon 
the waters, and amid the rich October leaves of the forest, a rainbow from the 
firmament had surely fallen. Poe Morella 42. 
 
The narrator conjures up a picturesque tableau loaded with clichés of rainbows and mist, 
as if nature already sensed the impending death of one of her daughters. Truly, the 
impressions one gains are warm and sensuous ones, being reminiscent of those qualities 
ascribed to the (feminine) semiotic/Imaginary sphere; there is even a certain cosiness or 
comfortability clinging to this description that recalls the enclosing warmth and security 
of the womb. The stillness and all encompassing peace that govern this scene suggest 
that Morella leaves the earth in peace with herself and her husband. Another common 
trope employed in this passage links the passing of the seasons with the circle of life, 
disguising autumn as harbinger of death. Does Morella attempt to confront the powers 
that be, by returning immediately in the body of her daughter? In doing so, she would 
irretrievably distort the natural order, and might thus be punished via the “second” death 
she experiences as her daughter drops dead in a horrifyingly Gothic baptismal scene.  
Ultimately, it can be suspected that Morella’s death was necessary for both the 
husband and the Symbolic Order, since the exasperatingly perpetual indeterminacy of 
her character, synonymous to the fluctuating state of the semiotic chôra as something 
that cannot be labelled, offered a prospective threat to patriarchal institutions like family 
                                                 
59 ‘Yet was she woman, and pined away daily. In time the crimson spot settled steadily upon the cheek, 
and the blue veins upon the pale forehead became prominent; and one instant my nature melted into pity 
[...]’ (41). 
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and home60, and that, as suits the femininely coded semiotic realm, she fades from the 
text into the night. Like Eleonora, Morella has resisted definition, albeit more 
consciously than her angelic counterpart. Yet unlike Eleonora, Morella has not released 
her husband and oppressor from the bond that united them, but managed to wreak havoc 
even after her death. This truly prevents one to categorise death as defeat, since in the 
aftermath of Morella’s demise, it becomes evident that the foundations of the orderly 
established paternal world have been irreversibly shaken; that Morella has laid bare 
fissures in the Symbolic Order that have previously been sugared over so as not to call 
into question the stability of this realm. Morella’s policies of resistance, or should one 
say, confrontation – reverting to enigmatic, even cryptic language in order to defy 
phallogocentric language and her striving for power even after her disempowerment – 
shall be outlined in the chapter dealing with strategies of resistance to the Symbolic 
Order, wherein the tale will be assessed according to its subversive potential and the 
exploitation thereof.  
 
3.6. Resisting the Symbolic Order – Madness and Enigmatic Language 
The following chapter is meant to witness a move from the meta-level of analysing 
Poe’s use of language to the level of the story itself, that is, to an analysis of the way his 
characters are employing language. Such an examination might indeed be indicative of 
the conception of the mysterious character Morella as well as of the ways in which she 
manages to undermine the prevalent order of things. So as to gain a deeper insight, the 
conversation on Morella’s deathbed, her name and the ending of the story need to be 
subjected to linguistic scrutiny.  
 
3.6.1. Morella as Miracle, Morella as Oracle 
Prior to her death, Morella initiates the subsequent conversation: 
‘It is a day of days,’ she said, as I approached; ‘a day of all days either to live or die. It 
is a fair day for the sons of earth and life – ah, more fair for the daughters of heaven 
and death!’ 
[...] 
‘I am dying, yet shall I live.’ 
                                                 
60 ‘[…] the Oedipally defined law of the father still aims at narrative containment by preventing the 
emergence of alternative personal structures and repressing its subjects into conformist positions – in 
other words, by advancing an emphatic need for society to be recuperated into the male order of things’ 
(Seet 142). 
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‘Morella!’ 
‘The days have never been when thou couldst love me – but her whom in life thou didst 
abhor, in death thou shalt adore.’ 
[...] 
‘Morella!’ I cried, ‘Morella! how knowest thou this?’ Poe Morella 42. 
 
What appears at the very first sight utterly disturbing about Morella’s use of language is 
the enigmatic, if not prophetic character of her declarations. Like an oracle, she ‘[...] 
utters uncanny prophecies [...]’ (Gargano 260) about primary principles of life – as a 
closer verbal analysis proves, death protrudes as the leitmotif – using typical rhetoric 
devices such as archaisms (thou couldst, thou didst) and even rhyme (abhor – adore) so 
as to align herself with the semiotic, poetic realm; a pattern that has already found 
resonance in “Eleonora”. Further, by choosing to ignore given contexts, she is entirely 
in control of any communication; observably, her partner of exchange does not seize the 
frame she has constructed. Though he does ‘[...] intone her name four times as if in 
religious response’ (Gargano 260), probably with the prospect of obtaining a less 
unfathomable response, Morella does not adhere to prefabricated patterns of 
conversation and thereby persistently holds the floor. Her refusal to attend to her 
husband’s pleas renders evident the supposition that Morella alone controls the 
exchange. She chooses to ignore the desperately requesting ‘Morella!’ by preferring to 
continue her sinister prophecies with which she dazzles her partner, thereby 
substantially increasing the halo of her obscurity. Morella remains an unsolved mystery 
in so far as she defines the rules for the setting, which, however, have nothing to do with 
systematic principles. Obviously, the way Morella utilizes language adds to the 
narrator’s inability of understanding, and thus, possessing her. He frantically tries to get 
hold of some piece of her – she, however, evades him by continuously issuing 
prophecies he cannot possibly understand. As has already been discovered, he seems to 
live more in a prosaic than poetic world and therefore has no access to the higher truths 
Morella envisions. 
 On a different level, Morella can be deemed to speak as the daughter of nature 
by voicing ancient, albeit stereotypical, beliefs. Has Morella already internalised 
conventional clichés that conflate women with nature? Indeed it seems so, given that 
she speaks about “sons of earth and life” and in the next instant about the “daughters of 
heaven and death”. This statement entices one to deduce that men are aligned with 
straight, understandable principles (earth), whereas women correlate to concepts far 
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more slipping and vague (heaven). Additionally, the connection with death voices 
men’s ascription of mortality to women, an association allowing for repression of 
primary male fears. That Morella may truly impersonate a daughter of “heaven and 
death” proves to be true as she reveals herself as ‘[...] a “timeless entity”, if not a god 
principle, that actualizes itself at will in time and space, echoing the words of God in the 
Old Testament: ‘I am here’’ (Gargano 260). At this point doubts may justifiably arise as 
to whether woman is really conceptualised as man’s inferior: Morella materialises as 
she chooses, does neither stick to rules nor petitions, and has obviously access to truths 
that remain withheld from mortal men.  
 
3.6.2. The Bitch is back61 
A second case of subversion latently circulates around the riddle of Morella’s daughter, 
or, to put it other words, Morella’s reborn self; about whom the following is reported: 
‘And she grew strangely in stature and intellect [...] Strange, indeed, was her rapid 
increase in bodily size, but terrible, oh! Terrible were the tumultuous thoughts which 
crowded upon me while watching the development of her mental being’ (Poe Morella 
43). Though tending feelings of parental love for his daughter, this affection inevitably 
mingles with terror as the daughter progressively assumes features that had been the 
wife’s. Past and present blurs as the tale’s mystery increases and steadily affect the 
father’s state of mind (Ramakrishna 51-52). Morella’s daughter takes on traits of the 
carnivalesque, grotesque body, she is literally pictured a “biological freak”62, the same 
monstrous feminine her mother had been. Suspicions emerge about the incident that 
might have occurred, which prompt the narrator to shut his daughter up at home. The 
terror evoked by the daughter can be claimed to feed upon the horror Morella has 
conjured up both with her body and by turning the familiar uncanny. Gradually, the 
house, and by association, the body of the young Morella, becomes a place of terror par 
                                                 
61 The slogan “The Bitch is back” is taken from Barbara Creed’s elaboration on women’s role as 
monstrous womb in horror films. The logo was used as an ‘[a]dvertising material [...]’ for David 
Fincher’s Alien³, wherein woman (Lt. Ripley) is starkly contrasted with man and therefore aligned with 
the alien, ‘[...] both ‘bitches’ in their respective ways’ (Creed 52). In a quite similar manner, Morella, 
especially in her birth giving function, is suggested to share characteristic with the abject, the monstrous, 
and the inhuman. 
62 ‘Monsters are human beings who are born with congenital malformations of their bodily organism. 
They also represent the in between, the mixed, the ambivalent as implied in the ancient Greek root of the 
word monsters, teras, which means both horrible and wonderful, object of aberration and adoration’ 
(Braidotti 77, emphasis in the original). It is exactly this blend of dread and fascination that the father 
watches the daughter with. 
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excellence, as ‘[...] the body/house is literally the body of horror, the place of the 
uncanny where desire is always marked by the shadowy presence of the mother’ (Creed 
55). While for the restlessly pondering father, home and daughter prove to be a source 
of constant fear and alienation, for the daughter, the home might bear traces of the Real 
that Morella has desperately longed for and is now able to re-experience through her 
daughter. Thus one might suspect that the young Morella grows up in a semiotic realm 
utterly defined and designed by herself63, a chôra that the father can anxiously behold, 
but neither watch nor control. Categories like space and time, usually compulsory if 
wanting to govern chaos and assign labels to human environment, but immaterial to the 
chôra, seemingly have become irrelevant, not to say perverted, when regarding the 
concept of time that is not at all in line with the young Morella’s physical development. 
Matters are difficult in terms of an ideal mother-daughter relationship, or identification 
with the mother-imago, since mother and daughter are palpably exactly the same 
person.  
 It comes little surprising that, when remembering Irigaray’s views about proper 
names, the daughter has not been given a name yet, only been referred to as ‘My child’ 
and ‘my love’ (Poe Morella 44). Also the horrifying incident at the baptismal ceremony 
may be explained by referring to Irigaray’s conceptions. Strangely but necessarily, it is 
precisely during this procedure that the narrator learns that ‘[t]he name, it seems, has a 
terrifying life of its own; only too obviously, it cannot be suppressed by rational checks, 
for at the baptismal fount it leaps, without his conscious volition, to the lips of the 
possessed father’ (Gargano 260). The evident conclusion must be that Morella, as a 
spiritual essence, still determines the lives of her family members. Yet by endowing the 
child with a proper name, the umbilical cord is irreversibly severed, the first proper 
name, the navel, eradicated, which surfaces in a figurative death necessary to leave the 
Imaginary and enter the Symbolic. What can actually be seen as an initiation into 
society opens up the desire for the lost unity with the mother figure, which is 
immediately fulfilled as the daughter drops dead after having uttered the biblical ‘I am 
here!’ (Poe Morella 45). Hence, the father has not been able to lure the child away from 
the maternal body and into the realm of language; indeed, this very attempt has only 
provided for the ultimate fulfilment of mother and daughter and his own downfall. On 
the other hand, it can be argued that the young Morella has never been able to occupy a 
                                                 
63 In fact, she is said to have ‘[…] received no impressions from the outward world […]’ (44). 
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subject position within the Symbolic Order – what in fact should have followed 
baptism.  
Ambiguities concerning the true nature of the mother-daughter relationship will 
probably remain unsolved; however, it seems fairly certain that Morella has drawn 
benefit from her subversive powers in so far as she has managed to pervert the 
Symbolic Order. The protagonist’s mental state at the end of the tale is all but safe. 
Obsessed with awfully sinister memories64 and tormented by the necromantic 
happenings surrounding him, he has worn down with guilt, regret, horror and grief. 
Even fundamental concepts like time or place, the foundations upon which patriarchal 
constructions are built, fail him, he keeps ‘[...] no reckoning [...]’ (Poe Morella 45) of 
them at all. Morella may have been defeated, but her long anticipated death comes at a 
high price:  
[...] the stars of my fate faded from heaven, and therefore the earth grew dark, 
and its figures passed by me like flitting shadows, and among them all I beheld 
only – Morella. The winds of the firmament breathed but one sound within my 
ears, and the ripples upon the sea murmured evermore – Morella. Poe Morella 
45. 
 
Suitably, the ‘[...] last three sentences of the story end, incantatorily, with Morella’s 
name’ (Gargano 260), emphatically heightened by poetic phraseology. The orderly 
world apparently has been turned upside down (stars fall from the heaven), and 
Morella’s spirit inhabits whatever it can appropriate to its resentful purposes. Finally, 
the ‘[...] long and bitter laugh [...]’ (Poe Morella 45) the narrator gives as he entombs 
the second Morella can indeed be viewed as a sign of madness; traditionally an illness 
allotted to women. Assuming that the protagonist has now involuntarily acquired 
feminine traits further testifies to the deconstruction of clear boundaries Morella has 
achieved – though, admittedly, at the expense of her death. Yet paradoxically, it is only 
in death that her greatest subversive powers may unfold, as she ‘[...] assumes truly 
Gothic proportions [...]’ and continues to usurp the Symbolic Order ‘[...] not as a 
material body [...] but as a psychological one’ (N. Armstrong 183). All the same, she 
had to pay a high price indeed; like her ancestress Lilith, Morella is ‘[...] locked into a 
vengeance [...]’ (Gilbert and Gubar 35), trapped into the scheme of an archetypal 
monster-woman, as a punishment for keeping her integrity and subjectivity as a self-
assertive individual defying patriarchal values.  
                                                 
64 ‘Years – years may pass away, but the memory of that epoch never‘(Poe Morella 45). 
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4. Madwoman, Mermaid, Wretch – Ophelia’s Myth and Madness as 
Subversive Potential in William Shakespeare’s Hamlet 
 
Having previously elaborated upon little popular heroines of Gothic literature, wrought 
by the pen of Edgar Allan Poe, the following chapter shall introduce one of the most 
popular characters of canonical literature. Ophelia, one of the first characters to fit into 
the type of the “madwoman”, is, similarly to Eleonora and Morella, inserted into hetero-
normative categories constructed and perpetuated by the patriarchal order that she can 
escape but in madness where systematic norms and categories are blurred or erased. 
When taking a closer look, it will become evident that those categories imposed upon 
Ophelia and her contemporaries merely served to ‘[...] construct natural aspects of 
womanhood by establishing a matrix of class-specific emotional, mental and physical 
characteristics supposedly demonstrated by women [...]’ (Rhodes 19). That these strictly 
essentialist discourses ‘[...] fashion[ed] “woman” as a monolithic rather than diverse 
category [...]’ (Rhodes 19) may indeed account for the fact that Ophelia ultimately 
withdraws from the Symbolic Order wherein a safe place cannot be found for her. 
Ophelia is alternatively framed as obedient daughter, fallen woman, elusive nymph or 
dangerously seductive mermaid without ever being able to develop a healthy personality 
congruous with her own needs and desires. Instead, she is only ever ‘[...] serving an 
image, authoritative and central, of man: a woman is first and foremost a 
daughter/mother/wife’ (Felman 134); an image, that, when rejected, condemns the 
woman to suffer the fate of the “madwoman”, the one who flatly refuses to act out her 
role within the Symbolic Order. Thus it appears sadly inevitable that the only way to 
escape prefabricated roles leads into madness and death: ‘[a] therefore difficult, if not 
impossible, identification with the sacrificial logic of separation and syntactical 
sequence at the foundation of language and the social code leads to the rejection of the 
symbolic – lived as the rejection of the paternal function and ultimately generating 
psychoses’ (Kristeva Women’s Time 204). Only in madness, Ophelia gains the strength 
to pervert and distort the order that continuously seeks to categorise and label her both 
on a socio-linguistic and a symbolical, iconographic level. After her death, which 
probably constitutes the only possibility of achieving the promised state of the Real and 
unconditionally regaining blissful fulfilment, Ophelia’s revolutionary powers are 
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glossed over and almost erased as she is elevated to the position of an icon, a token of 
popular culture to be admired, desired and possessed.  
 
4.1. Hamlet and Ophelia as Star-Crossed Lovers  
The very first scene endowed with the physical presence of Lady Ophelia seems to re-
inscribe traditional gender roles both on the social as well as on a linguistic level, as 
Ophelia is cast into the position of the attentive listener, eagerly waiting to obtain advice 
from her obviously overly protective brother. Subjected to closer scrutiny, however, 
myths of female passivity and obedience manifest themselves only on the surface level. 
Indeed, it is Ophelia’s brother Laertes who commands, but Ophelia herself who poses 
the questions65 and thus assumes the actual position of controlling the dialogue. Hence 
Laertes may think of himself as the one holding the power position, but in truth it is his 
sister who subtly yet undoubtedly determines the course of the interaction. It can even 
be claimed that Ophelia radiates an unusually strongly developed self-confidence and 
unwomanly bravery as she asks her brother whether her faithfulness and obedience to 
him can be questioned. Laertes warns her, admittedly in a predictably hypocritical 
fashion66, not to tend and foster any susceptibilities to Hamlet’s flatteries, since these 
are purely of a voluptuously ephemeral nature. Ophelia challenges this view, sweetly 
disguising the cunning of her laconic attire. As a response, Laertes firmly sticks to the 
sermonic tone of his lecture, quoting instances testifying to the worth of chastity. 
Scrutinising Ophelia’s retort renders obvious that she is not the naive, sweet dove one 
might have supposed her to be. Quite wisely, she promises to obey, but demands her 
brother to stick to his principles himself, faintly hinting to a possible pursuit of worldly 
pleasures on Laertes’ behalf. Allegedly ashamed of his sister’s knowledge, Laertes 
abruptly changes the topic, thereby straying from the course of the interaction by 
pointing out that he is already late. This unexpected twist, apparent on a socio-linguistic 
level, casts Ophelia in the power position as she is equipped with secret knowledge that 
Laertes cannot refute. Still, Laertes as the man is fully in command of any situation and 
severely determines to avoid the highly delicate subject his sister has timidly touched 
upon. 
                                                 
65 ‘Do you doubt that?’ (Shakespeare 1.3 4), ‘No more but so?’ (Shakespeare 1.3 9) 
66 ‘Of course Laertes’ advice is shallow; he seemingly judges Hamlet to be a man like himself. And 
Ophelia is perceptively aware of his shallowness as she reminds him in sisterly fashion to heed his own 
warnings [...]’ (Camden 248). 
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 The tiny amount of subversive power Ophelia has wielded is immediately 
snatched away from her as Polonius, undeniably superior to both his children and 
representative of the institution of patriarchy, enters the stage. Again, Ophelia utters a 
small clue directed towards her brother as she is repeatedly cautioned by him, but her 
innuendo remains without comment as Laertes disappears with a simple ‘Farewell’ 
(Shakespeare 1.3 87). Polonius unsurprisingly reaffirms his advanced position by 
assuming the floor, forcing Ophelia to reply honestly to all his questions. Immediately, 
he considerably diminishes his daughter’s agency by pointing to her youthful 
inexperience67 that might all too easily be exploited. Although it can be assumed that 
Hamlet’s affection is sincere, and that Ophelia returns the tenderly burgeoning feelings, 
she is discouraged by her father and even ordered to stay away from Hamlet, who is 
bluntly accused of solely wanting to steal her virginity. Disillusioned and disappointed, 
Ophelia agrees to do so, thereby unwillingly entering on the fatal course drawn by 
patriarchal authorities denying her access to the Symbolic Order she may have glimpsed 
during the interaction with Laertes when smoothly handling systematic principles of a 
predominantly paternal language. Simultaneously, Ophelia’s tenderly awakening 
sexuality is harshly repressed, until the seething energy can no longer be contained and 
breaks through with catalytic force at the expense of Ophelia’s sanity. 
 Ophelia’s second appearance proves that Laertes’ and Polonius’ worldly-wise 
cautioning have gathered momentum, as a terrified Ophelia enters Polonius’ chamber to 
report some significantly disturbing off-stage action. According to her, Hamlet has 
entered her closet, bewildered and seemingly mad in looks and manner, frightening poor 
Ophelia out of her wits. Polonius insistently convinces his daughter that Hamlet has 
come “mad for her love” and contributes to her belief that ‘[...] she is the cause of 
Hamlet’s madness’ (Camden 248), probably oblivious to the tragic irony that his 
indications seem ‘[...] to bring about Hamlet’s pretended madness but actually 
[contribute] to Ophelia’s real madness’ (Camden 249). If only cautiously, it can be 
suspected that the fatal games played at Elsinore indeed gravely shake Ophelia’s world 
views, causing serious detriment to her unstable because still innocent character. Truly, 
it must appear as a ruthlessly mocking blow of fate to Ophelia that the steps she has 
taken in order to keep her integrity and value have, according to her father’s words, 
                                                 
67 ‘You speak like a green girl / Unsifted in such perilous circumstance’ (Shakespeare 1.3 101-2), ‘Marry, 
I will teach you [...]’ (Shakespeare 1.3 105).  
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driven Hamlet mad. To her father’s question, whether she has followed his commands, 
Ophelia answers in the affirmative, only to obtain the awful diagnosis, ‘That hath made 
him mad’ (Shakespeare 2.1 107). As the scene draws to a close, Polonius is determined 
to confront the King with the ‘[...] very cause of Hamlet’s lunacy’ (Shakespeare 2.2 49).  
 As it appears, Ophelia is inserted into a pre-fabricated role of the ideal Lady, 
generated as a hetero-normative, all-encompassing category by patriarchy, as much as 
she is led into internalising the constructions she is made to embody. Recognition of the 
perverse inappropriateness of these models will only come to her too late; when she has 
already been driven over the brink of sanity into a realm that witnesses the complete 
rejection of any morals and norms. 
 The metamorphosis Ophelia has undergone since her first appearance attains 
completion as Ophelia is finally transformed into a mere puppet, a shallow character in 
the power struggle of Denmark’s aristocracy in the third scene. Finally believing that 
‘[...] she herself is the immediate source of Hamlet’s madness’ (Camden 249), 
distressed Ophelia has been successfully introduced to the ‘[...] bittersweet delights of 
love’ (Camden 247). Apparently having lost the wittiness she still possessed when 
conversing with her brother, Ophelia most humbly agrees to the instructions given by 
King, Queen and Polonius, as yet unaware of her impending doom.   
As has been hinted to in the previous paragraph, the third scene witnesses the 
elevation of Ophelia to the ‘[...] status of a cult figure [...]’ as well as the degradation to 
a highly stylised image of Victorian womanhood, ‘[...] appropriated in popular culture 
to such an extent that she has become a cliché’ (Solomon Kiefer 11). Far from being the 
devout yet smart sister and daughter, Ophelia becomes subsumed in the web of intrigues 
that is being woven around her, which is soon to assume the archetypal form of the 
well-loved ‘[...] sentimental tale of a victim, young and beautiful’ (Solomon Kiefer 11) 
wherein she is protagonist without agency.  
 Pawn to father, King and Queen, Ophelia is systematically fashioned as a decoy, 
meant to lure Hamlet so that the reasons of his alleged madness might become evident. 
Treating her exactly like the “green girl” Polonius has called his daughter before, he 
keeps giving orders, ‘Ophelia, walk you here – Gracious, so please you [...]’ 
(Shakespeare 3.1 43). Thus, Ophelia is aestheticised and framed by authority, bestowed 
with signifiers targeted towards Hamlet in an overtly symbolical language he is 
supposed to decipher the way it has been encoded for him. Much as Ophelia has been 
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‘[...] deliberately [fashioned] [...] into an image [...]’ (Gellert Lyons 60), Hamlet is 
supposed to “read” the two-dimensional text before him and fulfil the script Polonius 
has in mind. Equipping Ophelia with a book, Polonius draws upon a thoroughly 
reputable system of ‘[...] established significances [...]’, thereby presupposing ‘[...] 
knowledge of traditional visual symbols’ (Gellert Lyons 61) on the behalf of Hamlet. 
Gradually, Ophelia’s transformation into a prop, a narrative symbolical device and her 
fashioning into an enigmatic icon takes place. Her insertion into traditionally available 
Victorian gender roles seems to be a successful one: a passively obedient character in 
the beginning, she frightfully develops into the mother of madwomen as soon as she 
struggles with the role of the fairer sex she has been allotted. Correspondingly, one 
could argue that on the one hand, this transformation into an emblematic character 
completely expels her from the orderly system of the court alias the Symbolic Order, 
but on the other hand offers her – via death by drowning –the opportunity of finally 
attaining the Real.  
 Unfortunately, Polonius appears to miss the tragic irony of his own game; his 
instructions to stay away from Hamlet, then tempt but reject him anew, further 
aggravate the already disordered state of mind of the love-sick Ophelia. Carroll Camden 
argues that Ophelia’s fate has been misinterpreted by a vast number of critics posing 
Polonius’ death as the reason for her madness. Instead, she focuses on the star-crossed 
love story between Hamlet and Ophelia that breaks Ophelia’s heart and eventually 
causes her to run mad (247-8). Beheld from a psychoanalytical angle, one should not 
forget about Ophelia’s repressed sexuality, the libidinous energy that inevitably must 
sooner or later find an outlet.  
Ophelia herself expresses her despair at the unjust rejection and cruel treatment 
she receives from Hamlet in the famous nunnery-scene. Following Hamlet’s soliloquy, 
Ophelia enters the stage to pity and ponder about Hamlet’s indeed disturbingly bizarre 
thoughts and actions. As Hamlet repeatedly repels her and even denies the love she 
thinks he has tended – and still tends – for her, Ophelia is moved to desperate outcries, 
‘O, help him, you sweet heavens!’ (Shakespeare 3.1 132), ‘Heavenly powers, restore 
him!’ (Shakespeare 3.1 140). After Hamlet’s impolite exit, Ophelia adumbrates her 
most deplorable situation in a soliloquy wherein she characterises herself as a lady ‘[...] 
most deject and wretched’ (Shakespeare 3.1 154). Even more so, she believes to be the 
reason for his madness and bemoans her naivety leading her to respond positively to 
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Hamlet’s supposedly fake flatteries. The bawdy language and openly sexual offers 
Hamlet directs towards Ophelia in subsequent scenes68 certainly do not miss their 
target. Though Ophelia keeps as calm as she ought to, it might be suspected that his 
behaviour fits with the image Laertes and Polonius have evoked in Ophelia’s mind. 
Already the next important scene featuring Ophelia testifies to the transformation in 
character she has undergone. In madness, the repressed material breaks through, 
prompting Ophelia to regain – or reassume – the power that has ever been hidden and 
kept from her. Unabashedly, Ophelia voices in vulgar language the ugly truths 
concealed beneath the preppy surface of Elsinore, thus distressing the entire court as 
well as her brother as she freely breaks with norms and conventions characteristic of the 
Symbolic Order. 
 
4.2. Suffering the Female Malady 
While certain concessions can truly be made to the claim that with Ophelia, one 
voyeuristically witnesses the corruption of ‘[...] a spotless creature made salaciously 
attractive through her exposure to lewdness and obscenity’ (Morris 603); that is to say, 
the audience might experience a somewhat satisfactorily delight in seeing an innocent 
young maiden going wild, I attempt to issue the claim that one should not underestimate 
the strength Ophelia gains in her madness. In this respect I want to point to Carol 
Solomon Kiefer, who refers to feminist and psychoanalytical epistemological lenses, 
which, when applied to the case of Ophelia, shed an entirely new light on this eternally 
puzzling Shakespearean character: ‘Once seen only as a pathetic, innocent, submissive, 
and dutiful daughter, sister, and lover, Ophelia is now also perceived as a figure of 
strength, a heroine whose madness is seen as an assertion of self, an act of rebellion 
against patriarchal control’ (12). Hence the assertion that the delicately drawn character 
of Ophelia does not only serve as a ‘[...] document in madness [...]’ (Shakespeare 4.5 
176), but also as a powerful role model, shall be forwarded and elaborated upon. 
 One of the most prominent changes – and within the scope of this paper also one 
of the most crucial features – to be observed in Ophelia’s behaviour as “madwoman” is 
her ingeniously defiant refusal of norms and conventions as regards patriarchal 
language in particular and socio-linguistic behaviour on a more general level. Having 
                                                 
68 ‘Lady, shall I lie in your lap?’ (Shakespeare 3.2 114), ‘That’s a fair thought to lie between maids’ legs’ 
(Shakespeare 3.2 119), ‘It would cost you a groaning to take off mine edge’ (Shakespeare 3.2 247) 
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previously been locked into conventionally established and generally accepted 
mechanisms of speech and behaviour and having used phrases provided by a pool of 
readily available phallogocentric tokens of speech69, Ophelia moves beyond the borders 
of what is socially acceptable – and notably, acceptable in women – by retreating to the 
stage of ‘[...] semiotic babble [...]’ prior to meaning and sign, (Showalter 157), a realm 
governed by the nonsensical, yet exceedingly symbolical aspect of language resisting 
concretely shaped definition. Ophelia’s withdrawal to this pre-oedipal stage constitutes 
her utmost potency as well as her greatest weakness in so far as she subverts the 
patriarchal order by flatly rejecting the Name of the Father, that is, phallogoentric 
language (Showalter 157), but nonetheless fails to secure herself a stable position within 
the court as representative of the Symbolic Order. Ironically, it is exactly her 
revolutionary force setting her apart from the rest of the mendacious cast that ultimately 
expels her from the stage into the pseudo-mythical feminine realm of romantically 
distorted watery death. So basically, her rejection of the patriarchal system on an 
unconscious level openly manifests itself as the rejection of paternal language 
(Showalter 157) that can in her insanity no longer be controlled or indeed hidden away.  
 Prior to Ophelia’s appearance in the fourth act, her immodest and highly unusual 
behaviour following her father’s death is announced by a Gentleman, giving account of 
what was to be believed constituted the signs of madness: ‘She speaks much of her 
father, says she hears / There’s tricks i’th’world, and hems, and beats her heart, / Spurns 
enviously at straws, speaks things in doubt / That carry but half sense’ (Shakespeare 4.5 
4-7). Judging by the report of the Gentleman, a wholly new way of envisioning the 
madman was gradually gathering shape as ‘[...] disturbing images of wild, dark, naked 
men [were] replaced by poetic, artistic, and theatrical images of a youthful, beautiful 
female insanity’ (Showalter 10). As it seems, insanity no longer solely denoted the 
immensely sinister, fearful aspect of the deeply enigmatic human psyche, but could as 
well signify frail, feminine beauty, as awesome as it was pitiful. Along with this went an 
increasing correlation of madness and femininity that saw the ‘[...] madwoman as the 
victim of parental tyranny and male oppression [...]’ (Showalter 10), much as Ophelia 
has fallen prey to the power plays enacted in Elsinore. By the same token, this female 
irrationality and hysteria, supposed to lay the foundations for female insanity, 
                                                 
69 ‘Madam, I wish it may’ (Shakespeare 3.1 42), ‘How does your honour for this many a day?’ 
(Shakespeare 3.1 91), ‘No, my lord’ (Shakespeare 3.2 114), ‘Ay, my lord’ (Shakespeare 3.2 116) 
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designated an ‘[...] unknowable and untamable sexual force’ (Showalter 10), a 
supposition that can justifiably be applied to the case of Ophelia, who, bereft of her 
womanly sexuality, despairs of energy that she cannot, and must not, handle properly. 
That sexuality does assume a pivotal role indeed can be shown in a close analysis of 
Ophelia’s “semiotic babble” that shall be carried out below, along with an examination 
of how Ophelia manages to disrupt existing power structures. In order to be able to do 
so, I consider it necessary to refer to theoretically defined, conventional rules of socio-
linguistic behaviour that will then be contrasted with Ophelia’s actual attitude towards 
her communication partners. 
 Traditionally, participants of any communication are expected to heed to a 
number of unwritten rules in order to show politeness and good manners; the 
presupposition for a successful interaction to take place is that both speakers are ‘[...] 
able to depend on a lot of shared assumptions and expectations [...], which, when 
subjected to closer scrutiny, ‘[...] provide[s] us with some insights into how more is 
always being communicated than is said’ (Yule 112). “Politeness” in socio-linguistic 
behaviour is employed in the sense of respecting another person’s self-image (Yule 
119). When actively engaging in a conversation with one or more participants, people 
usually adhere to the guidelines defining the activity of turn-taking:  
Typically, only one person speaks at a time and there tends to be an avoidance of 
silence between speaking turns [...] If more than one participant tries to talk at 
the same time, one of them usually stops [...] For the most part, participants wait 
until one speaker indicates that he or she has finished, usually by signalling a 
completion point’ Yule 128. 
 
Given these guidelines for co-operative behaviour in interactions, it is easy to see that 
Ophelia both detaches herself from the community and writes herself out of the script 
she is anticipated to fulfil and thus catapults herself into a position differing from the 
one she occupied in sanity. She employs unique rules, appropriating phrases to her own 
use as if her aim was ‘[...] to speak not only against, but outside of the specular 
phallogocentric structure, to establish a discourse the status of which would no longer 
be defined by the phallacy of masculine meaning’ (Felman 153); a target she cannot hit 
satisfactorily since her audience consists of members completely subsumed by the 
patriarchal order. Yet by forcefully discovering ways to ‘[...] break the code, to shatter 
language, to find a specific discourse closer to the body and emotions, to the 
unnameable repressed by the social contract’ (Kristeva Women’s Time 204), Ophelia 
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achieves to lay bare the hypocrisy governing Elsinore, if only this is expressed via 
cryptic truths her audience cannot access.  
According to the stage directions, Ophelia enters “distracted”, posing aloud a 
question directed to nobody in particular. Indeed this raises the question whether she 
actively perceives her environment – which, when answered negatively, would 
completely deprive her of any agency – or whether she (unconsciously?) chooses to 
ignore the hegemonic group that previously withheld autonomy and agency from her. 
‘Where is the beauteous majesty of Denmark?’70 (Shakespeare 4.5 21), Ophelia asks 
unfocusedly, thereby perplexing the already alarmed listeners. Probably feigning 
empathy and interest, Gertrude asks Ophelia in a quite patronising fashion how she is, to 
which Ophelia neither listens nor responds. Instead, she starts singing a little song about 
true love. Enquired about the purpose of the song, whose meaning remains rather 
opaque to the bystanders, Ophelia answers, ‘Say you? Nay, pray you, mark’ 
(Shakespeare 4.5 28), which could be considered the first token of impoliteness directed 
towards authority as the quite informal reply does not appear to be the apt answer one 
should give to a Queen. Uninhibitedly, Ophelia perpetuates in her rebellious attire, even 
applying the imperative as she orders the Queen to listen to her without letting her finish 
her comment. Ophelia’s oddly bewildering songs of no immediately detectable context, 
largely tell of true love and the pain that comes with parting. It may be imagined that 
this is her fashion of coping, now publicly, with the loss of Hamlet’s love, who is now 
“dead” to her (Camden 251), mingled with instances of grief over the loss of her father, 
who is indeed physically “dead”. One of her last lines before the King enters the 
conversation, ‘Larded all with sweet flowers’ (Shakespeare 4.5 36), foreshadows her 
own death she will experience garlanded with flowers. Even the King fails to receive 
the amount of respect his position would naturally grant him; almost repeating his 
wife’s question, he is scarcely noticed as Ophelia ‘[...] responds to his greeting in the 
conventional fashion [...]’ (Camden 251); a formulaic greeting that could be addressed 
                                                 
70 Ophelia’s question truly underscores Carroll Camden’s argument that not Polonius, but the unhappy 
love-story between Ophelia and Hamlet serves as the actual source for Ophelia’s madness: ‘Surely she is 
not talking of her father here, since the words fit neither what we know of Polonius nor what a girl would 
say of a father who fails to understand her [...] Rather it is to Hamlet that her words apply [...] Hamlet, 
then, is the “beauteous majesty”; it is upon Hamlet that her mind in its madness dwells’ (250). Though I 
must admit that part of Camden’s argument is explained in a more commonsensical than academic 
fashion (Camden merely imagines what an adolescent girl would do, which is not likely to suggest 
expertise) and thus cannot be fully trusted, I would agree with the supposition that Ophelia might refer to 
Hamlet when giving clues about love and sexual innuendos as there are no signs of a possible Oedipal 
complex discernible.  
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to anyone. Following the King’s question, Ophelia starts her “semiotic babble”, 
stringing together random sentences that seems to be located at ‘[...] the limits of the 
symbolic order [...]’ (Barzilai Lacan 229) in a colourful jumble neither King nor Queen 
might entangle. As her language slowly eludes the systematically mapped realm of 
phallogocentric language, Ophelia truly must appear “mad” to King and Queen who fail 
to make sense of pre-Symbolic articulation. Although her deliberate juxtaposition of 
sentences and phrases does not fit any readily available meanings, one could maintain 
that her statement ‘Lord, we know what we are, but know not what we may be’ 
(Shakespeare 4.5 41) in fact disguises a lambasting critique of the prevailing 
circumstances in Denmark. Probably, Ophelia laments the fact that amongst others, 
King and Queen engage in hypocritical games in order to deceive those around them, as 
yet unaware of the damage they are about to wreak. As Ophelia and her speech remain 
shrouded in mystery, this is only one of several potential interpretations. What indeed 
can be assumed with confidence is the fact that Ophelia’s alleged disobedience testifies 
to a retreat into the Imaginary, that is, into a psychological state ‘[...] before the fear of 
castration produces a superego submissive to the interdiction imposed by the father’ 
(Barzilai Lacan 234).  
 As the King derides Ophelia’s madness  as mere ‘[c]onceit upon her father’ 
(Shakespeare 4.5 43), (and by doing so, also excuses her immodest behaviour), he 
assumes the position of the ‘[...] contractor who builds meanings out of disparate, 
“empty” elements’ in order to ‘[...] repair the paternal function [...]’ and ‘[introduce] a 
sequential, relational logic into a discourse that is marked by discontinuity and 
fragmentation [...]’ (Barzilai Lacan 239). Representing the institution of patriarchy, he 
‘[...] pronounces [his] expert, professional discourse, without even noticing the 
conspicuousness of [his] flagrant misogyny’ (Felman 141). And notice it he need not, 
for he represents the head of the hierarchy at Elsinore, holding the power to decide 
about right and wrong. In fact, however, he must not admit that he, too, fails to “read” 
Ophelia, and thus all too easily assigns to her the female malady because ultimately, 
‘[m]adness and women, however, turn out to be the two outcasts of the establishment of 
readability’ (Felman 142). His interpretation is proven fruitless as Ophelia cuts short on 
him to start singing one of her bawdy songs about illicit sexual love, ‘[...] the effect of 
which underlines strongly the chief cause of her madness’ (Camden 251). Basically, the 
coarse verse she is citing tells the unlucky tale of a young maiden, who, having given 
 66 
 
herself to the man she loves, is rejected by him for the reason that she has given up her 
virginity so easily. Hidden beneath the surface of the bluntly sexual, plainly one-
dimensional song is a thoroughly reflected piece of social criticism questioning the 
unequal footing of men and women. Focus of the little tale is the still hotly debated 
topic about the inherently different sexuality of men and women, which forms the basis 
for the idea that the man is allowed to engage in sexual intercourse without having to 
fear that his reputation might get damaged, whereas for women, doing the same entails 
being equated with fallen women. In one of the previous chapters I was referring to 
Dale Spender and her elaboration on this dilemma, who deduces that an asymmetry, 
whereby the man is seen as potent, while the woman becomes a bitch in public opinion, 
has been enhanced as a result of man being in charge of language. As it seems, this 
debate has been as relevant in the seventeenth century as it is nowadays, which truly 
entices one to ask whether an erasure of the perceived differences between the sexes 
will ever be possible. But since it is neither my task nor my ambition to solve this 
eternal struggle, it better be noticed how sensitive Ophelia appears to have been to 
questions of gender and agency. That she sympathises with the woman who has lost her 
virtue and thus probably her only chance to find happiness in marriage, can be assumed 
with fair certainty as Ophelia cites, ‘Young men will do’t, if they come to’t, / By Cock, 
they are to blame’ (Shakespeare 4.5 58-59). Little surprisingly, Ophelia’s bawdy 
language prompts the King’s outcry, ‘Pretty Ophelia!’ (Shakespeare 4.5 54), as he is 
utterly astonished to hear such crude language coming from the mouth of a Lady. 
Overpowered by Ophelia’s newly acquired revolutionary strength, ‘[he] does not 
succeed in halting the heroine’s bawdy ballad [...]’ (Rhodes 17), neither is it possible for 
him to silence the unruly lady and recreate her in his own vision as a virginal, 
sentimental and submissive maiden. The only reaction his appalled remark triggers is 
Ophelia’s obscure because ambiguous promise that she will make an end on it 
(Shakespeare 4.5 55); which can be read as an appeasing assurance that she will stop 
voicing unwanted truths in order to end his distress, or as a sinister prophecy that she 
will no longer face the falseness and pretence of Denmark’s court, choosing death as the 
only acceptable alternative. Before retreating, Ophelia gives a last speech wherein she 
thanks her audience for their counsel (is she indeed not in command of her own speech 
or mocking her audience?) and bemoans her father’s death – which provides Claudius 
with sufficient reason to presume that this might have brought about her madness. 
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However, when thinking of the lyrics Ophelia had been reciting before, it seems much 
more likable that ‘[t]hese coarse and uninhibited lines are the sort which might 
unconsciously and naturally float to the top of Ophelia’s muddled mind if her thoughts 
had been dwelling on Hamlet’s love and on possible marriage to him’ (Camden 252), a 
door that has been closed to her as it has been for the tale’s maiden – if only for a 
different reason. Support for this daring, yet in Freudian terms only too understandable 
argument can be found in Morris, who states that ‘[t]here can be little doubt that a 
partial cause [for Ophelia’s insanity] is the death of her father [...] but the major cause 
must be laid to her loss of Hamlet, which she refers to [...] in terms of the loss of the 
delights of physical love’ (601). Thus Ophelia might have unconsciously chosen this 
song processing the awful fate of a lovesick maiden because she herself is ‘[...] 
frustrated in her love for Hamlet and in its physical fulfillment’ (Morris 601), or to be 
more precise, the impossibility of the fulfilment she seeks.  
 As Ophelia re-enters, she is already awaited by Laertes, who, immediately after 
his arrival, has been informed of his father’s death and his sister’s madness. Before 
actually catching a glimpse of his sister, Laertes, deeply distressed and taken, utters 
some enigmatically encoded higher truths about the nature of love, which again 
establishes a latent bond between Hamlet and Ophelia. Ophelia continues in singing 
nonsensical songs underscoring her madness as they contain bits and pieces reminiscent 
both of a pre-symbolical babble devoid of orderly, definite meaning as in patriarchal 
language71 and children’s rhymes, which additionally infantilises Ophelia in her 
madness and thus seems to snatch power away from her; some lines of which clearly 
revolve around her father’s death72, while others seem to be directed towards Hamlet73 
or no one in particular at all74. Uttering infantile tokens of speech, Ophelia openly 
voices her wish to retreat into a stage defying the Symbolic Order, or even 
unconsciously declares her already ongoing withdrawal. This supposition is more 
closely explained by Barzilai, who maintains that ‘[i]n such regressive states, the 
unstable ego tends to produce echolalia – that is, an echoing infantile discourse’ (Lacan 
238).  
                                                 
71 ‘Hey non nonny, nonny, hey nonny’ (Shakespeare 4.5 163) 
72 ‘They bore him barefaced on the bier [...] And in his grave rained many a tear’ (Shakespeare 4.5 162; 
164), ‘His beard was as white as snow / All flaxen was his poll / He is gone, he is gone [...]’ (Shakespeare 
4.5 192-94) 
73 ‘Fare you well, my dove!’ (Shakespeare 4.5 165) 
74 ‘You must sing: ‘A-down a-down’ / and you: ‘Call him adown-a.’ / O, how the wheel becomes it! / It is 
the false steward that stole his master’s daughter’ (Shakespeare 4.5 168-171) 
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Ophelia then starts with one of her most meaningful deeds, the distribution of 
flowers; symbolically charged in so far as every item is ‘[…] inserted into a sort of 
chain of continuous references to other units […]’ (Eco, 66). Indeed, it needs to be 
registered with care how sensitively and thoughtfully Ophelia handles this self-
constructed task; the deeper insight she must have gained equips her with profound 
knowledge about human nature and its fallacies which are to be unveiled as Ophelia 
allots flowers highly charged with symbolical and socio-historical meaning to the right 
person. With an astonishingly calm clarity that has been missing – at least to her 
audience – beforehand, Ophelia supplies Laertes, Claudius and Gertrude with 
specifically chosen plants that often carry an ambiguous meaning pivotal to the 
character and the masquerade that is being enacted. Choosing her brother as the first to 
receive her gifts, Ophelia explains, ‘There’s rosemary, that’s for remembrance - / pray 
you, love, remember - / and there is pansies, that’s for thoughts’ (Shakespeare 4.5 173-
75), which Laertes instantly and falsely disdains as being the product of a disordered 
mind. Only outwardly oblivious to the actual meaning of the flowers being handed out, 
Laertes does not lay great stress to his sister’s words; however, in Shakespearean times 
it should have been widely known that Ophelia’s herbs and flowers can also be read as a 
‘[...] shocking enumeration of well-known abortifacients and emmenagogues’75 
(Newman 227). Thus it can be supposed that Ophelia’s audience is appalled by her 
openness and chooses to disguise her action as an instance of insanity. Newman does 
not wish to suggest here that Ophelia might have used or even needed those plants; in 
fact, she merely seeks to unravel the hidden, surprising dimension to the act of flower 
distribution (Newman 227). It is noted of rosemary that it was used for abortion, as were 
fennel, rue and violets, which will be distributed by Ophelia only instances later 
(Newman 229-30). A riddle that remains as yet unsolved is the occurrence of 
remembrance and thoughts that Ophelia hints to; what exactly shall be remembered, one 
is tempted to ask? Is she referring back to the conversation led prior to Laertes’ 
departure, when she cautioned him to take heed of his own warnings? Or is she talking 
about the future she has some darkly secret access to, already knowing that she will be 
dead and gone then, and simply asks him to remember her? In combination with 
                                                 
75 ‘These particular herbs were thought to act as emmenagogues, i.e., in the terms used in Elizabethan 
England, substances taken by mouth as tea or tisan, or applied locally with massage to induce 
menstruation [...] or as abortifacients, substances used similarly to provoke abortion. Then, as now, there 
is a fine line between starting a potentially missed menstrual period and avoiding an unwanted or 
inappropriate pregnancy, and the same substances were often used for both purposes’ (Newman 228). 
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“thoughts”, one might suspect that probably, Ophelia demands of Laertes to be more 
thoughtful when it comes to women in the future. But since Ophelia seems to voice 
higher truths, or freely combines the semiotic material that works its way from the 
unconscious to the surface, a definite interpretation can never be reached. Things are 
less ambivalent in the following cases: to Claudius, Ophelia hands fennel and 
columbines (as has been explained before, fennel was known for its abortive function; 
in this case, it can be suggested that Ophelia rather hints to the double nature of the herb 
as corresponding to Claudius’ duplicitous games), for Gertrude and herself, she chooses 
rue. Significant at this point is Ophelia’s remark, ‘O, you must wear your rue with a 
difference’ (Shakespeare 4.5 180), since the rue was also called the ‘[...] chaste herb’, 
and ‘[...] known for its characteristic of suppressing desire’ (Newman 231). Thus it 
follows that Ophelia unashamedly – or probably she is unconsciously taking revenge? – 
exposes Gertrude for her inappropriate desire for Claudius, recommending that she take 
the chaste herb in order to have these illegitimately bawdy desires repressed. Turning 
again to her brother Laertes, Ophelia furnishes him with a daisy, an action that goes 
without a comment. Conventionally, the daisy is known to represent the Sun as well as 
the virtues innocence and virginity, and is said to ‘[…] adorn[s] the lawns of Paradise’ 
(de Vries 127); a realm that Ophelia possibly wishes to enter in the near future. On an 
allegorical level, Ophelia’s intention may be to remind Laertes of her sincerely innocent 
nature, thereby erasing the possible doubts he may have entertained when taking his 
leave. In her warm-heartedly sisterly fashion, Ophelia may have made her point clear 
and does not feel like appending any further explanation. While it must be admitted that 
some of the flowers do carry a quite mysterious, ambiguous meaning, matters are more 
certain with respect to the last flower that Ophelia mentions, but, significantly, does not 
hand out: ‘I would give you some violets, / but they withered all when my father died’ 
(Shakespeare 4.5 181-82). An emblem of grief and mourning, the violet assumes a place 
on a metalevel uniting past, present and future as it refers back to Polonius’ death and 
analeptically points towards Ophelia’s own death that will be mourned by Laertes with 
the following words, ‘And from her fair and unpolluted flesh / May violets spring!’ 
(Shakespeare 5.1 233), probably wishing to do his sister a last favour by remembering 
her words and advice.  
 Most certainly, Ophelia’s distribution of flowers cannot be simply explained as 
springing from her deranged mind; instead it should rather be proposed that this act be 
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read as a text, written in a profoundly symbolical, skillfully chosen language, 
intertwined with anger and grief at the prevailing circumstances that cannot be undone 
as long as the forces of the Symbolic Order are thoroughly intact. Bridget Gellert Lyons 
epitomizes this suggested reading as she avers, ‘In the confused meanings she ascribes 
to her flowers in her madness, Ophelia expresses in its most extreme form the gap 
between an ordered world of shared symbolic meanings and the murky world of intrigue 
and mental disorder that exists in Denmark’ (63). Ophelia instinctively may wish to 
bridge that gap, or even, regardless of the gross impossibility of that task, to be that 
bridge, as much as the psychotic wishes to mend the irrevocably broken world of 
language. That Ophelia will not be able to do so is evident as she stands in diametrical 
opposition to the world she has disconnected from. Withdrawing into a semiotic realm, 
Ophelia represents a ‘[…] mythical world of natural fertility and innocence […]’ that 
cannot possibly be reconciled with the ‘[…] urban or courtly world of deception and 
calculation’ (Gellert Lyons 63). The stark contrast between these two worlds that can 
positively be identified as Imaginary and Symbolic Order, most strikingly surfaces in 
the double nature one can allot to the emblem of the flower. Essentially being products 
of a happily intact, pastoral environment, flowers also fit into a chain of rather worldly 
associations: ‘picking flowers, young girls as flowers, “deflowering” […]’ (Gellert 
Lyons 65). Hence Ophelia may adorn herself with flowers suggestive of a halo of 
innocence surrounding her; however, in giving away those flowers, she metaphorically 
deflowers herself and thus connects herself more closely with the false, scheming world 
of Denmark. Ophelia’s confusion as to which world to belong to, or how to reconcile 
this schism, shows in the confusion that governs her distribution. The analogies she 
attempts to forward seem out of place and broken as has been hinted to in the text 
above; it is never quite clear what exactly she wants to express. Admitting on the one 
hand that there are stable links to be established between flowers and their meanings 
(for instance, naming violets as symbols for grief), ‘Ophelia […] is in fact drawing 
attention to the confusion that such linkings can create […] In some instances, she does 
not assign any meanings to the plants she distributes, although these plants […] can 
have […] widely different meanings’ (Gellert Lyons 66). Perhaps, however, it is not 
uncertainty or disorder that prohibits Ophelia from achieving clearly formulated 
interpretation; indeed it should be maintained that Ophelia intentionally refrains from 
expressing truths that are in harmony with the people addressed and one another in 
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order to highlight the incongruity between Denmark and an idyllic, intact world of 
orderly meaning. The duplicity dominating Elsinore is not only demonstrated via the 
mysterious distribution of flowers, but also surfaces in Ophelia’s use of language, a 
topic that has been elaborated on before. By repulsing the Law of the Father, Ophelia 
both departs from the Symbolic Order and the world of language. As has been pointed 
out, her language has become disintegrated, insubstantial and illogical; pieces of bawdy 
and infantile speech have been blended into a dense discourse, whose effect is to ‘[…] 
reveal the fragmentation of the worlds to which she can relate imaginatively’ and to 
manage a debasement of ‘[…] both courtly and country values’ (Gellert Lyons 68). 
Ophelia’s statement given immediately after the distribution, ‘For bonny sweet Robin is 
all my joy …’ (Shakespeare 4.5 184), eventually epitomizes the long anticipated, 
inevitable clash between the two worlds that have been existing side by side all along. 
Finally, the existence of these states is affirmed as a ‘[…] dramatic contrast between 
Ophelia as the potential heroine, pure and marriageable, of romance, and the actual lust 
and danger of the Danish world that Laertes and Polonius, as well as Hamlet, insistently 
impress upon her imagination’ (Gellert Lyons 69). Her seemingly “dirty mouth” does 
not suggest that Ophelia has become an unruly, fallen woman, but functions as an outlet 
for expressing ‘[…] emblematically the gap between the free world imagined in pastoral 
or comedy and the unsavory world of Denmark’ (Gellert Lyons 70). Ophelia literally 
becomes this “doubleness” that she is unable to cope with and that will eventually tear 
her apart. Having cherished purity and innocence all her lifetime, Ophelia can no longer 
control her drives in her madness as her ‘[…] subconscious mind […] finds oral 
expression while she is in an abnormal condition […]’ (Morris 602). It follows that 
Ophelia would probably never have uttered these obscenities deliberately in order to 
trouble the court. Another proof for the hypothesis that the lost love for Hamlet and not 
the death of her father has fatally influenced her mental sanity can be detected in her 
reference to bonny sweet Robin, which Morris identifies as ‘[…] one of the cant terms 
for the male sex organ’ (601). This unmistakably phallic allusion that Ophelia gives so 
freely verifies that Ophelia must have truly loved Hamlet, and, as a natural 
consequence, must as well have desired him physically; moreover, her bawdy remarks 
‘[…] imply that her suppressed desires were so strong that they helped to force her over 
the brink of sanity’ (Morris 602). To make his point irretrievably clear, Morris ends his 
article on the argument that ‘[t]he only conclusion that can be deduced […] is that […] 
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Shakespeare provides a clue to part of Ophelia’s malady: sexual frustration’ (603), 
hence opening up the play to the possibility of a Freudian reading. Beholding Ophelia’s 
case from this angle, one might imagine that Ophelia was unable to cope with her illicit 
desires and thus suppressed the awkwardly inappropriate material. As Ophelia must 
have been unable to come to terms with her sexuality – possibly because she was not 
expected or even allowed to do so – the repressed material kept coming to the fore again 
and again, forcing her to voice her thoughts again and again, furnish them with deeds 
and eventually, banish them for good. For socio-political reasons, it must have been 
impossible for Ophelia to overcome this repetition compulsion by processing her 
libidinal energy, so that the only way to escape this prison seemed to be death.  
 
4.3. Bride, Mermaid and Wretch – Ophelia’s Death as Tableau Vivant 
The revolutionary power Ophelia has assumed in her madness by way of violating 
established principles, showing a lack of respect towards authorities and exposing the 
intrigues at work in Denmark, is efficiently snatched away from her in death. The frame 
that has been constructed for her in lifetime as obedient daughter, humble sister and 
innocent maid is re-installed and re-impressed upon her as Gertrude reports in theatrical 
language the circumstances of Ophelia’s tragic yet poetic death. Bereft of agency and 
voice76, Ophelia is imprisoned again in the beautified picture that has been 
metaphorically painted by male superiors and would continue to be painted of her 
centuries after the play was published. As Ophelia’s suicide happens off-stage, the only 
account of it is given by Gertrude and thus proves to be a highly subjective and distorted 
source. Admittedly, her report lacks immediacy and thus empathy; it rather conjures up 
the impression of a monologue written for theatrical performance (Rhodes 74), wherein 
setting and action is rendered in minute detail so as to enable a sincerely authentic re-
enacting of the scenario. Additionally, the melodramatic account Gertrude gives seems 
merely to be ‘[...] prompted by a melancholy recollection rather than by immediate 
dramatic needs’ (Nosworthy 345). One might even tentatively argue that Gertrude’s 
speech permits the transformation of Ophelia into the type of the madwoman as 
                                                 
76 William W. Lawrence directs attention to the crucial fact that in ‘[...] Shakespeare’s play Ophelia does 
not affect the action at all after the Nunnery Scene, as far as Hamlet is concerned, excepting in so far as 
her death spurts Laertes to consent to the King’s final plot. In the tragedy of her madness and suicide we 
are likely to forget that her function in the main plot is over’ (413, emphasis in the original). Thus it 
appears justified to claim that Ophelia has been bereft of her agency as woman; the only purpose she 
serves after the Nunnery Scene is to exemplify the type of the madwoman and to measure up to the image 
of the pop culture icon. 
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pictorial and iconographic allusion figure so strongly that indeed a ‘[…] visual tableau 
[…]’ (Gellert Lyons 71) is created wherein Ophelia is successfully silenced and killed 
into art.  
 The opening words of her report, ‘[t]here is a willow grows askant the brook’ 
(Shakespeare 4.7 165) in fact disrupt the dialogue as Gertrude apparently switches to 
prose in order to facilitate a narration of Ophelia’s death. In highly poetically phrased 
language, Gertrude frames the setting of the tragedy as if providing an introduction to a 
narrative. The ‘[...] fantastic garlands [...]’ (Shakespeare 4.7 167) launch the pivotal 
detail that features in almost all subsequent depictions to be created of Ophelia, and 
which were to be become one of the key signs of her madness. By the same token, a 
connection between madness, femininity and nature is established that was never to be 
broken in the pictures of Ophelia that were composed even centuries later. It has been 
assumed that “fantastic” has been employed in the sense of “grotesque”, since no logical 
reason for why a suicidal maiden should adorn herself with ‘[...] crow-flowers, nettles, 
daisies and long purples [...]’ (Shakespeare 4.7 168) can be provided77. However, it can 
be claimed that the broken connections between those apparently randomly picked 
flowers ties in with the seemingly enigmatic statements Ophelia has uttered before. Her 
advice, given when dispensing flowers, as well as her deeds seem to be out of place and 
make little sense to the audience; to Ophelia, on the other hand, her actions must appear 
meaningful, even if they are not “orderly” and “logical” in a readily understandable 
sense of the word. Hence, the ‘[...] emblematic features of this description reveal 
dissonances [...]’ (Gellert Lyons 71) between the pastoral setting the Queen evokes and 
the sexual allusions she gives, which forms a connection to Ophelia’s utterances 
unravelling the gap between nature and Denmark, two worlds at odds with each other. 
In this respect there is a latent red thread to Ophelia’s madness that can only be detected 
when carefully trying to decipher the riddles Ophelia gives without disdaining them as 
nonsensical phrases springing from a troubled mind. The beautification of Ophelia, 
achieved by initiating the detail of the flower garland, and thus the peaceful splendour 
                                                 
77 According to Karl P. Wentersdorf, long purples are highly unsuitable for fashioning them into a 
garland, since ‘[...] the stalks droop quickly [...]’ and the smell is unpleasant. He continues by explaining 
that ‘[...] Ophelia’s garlands were made not only of “long purples” but also of “crow-flowers, nettles, 
[and] daisies.” Some varieties of flowering nettles are also malodorous and would surely be even more 
unsuitable for making garlands than the arum [long purples]. Crow-flowers, nettles, daisies, and arums 
are indeed an unlikely combination of flowers for a maiden’s coronet, and this is precisely what Gertrude 
implies when she describes the garlands as “fantastic.” [...] the grotesqueness of the coronet is intended to 
emphasize the pathetic madness of its wearer’ (416). 
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of nature, re-inserts Ophelia into the ‘[...] iconographic presentation [...]’ (Gellert Lyons 
71) that has been suggested earlier in the play. It appears as if Ophelia is transported 
back across the threshold she has crossed as if to erase her frightfully disorderly 
psychological development. Furthermore, the Queen may wish to divert attention from 
the horrors of death to the loveliness of nature (Gellert Lyons 71), which she places in 
the focus from the beginning on. Immediately after the first four lines, a sudden rupture 
occurs as the Gertrude takes to bawdy language and thus implies to bear the potential 
for madness as well. Of the long purples, she reports that these are plants ‘[t]hat liberal 
shepherds give a grosser name / But our cold maids do dead men’s fingers call them’ 
(Shakespeare 4.7 169-170), thereby drawing upon the phallic insinuations Ophelia has 
so unreservedly pioneered before. Apart from acknowledging the overtly sexual nature 
of these unsavoury connotations, there have been heated debates concerning the nature 
of the long purples. Karl P. Wentersdorf argues in a botanical article that Shakespeare 
might have been referring to Arum maculatum, ‘[...] the wild arum or Cuckoo-pint’ 
(414). He grounds his argument on the fact that ‘[...] the most striking feature of the 
flower is the long purple spadix, and [...] this feature has widely been regarded as 
phallic in appearance’ (Wentersdorf 415) and further elaborates on his supposition by 
saying that  
[...] the name “dead-men’s fingers” seems more appropriate to Arum maculatum 
than to Orchis mascula, partly because the Arum’s phallic spadix is surrounded 
by a partially opened whitish sheath that could be thought of as a shroud, and 
partly because the term “finger” can be a euphemism for the phallus. 
Wentersdorf 416 (emphasis in the original) 
 
Charlotte F. Otten provides a stably founded counterargument to Wentersdorf as she 
identifies Ophelia’s “long purples” with a species of orchids, ‘[...] most likely the 
“handed” Orchis Serapias or the Satyrion Royall [...]’ (399, emphasis in the original). In 
order to prove the accuracy of her theory, Otten supplies five arguments: 
[...] the Greek and Latin names, Orchis and Testiculus, were adopted because the 
roots resemble testicles and arouse carnal desires; [...] the “grosser name[s]” 
(Ballocks, stones, cods, cullions, pintell, Serapia’s stones, Satyrion) connoted the 
organs of generation [...]; the name Satyrion [...] an ancient allusion to a satyr 
[...] is particularly appropriate in the incestuous kingdom where Hamlet refers to 
Claudius as a satyr [...]; [...] the animals suggested (flies, gnats, frogs, lizards, 
hares, goats, apes)78 were a reminder of the loathsome bestiality of copulation 
                                                 
78 At an earlier point in the article, Otten explains that some orchids resemble those animals in smell and 
appearance (400, 401). 
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[...]; [...] Serapia’s stones [...] was an indication of rank and gross adultery, the 
kind Hamlet ascribes to Claudius and Gertrude [...] 401-402 (emphasis in the 
original) 
 
By weaving and wearing these curiously unusual garlands, Ophelia associates herself 
for the first time most explicitly with the fallen woman. It follows then that the only 
acceptable alternative for Ophelia, other than openly accepting her sexuality and being 
deprived of any social standing and good reputation, is to depart from a world wherein 
even nature has been contaminated by the depravity of sexuality (Gellert Lyons 72). 
This statement equally entails that a blurring of boundaries has already taken place in so 
far as the despised aspect of sexuality has entered into Ophelia’s semiotic realm where 
she is not (yet) able to cope with this issue originally meant to exist in the Symbolic 
Order. Wearing ‘[...] floral genitalia’ (Otten 398) cannot be allowed in a world that 
strictly adheres to the perpetuation of safe boundaries and in which a virgin decorated 
with phallic garlands is in itself a paradox contradicting any norms of what is possible 
and viable. This excess of signifiers, inconsistent in itself, unable to be allocated a 
securely defined space, is what expels Ophelia from the Symbolic Order into what is 
generally believed to be her natural element, water. Otten sums up this dilemma as she 
expresses sorrow for the ‘[...] virgin Ophelia, who [...] adorns herself with flowers 
whose sexuality is so apparent that in the wearing of them she appears to bring dishonor 
upon herself’ (402). Having symbolically deflowered herself, Ophelia is caught between 
the devil and the deep blue Sea; either she continues her subsidiary existence as a 
madwoman held in scantest regard, or she seeks to regain purity and completion in 
death, the only power that can grant her ‘[...] a felicitous escape from the obscenity of a 
funerary wreath of flowers known as hares bullocks, Serapia’s stones, Satyrion, 
Kingfingers, and Priest pintell’ (Otten 402). 
 Already in the next lines, Gertrude restores the harmony that she initiated, but 
then disrupted herself when referring to phallic plants and fallen women. Nature is 
anthropomorphised as Gertrude’s account continues in the following manner: ‘There, on 
the pendent boughs her coronet weeds / Clamb’ring to hang, an envious sliver broke / 
When down her weedy trophies and herself / Fell in the weeping brook’ (Shakespeare 
4.7 171-74). The correlation of nature and femininity reaches a wholly new dimension 
as nature itself takes on human traits. In the same instant, Ophelia’s death is made to 
resemble an accident, due to the envy felt by a twig (MacDonald 313). The brook is 
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weeping – is it bemoaning the death of nature’s daughter? Or should the brook rather be 
regarded as a part of Ophelia, expressing the sorrows and feeling that Ophelia herself is 
unable to handle? Either way, the connection is forged so strong that no doubts as to the 
natural connection between Ophelia and nature can arise. One even feels enticed to 
acknowledge an incontestable ‘[...] sense of harmony between the humanized landscape 
and the image of Ophelia as a nymph-like creature who is at home in the water’ (Gellert 
Lyons 72) that serves to diminish the tragedy of Ophelia’s death. Ophelia merges with 
the picturesque background of the setting in a way that adds a poetically melancholy 
dimension to her death; a deep-seated feeling that secretly accepts her death as an 
aesthetic wish of nature to call home its daughter. Yet another image that emerges from 
this scene is that of the mad bride, as Ophelia hangs her “coronet weeds” on the 
branches. The coronet metonymically takes the place of adornment a bride may wear, in 
particular the veil, as Ophelia probably prepares for an imagined wedding with Hamlet 
or her symbolical wedding to death; once deflowered, being socially dead.  
 Having already scrutinised part of the Queen’s relation, it must have become 
obvious by now that her ‘[...] speech cannot sustain the force of these mythological 
suggestions, any more than the water can sustain Ophelia’ (Gellert Lyons 72). The 
speech is in itself incoherent, composed of bits and pieces that help to insert Ophelia 
into an endless series of iconographical representations at times at odds with one 
another. This rhetoric of excess, as one may wish to call it, establishes Ophelia as an 
‘[...] incongruous figure [...]’ (Gellert Lyons 72), virgin in one instant, water-nymph and 
fallen woman in the next. Especially the popular because surreptitiously romanticised 
image of the nymph seems to please Gertrude, as she continues to narrate her story 
resonating with mythological overtones: ‘Her clothes spread wide, / And mermaid-like 
awhile they bore her up, / Which time she chanted snatches of old lauds, / As one 
incapable of her own distress, / Or like a creature native and endued / Unto that 
element’ (Shakespeare 4.7 174-179). The lines just cited occupy an exceedingly 
symbolical place in the narration since they irrefutably position Ophelia ‘[...] on 
opposing sides of traditional notions of femininity: that of the innocent and that of the 
fallen’ (Rhodes 73). While there are indeed subtle hints given that Gertrude pities 
Ophelia, accusing the twigs that have broken of envy which aligns Ophelia with 
innocence; there are as well some faint elements in her speech that ‘[...] complicate 
Ophelia’s ideally feminine (innocent) character by associating her with a more explicit 
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sexuality’ (Rhodes 74). Particularly the icon of the mermaid would engage the interest 
and attention of successive generations as they felt both horror and fascination for this 
mythically seductive creature which deliberately lured men to their cruel deaths. 
Productions of this image at times even outnumbered such versions as Ophelia-as-bride 
or Ophelia-as-daughter-of-nature, for the mermaid, ‘[...] a fantastical and unnatural 
creature [...] occupied a more decadent place than Ophelia in the Victorian imagination 
[...]’ (Rhodes 74). The layer of madness being attached as Ophelia is pictured as one 
oblivious of her impending doom even further complicates the conception of Ophelia’s 
character. This child-like unawareness, a youthfully innocent naivety inseparably linked 
to Ophelia’s delicate character, again detaches Ophelia from notions of sexual abandon 
and wantonness, implying that Ophelia perpetually negotiates between two competing 
discourses as she ‘[...] complexly embodies and aids in the regulation of both positive 
and negative feminine social roles’ (Rhodes 74). Gertrude’s finishing lines equally 
propagate contradictory notions of femininity: ‘But long it could not be / Till that her 
garments, heavy with their drink, / Pulled the poor wretch from her melodious lay / To 
muddy death’ (Shakespeare 4.7 179-181). Finally, Ophelia is transformed ‘[...] from a 
madwoman into a mermaid and a “wretch”’ (Rhodes 74); though called “poor”, she 
suffers a “muddy death” that ultimately ‘[...] resist[s] moral resolution’ (Rhodes 74) and 
bars the audience from achieving a satisfactorily coherent image of Ophelia. Gertrude’s 
speech, then, is as ambivalent as the picture that is negotiated of Ophelia after her 
death79, as she is bereft of voice, sexuality and agency for good. The pictures to be 
drawn, painted or composed reflect the polyvalent ways wherein Ophelia has been 
imagined in the minds of following generations of artists who almost always endowed 
her with those ‘[...] mythical and symbolic meanings [...]’ (Gellert Lyons 72) Ophelia 
was unable to handle in her lifetime and therefore withdrew into madness and death in 
water as offering some of the comfort that life could not donate. 
 
4.4. Too Young to Die – Ophelia as Pop Culture Icon 
For decades and centuries to follow, Ophelia has been fashioned and refashioned as an 
image based on male imagination of femininity and madness80. Her death even now 
                                                 
79 Nosworthy argues that ‘[...] it has to be admitted that the Queen’s story, as such, is one that will not 
endure the test of common sense’ (346). 
80 Jane Marcus accuses and deplores the allegedly natural connection between madness and femininity, 
identifying them both as social constructions that have been intertwined without justification: ‘Like 
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seems to exude an irresistible, almost preternatural fascination that apparently forces 
generations of artists to return to this subject ever and ever again. Carol Solomon Kiefer 
reports of this disturbingly deep-seated allure that ‘[p]aradoxically, we see and feel 
beauty in the awful reality of a troubled girl’s death by drowning’ (11), thereby possibly 
capturing the charms and horrors arising from the iconic image of a drowning virgin 
gone insane. She continues,  
[t]he scene has a long history of visual representation, beginning in the 
eighteenth century and continuing to the present. Ophelia is the most frequently 
depicted of Shakespeare’s heroines and certainly one of the most popular and 
intriguing of all his characters. But it is more than Shakespeare’s poetry and the 
universal fascination with death that accounts for Ophelia’s popularity. Hers is 
the sentimental tale of a victim, young and beautiful. She is an especially 
intriguing character, however, because of her madness – a madness that is 
ultimately linked to her femininity. Solomon Kiefer 11. 
 
This madness that seems to play the key role in various depictions of Ophelia is, 
however, never displayed as a token of power; her self-assertion appears to be 
completely eradicated after her death. Ophelia is most happily presented as a fair nymph 
having a ‘[...] wan, frail look, with a consumptive-like pallor’ (Solomon Kiefer 12). Her 
madness is indicated by her ‘[...] lost gaze [...]’ and ‘[...] long, dishevelled hair [...] 
strewn with flowers or twigs and straw [...]’ (Solomon Kiefer 12) which again 
establishes a subtle, yet undeniable connection to the indissoluble link between nature 
and woman. The “long, dishevelled hair”, nowadays an emblem of beauty, offered 
ample proof for Ophelia’s madness as wearing one’s hair openly appeared tantamount 
to frankly displaying one’s sexuality: ‘[a]nd the more abundant the hair, the more potent 
the sexual invitation implied by its display, for folk, literary, and psychoanalytic 
traditions agree that the luxuriance of the hair is an index of vigorous sexuality, even of 
wantonness’ (Gitter 938). Thus it appears perversely logical that when wanting to 
portray Ophelia as a luring mermaid, one chose to supply her with the ‘[...] tangled, 
disorderly hair of the sexually and emotionally volatile women [...]’ (Gitter 941) that 
testified to the ‘[...] glittering symbolic fusion of the sexual lust and the lust for power 
[...]’ (Gitter 943) that Ophelia was never able to attain.  
                                                                                                                                               
femininity, madness is a social construction. It is conceived as the opposite of sanity as woman is the 
opposite of man [...] What does the idea of the “normal” have to do with gender? Is madness a condition 
of gender? Does woman’s very otherness constitute a case of madness?’ (1).  
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The ambivalence that had already governed Gertrude’s speech is taken up as 
these depictions continue to enhance ‘[...] dual messages about femininity and insanity’, 
for a woman ‘[...] with her hair down indicated an offense against decorum, an improper 
sensuality’ (Showalter 11). Ophelia’s metaphorical defloration is hinted to as she is 
often depicted holding, dispensing or decorating herself with flowers carrying 
ambiguous meanings. Far from assuming the place of a revolutionary figure whose 
disruptive strength allows her to unveil hidden lies and intrigues, Ophelia becomes the 
young, passive and seductive mad bride dressed in white81. Remarkably, it is nowhere 
stated in the text that Ophelia was dressed in white as she marched towards death and 
salvation; again, this element was added by artists in order to transform Ophelia into a 
popular type – ‘[...] that sweet, gentle type of young womanhood [...]’ (Vanderlyn 91) 
rather than into a uniquely drawn, sensitive young woman desperately striving to attain 
her place in society.  
  
                                                 
81 ‘As on the Elizabethan stage, Ophelia is traditionally dressed in white [...]’ (Showalter 11); ‘Ophelia 
usually wears a long flowing white dress, a sign of her purity and innocence’ (Solomon Kiefer 12) 
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Fig. 1: “Ophelia” by John Everett Millais, oil on canvas 1851-1852 
 
Especially throughout the nineteenth century, the cult surrounding Ophelia and her 
death was fanned to a white heat; the Royal Academy boasted exhibitions of this subject 
around fifty times (Solomon Kiefer 12), and it was also during this period that the most 
popular image of Ophelia was painted. When John Everett Millais begun his portrayal 
of Ophelia’s death in 1851, he was about to create an iconic, almost larger-than-life 
image of Ophelia that ultimately captured her apotheosis into a cult figure. Particularly 
aptly, his painting fuses the rivalling notions revolving around Shakespeare’s heroine as 
he combined both the ‘[...] wild, emotional, and erotic [...]’ aspect as well the ‘[...] 
idealized conception of the pure and innocent Ophelia, a sentimentally precious, 
aesthetic object, bereft of sexuality and pitiful in her frail, delicate madness’ (Solomon 
Kiefer 12). Millais ingeniously processes the timelessness of Ophelia’s death, the supra-
historical component whereby she is left ‘[...] suspended forever between life and death’ 
(Solomon Kiefer 22). It should be pointed out that this aspect can be considered vastly 
appropriate since Ophelia never does get explicitly buried in the play so that there is no 
‘[...] representation of female death [...]’ (Chillington Rutter 300) to be taken as a 
model82. In the burial scene, her body is not shown, she has become an undead half-
presence, haunting generations of artists until Millais finally found the means to 
preserve this highly unusual state. Subjecting the painting to closer scrutiny, one might 
suggest it to be an illustration pertaining to Gertrude’s monologue, functioning now, 
however, as a visual sign of the potency of the male genius. Ophelia is no longer the 
drowning girl, but has become a spectacle, an object of conspicuous consumption with 
the spectator lingering ‘[...] voyeuristically [...] over the beautiful, pathetic spectacle, 
untroubled by any recognition that he is admiring a corpse’ (Chillington Rutter 308). 
Ophelia-as-spectacle is caught in the act of drowning itself; her pale watery eyes 
directed pathetically towards heaven, her fingers unnaturally writhed, mouth still half-
open suggesting her singing; which, on the other hand, also enhances a sexual reading 
(Rhodes 97). Hair and dress is voluminously floating in the brook, bestowing a 
mythological whiff upon the picture as the masses of wavy red hair remind the spectator 
of a mermaid’s sinister charms. Focusing rather on Ophelia’s meticulously realised 
                                                 
82 That there is no explicit burial scene incorporated into the play can be seen as grounding in the fact that 
‘[...] contemporary attitudes to suicide were more ambivalent and mortuary customs more uncertain [...]’ 
(MacDonald 309). 
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beauty arrests the picture in its ‘[...] pathos, innocence, and beauty rather than [in] the 
unseemly details of her death [...]’ (Rhodes 89), but does not erase, however, the creepy 
effect of Siddal’s half-shut, pitifully staring eyes. Ophelia-as-spectacle is in the same 
instant also Ophelia-as-victim, an icon of passivity floating in this native yet deathly 
element wherein her life dissolves gently and quietly into a dream of pre-Oedipal 
fulfilment that only the Imaginary can grant. No longer woman, human nor nymph or 
mermaid, Ophelia has been transfigured into a ‘[...] site of memory, fantasy, projection, 
and desire. Although she continually takes on new forms because she is what one brings 
to her, Ophelia is embedded or encoded with a specific set of distinguishing 
characteristics and meanings’ (Solomon Kiefer 12).  
 As is the case with Millais’ masterpiece, ‘[...] the viewer pities rather than fears 
Ophelia’s increasingly uninhibited expression of her perception of corruption in the 
court and her own unfettered sexuality’ (Rhodes 18). Having been framed by various 
artists and mingled with their perceived notions of idealised femininity, Ophelia’s 
subversive powers have been distorted into mere hysteria and deplorable insanity so that 
her unleashed powers are softened and thereby greatly reduced in scope. As Rhodes 
rightly points out, ‘[r]emoving the signifiers of her madness and repressing her sexuality 
[...] sentimentalizes and sanitizes Ophelia and contributes to the normalization and 
naturalization of mental illness as a presumed “female malady”’ (Rhodes 18). By 
drawing a perverted picture of Ophelia as coquette nymph, male painters possibly 
attempted to soften the strongly sexual powers surging in Ophelia’s bosom and thereby 
alleviated their own anxiety felt towards openly sexual, probably dominant women.  
In retrospect, the only way for Ophelia to assume a quantum of agency lay in 
madness, where all her hidden thoughts and desires uninhibitedly came to the surface. 
This madness, however, was after her death – and this death seemed inevitable as 
Ophelia had in her insanity withdrawn from the Symbolic Order in search for the Real, a 
place where she would candidly live and speak her desires – aestheticised and played 
down in order to silence Ophelia and reinsert her into the role of a chaste and 
submissive character. Elaborating on this aestheticisation has hopefully aided in 
unpacking the ‘[...] manner[s] in which images of Ophelia [...] were used to feminize 
madness, naturalize the stereotypical, circumscribed female roles of daughter and 
virginal, loyal love interest and identify physical beauty with morality’ (Rhodes 18). 
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The key questions, however, that may be posed after having elaborated upon Ophelia’s 
tragic fate,  
How can the woman be thought about outside of the Masculine/Feminine 
framework, other than as opposed to man, without being subordinated to a 
primordial masculine model? How can madness, in a similar way, be conceived 
outside of its dichotomous opposition to sanity, without being subjugated to 
reason? Felman 138 (emphasis in the original) 
 
will remain unanswered for now, as there seems to be no escaping conventionally 
established and acknowledged constructions that provide readily available und 
understandable reasons for women’s – and in this special case – Ophelia’s madness.  
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5. The Curse Is Come upon Her – the Impossibility of Crossing and 
Overturning Boundaries in Alfred Lord Tennyson’s “The Lady of Shalott” 
 
Alfred Lord Tennyson’s poem “The Lady of Shalott”, constituting one of several texts 
wherein he sought to process the myth of King Arthur and Lady Elaine, was first 
published in 1833 and later subtly, yet in interpretative terms meaningfully rewritten in 
1842 and finally revised in 1853. Steeped irresistibly deeply in a fictitious medieval 
world of courtly romance, the poem – despite its smacking of passions and morals 
belonging to a bygone age – nonetheless seems to be situated outside history, as it justly 
speaking reveals more about England’s nineteenth century mores than about mysterious 
Camelot83. Indeed, the imprisoned Lady bears much of the ‘domestic woman’s’ 
characteristics (N. Armstrong 19), endowed with ‘[...] little direct access to economic or 
political power [...]’ (N. Armstrong 56), her only reasonably attainable goal being 
marriage. Even this prospect fades as gratification is eternally deferred, ‘[...] set [...] 
forever in the realm of romance and therefore at odds with reality’ (N. Armstrong 198). 
Tennyson’s strategy, then, obviously resides in concealing contemporary discomforts 
and socio-political problems behind pastoral landscapes and medieval courts; a strategy 
one might easily label escapism. This can quite straightforwardly be inferred after 
having read in Udall that nineteenth-century England, in particular the Victorian society 
that ‘[...] delighted in medieval legends, mingling them freely with Biblical history and 
elements of ancient mythology’, unhappily ‘[...] sought to escape an accelerating 
industrial blight by retreating into the mythology of [the] past’ (N. Armstrong 34). 
Caroline Evans connects such a re-assessment of ancient tropes to the return of the 
repressed, as artists ‘[...] intuitively reinterpret past images of instability in the present’ 
(Emblems 94)84. Mentioning the return of the repressed, it becomes evident that the 
                                                 
83 ‘One could argue, if one were to read the poem as a modernized medieval tale, that the setting renders 
irrelevant the nineteenth-century aesthetic and social categories fundamental to the reading of the poem 
proposed in this paper. Or one could argue that this setting, removing the narrative situation of the poem 
from the historical era in which the poem was written, is meant also to remove the artistic or even the 
sexual problems the poem poses from the flux of history, to suggest that those problems are simply 
inherent in art or sexual difference in general. Both of these arguments rely on an assumption implicit in 
the historical distance that the setting imposes between the narrative situation of the poem and that of its 
audience: the dilemma the poem describes is universal and supra-historical; it confronts all women 
and/or all artists in all eras’ (Chadwick 29, emphasis mine).  
84 Actually, Caroline Evans writes about ‘designers’ and not ‘artists’, since her article revolves around 
‘[t]he return of the repressed in fashion imagery today’. I have appropriated this quote to my own ends, 
arguing that both poems and fashion items are tokens that are created with a deliberate aim in mind, 
however infused with unconscious (repressed) motives.  
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poem perfectly lends itself to a psychoanalytical reading; however, it is Lacanian 
psychoanalysis and not the Freudian one that shall be applied to unveil the poem’s 
mysteries. And mysterious it proves to be indeed: 
It [the poem] studies to create a form which, as Ruskin was later to say, appears not to 
know its own meaning. It is curiously unaccountable and sourceless. Its strategy is to be 
opaque, proffering and evading interpretation simultaneously [...], 
 
states Isobel Armstrong in a detailed reflection upon Alfred Lord Tennyson’s famous 
poem “The Lady of Shalott” (50). Countless coatings of symbolism have given rise to 
controversial claims, speculating about the very purpose the poem might want to fulfil: 
does the poem seek to conform to patriarchal values, upholding a solidly paternal world 
founded upon Victorian values and dogmas, or are the dissident whispers that ghostly 
haunt the stable Victorian setting witnesses of an attempt to subvert nineteenth century 
mores?85 The poem, much like its eponymous protagonist, seems indeed thwarted, torn 
between unattainable goals and at unease with itself. This all too evident cacophony is 
what prompts the following consideration of the poem’s stance towards femininity and 
sexuality in a world that literally ‘curses’ women striving for subjectivity. Though 
critics have read Tennyson’s poem as potentially subversive – and I do not endeavour to 
deny its seditious potential – and the ending as possibly triumphant, I would argue that 
via self-fashioning done by copying from already established models, and a simple 
inversion rather than deconstruction of existing categories, gender dichotomies are re-
enacted merely than transgressed. The psycho-analytical order of states, semiotic 
(Imaginary) versus symbolic (Symbolic Order) is left scrupulously intact, although 
attempts to point to cracks within this self-enclosed system manifest themselves. On a 
journey away from a partly ideal, feminine state – possibly the semiotic chôra, as one 
may wish to call it – through mirror-stage entailing tragically disillusioning discoveries 
and the transgression of the thetic barrier towards the omnipotent Symbolic Order, it 
becomes clear once more that the bubble of the Real wherein the Lady might wish to 
continue a self-determined existence must necessarily burst. 
 
 
                                                 
85Among others, Carl Plasa gives rise to such speculations, concluding his article with the statement that 
‘[…] Tennyson’s poem emerges as no less centrally fractured, or “cracked from side to side,” than the 
mirror within it, precisely unsure in fact as to quite which side of its own covert political and socio-sexual 
debate it is on – that of patriarchy and reaction or women and subversion’ (260). 
 85 
 
 
5.1. The Poem “Cracked from Side to Side?”86 
The primary dichotomies whereon the narrative is fleshed out are the oppositional pairs 
semiotic/symbolic, alias Imaginary/Symbolic Order, man/woman, life/art. Right from 
the beginning onwards, the binary pairs are employed in a highly conventional manner, 
before they come to be overturned as the narrative draws towards its tragic close. At the 
height of the poem’s subversive potential, gender dichotomies are reversed only to be 
safely re-installed at the very end, deferring the Real endlessly beyond reach87. 
A securely divided existence of semiotic chôra and Symbolic Order is affirmed 
already in the opening lines of the poem that plunge the reader into a highly elaborate, 
though admittedly pseudo-medieval agrarian setting, picturesquely invoked via pastoral, 
idyllic fairy-tale scenes. Both ‘[...] barley and [...] rye [...]’ (Tennyson 2) and a ‘road’ 
(Tennyson 4) running towards Camelot speak of male craft and productiveness, whereas 
Shalott is introduced as a feminine, flowery space, immediately conjuring up 
reminiscences of the “natural” connection between nature, art and femininity88. An ever 
flowing, changing nature heavily contrasts, and is complemented by, the static interior 
that the Lady, as much an epitome of Shalott as Lancelot is of Camelot, seemingly 
involuntarily inhabits (Shannon 210). Whereas the outside world appears to be busy and 
working, time stands still in Shalott – it is cut off from knowledge, experience, and, as 
one feels, also from space and time, a free floating signifier in an otherwise intact 
pastoral little world. However, the problematic crack in the picture appears when 
considering the role Shalott assumes for the Lady and her already mysteriously cast fate. 
What is Shalott, this sequestered island, remote from the world and still locked into a 
symbiotic relationship with it, for its inmate? Being compelled by some unknown power 
to an immobile existence within ‘[f]our grey walls and four grey towers’ (Tennyson 15), 
the setting bears connections to a private, domestic space designed as woman’s common 
lot. On the other hand, the very enclosure that darkens the sunny sky outside 
unmistakably calls the semiotic chôra to mind, a ‘[...] womb, source of creativity and 
fulfilment’ (Gribble 22). It comes little surprising then, that Shalott should be defined 
                                                 
86 I have borrowed this subheading from Plasa’s article with the same name wherein he questions the 
ambivalent sexual politics of Tennyson’s poem. 
87 This indeed becomes more obvious in the second version of the poem, where Lancelot has the last word 
and smothers the fear the Lady has evoked by re-introducing the patterns that have been at work before. 
88‘It is hardly surprising, then, that in “The Lady of Shalott“, the feminine is repeatedly identified with the 
private and artistic and the masculine with the socially productive’ (Gill 111). 
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through and through by feminine images (Gill 111). Surrounded by water, Cixous’ 
master signifier of femininity, and ‘a space of flowers’ (Tennyson 16), the Lady seems 
to melt with the natural environment into a single, coherent image, remaining a sheer 
echo of flowers and river that are visually perceptible whereas she is not. The fact that 
the Lady herself is not explicitly introduced, but enters the stage only as the “prisoner” 
of the phallic castle89, only ascertains the speculations of her being an appendix, a by-
product of nature that cannot really be separated from it. Further tracing this 
supposition, the Lady becomes a ‘[...] half-presence [...]’ (Gill 111), wholly dependent 
upon lilies and roses with which to identify in order to be able to speak of an existence 
at all. When she is finally personally introduced, which does not happen until the end of 
the poem’s first part, she appears as a Lady of courtly Romance, an emblem of the 
maiden cult, which only too obviously severs the ties that could possibly unite her with 
the peasant community surrounding her. ‘She leaneth on a velvet bed / Full royally 
apparellèd’ (Tennyson 1832 34-35), there is a certain halo of arrogance and aloofness to 
her (or is it indeed oblivion?) that entices one to ask whether she is fairy or human, and 
what her place in the community might truly be. All dressed up and nowhere to go, she 
might as well constitute a being from a separate sphere, yet unconscious of its fate and 
role in the world. Indeed, the Lady conjures forward the impression of impersonating 
nineteenth century fantasies of a feminine ideal that is both ‘[...] corporeal and 
insubstantial’ (Chadwick 19). Fully enclosed by a lively public space she cannot enter, 
she is wholly allotted the role of the angel of the house ever dedicated to domestic tasks. 
Paradoxically, it is precisely her femininity that binds her to this ‘[...] unmoving, 
unchanging [...]’ existence, where she remains detached from ‘[...] the cycles of 
economic and sexual exchange’ (Chadwick 17); an existence denoting equally a space 
and a state of mind. All these unviable interdictions imposed upon her serve to deny her 
subjectivity and even more so, her corporeality. As the poem unmistakably bears 
witness to, the Lady is but a mere myth – a myth that is deepened in the subsequent 
versions, where she embodies even stronger some fairy figure whose existence nobody 
can truly confirm: ‘But who hath seen her wave her hand? / Or at the casement seen her 
stand? / Or is she known in all the land?’ (Tennyson 24-26). Purportedly, she might not 
constitute more than an element of a fairy tale, a legend that has been heard of – or is 
                                                 
89 ‘The island of Shalott is the object of people’s curious gaze, the Lady herself is hidden and displaced as 
the stanza describing her proceeds‘ (I. Armstrong 61). 
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vaguely believed to be true – by the superstitious peasant commune, an epitome of 
which is launched by the figure of the enigmatic reaper. Emblematic part of the rural 
community or narrative device, the reaper remains puzzlingly shady grace to his 
nocturnal whisperings that nevertheless comprise a pivotal role in the first part of the 
poem. The appearance of the reaper and his seemingly apprehensive rumours as to the 
nature of the Lady prove to root her even more profoundly within a traditionally 
conservative and unsubtly credulous agrarian environment (I. Armstrong 55). The 
reaper represents a character as ambiguously mysterious as the Lady herself; Shannon 
puts forward that he, as one of the people ‘[...] most closely attuned to rural 
superstitions [...]’ (210) functions as a mere tool needful to increase the Lady’s 
mystifying aura. Is he truly only an instance of folk mythology, or is there a deeper 
aspect behind this person? Given that he only emerges during the unfathomable twilight 
hours90 and murmurs ‘[b]eneath the moon’ (Tennyson 1832 34), he could equally be 
considered as a harbinger of death, even a personification of Death itself, reminiscent of 
the figure of Death as the Harvester, foreshadowing the Lady’s dreadful fate. With the 
voice of patriarchal interdiction, he introduces the curse, labelling the Lady a fairy, thus 
diminishing the spectrum of roles available to her considerably. The reaper’s whisper, 
reaching the Lady’s ears, forbids her to look down to Camelot, which implicitly warns 
her against the dangers of a role reversal achieved by actively assuming the gaze. ‘She 
has heard a whisper say / A curse is on her if she stay / To look down to Camelot’ 
(Tennyson 39-41), Tennyson tells the reader, hence providing a bridge to the 
aforementioned “whispering” Grim Reaper. Perceiving only the faint echoes as traces of 
the omnipresent, omnipotent masculine voice, the Lady might automatically assume the 
lowly uttered rumours to be her curse91. On a different level, the “curse” can be read as 
a masked commemoration of conservative Victorian values – arguing for proper 
behaviour and a complete repression of desire – that need to be upheld, if necessary by 
force. In this respect, the section concerning the curse, if not the entire poem, can be 
understood as latently bemoaning the female situation in the Victorian Age; a socio-
historical, political reading, however, is not relevant to the purpose of this thesis.  
                                                 
90 ‘[...] reaping late and early’ (Tennyson 20) 
91 ‘This whisper precedes the curse-whisper so closely [...] as to suggest that the Lady hears the reaper’s 
whisper as the curse [...] The reaper’s whisper, crossing the river, becomes the curse, thus taking on the 
force of a speech act which makes the Lady what it names’ (Chadwick 21). 
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What to some extent bridges the gap between semiotic Shalott and symbolic 
Camelot is the meticulously portrayed landscape stretching around and about Shalott. 
Tennyson introduces to the mind of the reader ‘Long fields of barley and of rye / That 
clothe the wold and meet the sky’ (2-3), ‘The yellowleavèd waterlily / The 
greensheathèd daffodily’ (Tennyson 1832 6-7), and among others, a ‘stream that 
runneth ever’ (Tennyson 1832 12). Regarding this tableau vivant in greater detail, 
however, one reluctantly needs to admit that all these successions of sensual 
impressions seem disconnected, broken and almost deathly. Bits and pieces, waterlily, 
barley, wold, stream, are enumerated and serve to contrast with the achromatic phallic 
castle, but they open the view to a ‘[...] world dominated by separateness and without 
promise of continuity and wholeness [...] the pieces dislocate the continuity and create a 
landscape in which there are openings and discontinuities’ (Colley 370); they are free 
floating signifiers without any readily available meaning. A ‘[...] synecdochic landscape 
[...]’, as Colley aptly labels it (Colley 371) surrounds the Lady, thereby still aggravating 
the burgeoning sentiments of her being displaced, of not belonging, being scattered and 
fragmented all over the place. Thus it seems only suitable, if not too obvious, that only a 
piece of the Lady – her voice – should leave the tower in order to haunt the already 
disunited landscape. “Haunt” might indeed prove to be an appropriate term, as nature 
itself is alien and frightening (Alaya 281). Waterlily and daffodilly ‘[t]remble in the 
water chilly’ (Tennyson 1832 8), ‘[...] aspens shiver / The sunbeam-showers break and 
quiver’ (Tennyson 1832 10-11), as if quite at unease with themselves – a statement that 
could as well apply to the Lady of Shalott. Trembling, shivering, quivering – in fact 
these lexemes do not suggest graceful, easy movements as one would conventionally 
expect to take place in a feminised realm. The tremble might be one of a painfully 
indeterminable anticipation, telling of sinister suspicions preceding probable changes. 
Hand in hand with the nascent doubts as to the character of these impending changes go 
the quivering and shivering, terrors of mind that literally affect the body to move 
anxiously. 
Shalott’s partner and opposite in this poem dominated by binary pairs is 
Camelot, the place that both road and stream lead to, as if already suggesting that this is 
the goal ultimately to be reached; the master signifier that will always and necessarily 
win the game. The descriptions concerning Camelot are few and sparsely employed; 
listing people rather than objects, which yet further divides active Camelot from static 
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Shalott. Village-churls, market-girls92, a troop of damsels, an abbot, a shepherd, a page 
as well as knights pass by, reminding the Lady of her missing social life. 
Conspicuously, these people are almost always referred to by their social function or 
role they assume within the orderly – and hence masculinely connoted – community of 
Camelot. Even though individuality seems not to play a vital part, nonetheless they 
represent a hierarchy of their own and thus instil in the Lady the irrepressible yet self-
destructive desire to participate in the Symbolic Order (Alaya 282).  
Now that the poem’s underlying binary structure into private/semiotic Shalott 
and public/symbolic Camelot has been made evident, the next chapter shall introduce 
Lacanian notions of desire and loss that inexorably come into play as the façade of the 
initial idyll crumbles and the dormant subversive potential breaks to the fore.  
 
5.2. “Tirra lirra” – the Lady as a Lancelot? 
So far it has been presumed that the Lady lives in an Imaginary realm, thus being 
oblivious to the patriarchal interdictions and rules that have confined her within her 
prison. Having not yet been introduced to the Symbolic Order, her life appears to be 
perfect as she is utterly dedicated to the task of weaving ‘[a] magic web with colours 
gay’ (Tennyson 38), knowing little of language, sexual difference and the outside world. 
Weaving in her shapeless, fluid personal realm, the Lady could happily continue her 
task forever and ever, would not the mirror’s seductive sights – be they magically 
distorted representations of patriarchy or just unsuccessfully repressed projections of her 
own dissatisfied mind – interfere and lure her away from her figurative mother’s lap. 
The productively artistic existence can therefore find its fulfilment only at the expense 
of leading a life in shadows, a psychotic and consequently impossible continuation of 
the symbiosis with the maternal body. The fallacy whereon the Lady grounds her 
otherwise content life is summed up by Chadwick, who asserts that ‘[t]he autonomy and 
independence her isolation grants her, then, turn out to be fundamentally illusory, since 
she is granted them only at the cost of becoming just as shadowy as the images the 
mirror shows her’ (18). The crucial gadget, then, the one thing that implants the desire 
for subjectivity and (sexual) completion beyond her castle in her, is – little surprising, 
allowing for the heavily resonating Lacanian undertones – the mirror.  
                                                 
92 The market-girls‘ red cloaks are indeed reminiscent of another fairy tale, Little Red Riding Hood, and 
thus even more strongly connect the Lady to menstruation, sexuality and impending womanhood. 
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 Whereas the 1833 version holds that the mirror simply ‘[reflects] towered 
Camelot’ (Tennyson 1832 50) and thus reproduces patriarchal Camelot in front of the 
Lady’s eyes, the revised version gives rise to more ambiguous speculations: ‘And 
moving thro’ a mirror clear / That hangs before her all the year / Shadows of the world 
appear’ (Tennyson 46-48). Shadows, which are by their very nature already distorted, 
suggest a rather sinister worldview, paradoxically appearing in a “mirror clear”. It is 
again the magic mirror that inevitably instigates the thetic break and by the same token 
the poem’s first turning point; prefiguring the Lady’s entering into language, 
knowledge, sexuality and ultimately death. Catching a glimpse on a life beyond her 
cage, especially on scenes intrinsic to human social life, finally thrust the almost 
apathetically working Lady into sudden awareness and prompt her to challenge her fate 
by dismissing her rigidly framed role. An only seemingly deliberate jumble of pictures 
featuring ‘[a] funeral with plumes and lights’ (Tennyson 67) and ‘[...] two young lovers, 
lately wed’ (Tennyson 70) rushes by in front of her, enabling her to voice her desire by 
uttering the famously liberating yet utterly detrimental sentence ‘I am half-sick of 
shadows’ (Tennyson 71). Especially the two lovers make the Lady understand what she 
lacks, and furthermore, permit her to name that lack, thereby allowing her to fully 
apprehend the measure of her perilously looming tragedy93. Βy speaking for the first 
time with a voice of her own, the Lady declares herself as an autonomous subject and 
articulates her own, deeply personal desires, which causes a shift in power relations. 
Stepping across the thetic barrier, the Lady has experienced the Mirror Stage and hence 
inescapably left behind the time spent weaving mechanically without reflection for 
good. In this respect it seems that the kind of “security blanket” that had sheltered the 
Lady before in her semiotic chôra has been removed, that by leaving the realm of myths 
and entering into the Symbolic Order, the Lady has also become increasingly vulnerable 
and susceptible to all too human fallacies. Illusory – or phrased more poetically, 
“magical” – projections the mirror has delivered to her lead her into believing in an 
ideally coherent, satisfying life outside the castle. This falsely granted security bestows 
a certain revolutionary force and bravery upon her; but since the basis whereon her 
                                                 
93 Isobel Armstrong sees this newly gained knowledge as arising from reflection: ‘Reflection and 
language belong together [...] because the act of reflection is an act of separation of categories and 
therefore inevitably an act of self-separation. And since language is a system of marks and differences, 
reflection and language are inseparable. [...] Thus in coming into language we simultaneously come into 
reflexive self-consciousness’ (98).  
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hopes are grounded is necessarily a delusional one, her subversive attempts must 
automatically end in disaster.  
 The narrative’s second turning point is enacted with an even stronger disrupting 
force as it features ‘bold Sir Launcelot’ (Tennyson 77) loudly and vigorously 
penetrating the Lady’s private space. The change occurs suddenly and with a kind of 
violence necessary to cause a rupture into the neatly established system; with the same 
catalytic force that catapults the infant out of its mother’s arms into a traumatic state of 
alienation within the Symbolic Order, the Lady is seized abruptly by a desire she has 
never known before. Lancelot, an epitome of all that Camelot stands for, pierces 
flowery Shalott as he rides ‘[...] between the barleysheaves’ (Tennyson 72), thereby 
(albeit unconsciously) anticipating the split he is about to cause. It is also Lancelot who 
fully unleashes the desire for sexuality and marriage that had been surging within the 
Lady’s bosom since the two lovers suggested the promise of wholeness and fulfilment. 
‘[S]tudded with sunlit, phallic imagery [...]’, he metaphorically “rapes” the Lady’s 
private space: ‘[a] metallic phallus, he cracks “from side to side” the “crystal mirror” 
which has formed the barrier between the Lady’s privacy and public Camelot’ 
(Chadwick 23). Allegorically, the Lady is “deflowered”; the orderly patterns get 
confused and turned upside down. In an act of self-determination as well as self-
destruction, the Lady moves from stasis to activity as she crosses the room and looks – 
against all odds – out of the window down to Camelot. In an almost voluntarily 
juxtaposition, she sees waterflower, helmet and plume (Tennyson 111-112) as the last 
pictures reaching her eyes before both her greatest success and her downfall. These 
elements seem wrongly out of place, and moreover, out of reach for her, as they bear no 
relations toward one another, except that they stand in an all too obvious asymmetric 
power relation. The masculine, phallic and metallic helmet forms a stark contrast to the 
defencelessly fragile flower; the plumes seem arbitrarily pasted into this highly 
symbolical collage. Almost forming a bricolage, the items bearing feminine and 
masculine connotations respectively only testify to a ‘[...] discrepancy in power and 
value’ (Chadwick 24), pointing both backwards to the synecdochic landscape that 
cannot be mended and forwards to a future wherein the Lady will be as much displaced 
as flower, helmet and plume are now cut off from their contexts. Yet, this jumble of 
symbols can be read as associations flashing to the Lady’s mind as a kind of shock 
reaction to the just executed defloration and the impending journey into an as yet 
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unknown future. As the pieces of a puzzle finally fall into place without making 
concretely discernible sense, the fragmentation of this passage testifies to a certain 
madness the Lady experiences as the curse comes “upon her” (I. Armstrong 93). The 
concurrence of these three signs – both meaningful as associative pictures and 
meaningless because a rational explanation for this random collection cannot be 
provided – furthermore points to the disorder and change of roles to take place. 
Had the narrative up to now followed quite conventional patterns (the Lady as a 
fairy living among the flowers, Lancelot as the knight in shining armour complete with 
heavenly/cosmic, phallic imagery), there seems to take place now a gradual reversal of 
roles. Contrary to conventional expectations, Lancelot does not carry armours with him, 
but a (nevertheless phallic) ‘[...] mighty silver bugle [...]’ (Tennyson 88), a musical 
instrument that connects with the Lady’s previous musical activities. Lancelot is further 
effeminised – if one chooses to stick to traditional patterns that assign uniquely musical 
qualities to women – by his singing “Tirra lirra” (Tennyson 107), that finally distracts 
the Lady’s full attention and directs it wholly and fatally to the outside world. If the 
production of free floating sounds is what ostensibly unites the Lady and Lancelot94, she 
gains supplementary strength to escape her prison by relying on mutual bonds that 
unhappily exist only in her imagination. As her aural senses have been stimulated by 
Lancelot’s singing, the Lady feels compelled to rely on the visual sense as well, in order 
to complement the picture she has received in her mind. Employing sight, however, 
proves to be her undoing as the scene presented to the Lady turns out to be ultimately as 
much distorted as the ‘[...] mirror’s magic sights’ (Tennyson 65) had been. Observing 
Lancelot’s shield, wherein ‘a redcross knight’ kneels sincerely devoted to his lady 
(Tennyson 78-79), the Lady assembles the jumble of pictures she has just obtained into 
an organic whole, a love story without happy ending, however, since it is based on 
utterly wrong assumptions and hopes. Thus, the emblem of courtly love is perverted 
into a myth, used unwillingly as a ‘[...] means to manipulation and power’ (I. Armstrong 
79), leading the Lady into believing she could have the same, would she just confront 
the curse and take action95.  
                                                 
94 ‘His singing, a further point of affinity between him and the Lady, strengthens her will to defy the 
curse’ (Shannon 216).  
95 ‘Now continuity and wholeness seem as possible as the promise of eternal faithfulness depicted on 
Lancelot’s shield [...] That momentary presence pushes the Lady from her loom, her mirror, from her 
synecdochic and metonymic space, and urges her and the poem forward’ (Colley 372).  
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As has been monitored above, the binary patterns whereon the poem seems to be 
built have been shaken and challenged, partly by the Lady herself. Firstly, the male 
protagonist has been effeminised via his association with feminine attributes (singing, 
black curls, music instrument); and secondly has the “fairer sex” taken means to defy 
the patriarchal system that has entrapped her. Having been previously framed by 
anonymous spectators outside the poem, it is now her who does the looking: ‘She saw 
the waterflower bloom / She saw the helmet and the plume: / She looked down to 
Camelot’ (Tennyson 111-113, emphasis mine). The Lady moves from a rather passive 
witness – honestly, “seeing” would not be defined as something ones does on purpose; 
rather, pictures and scenes are reflected by means of light and meet the eye – to an 
active spectator, who swerves the gaze deliberately towards Camelot. Assuming the 
gaze of an erotically desiring subject – conventionally granted to men – and thereby 
trespassing on male grounds, the Lady achieves her up to now greatest triumph: the 
binaries of spectator as subject and object of the look are temporarily reversed96. In so 
far, one could claim for Lancelot to momentarily occupy the female position, the object 
of desire and the Lady’s hopeful stare. Conversely, the Lady ‘[...] emerges as a Lancelot 
[...]’ (Colley 372) both penetrating and seizing the space around her; she has acquired 
masculine traits as it is her who determines the action; even if she is slave to a greater 
will that has loaded the curse on her. Gone are the slow-paced renderings of landscape, 
singing and weaving: ‘[a]ction, fullness, and inscription replace passivity, emptiness, 
echoes, whispers, and rumour’ (Colley 372). Shalott, initially both prison and source of 
an originally feminine art production, accomplishes its last function as the very space 
which ‘[...] the hero crosses or crosses to [...]’ (De Lauretis 139) – thereby assigning the 
space its mythological or symbolic function – is left for good, which becomes especially 
clear as the Lady’s piece of art is abjected and her primary tool of perception destroyed: 
‘Out flew the web, and floated wide / The mirror cracked from side to side’ (Tennyson 
114-115). Simultaneously she realises ‘The curse is come upon me’ (Tennyson 116), as 
if fully apprehending the measure of her frantic action for the first time. Desire for 
completion and fulfilment of the lost unity, the Real kindly beckoning to her, now urges 
her forward to eventually meet her fate and forces her to sacrifice provisional, semiotic 
structures in order to assume her place within the Symbolic Order. 
                                                 
96 ‘Appropriating the gaze, the Lady enters the position of the desiring subject and so enacts – at the 
scopic level – the crossing from “feminine” to “masculine” gender positions originally figured in the 
projected foray from Shalott to Camelot’ (Plasa 258).  
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In what follows an account of how the poem’s indeed significant subversive 
potential ultimately proves to be its greatest weakness at the same time shall be given. 
The next subchapter shall trace how reversing apparently fixed gender positions and 
foraying into the patriarchally determined, symbolic Camelot furnish the Lady with the 
potential to disrupt the prevalent order of things; due to the narrow range of possibilities 
within her reach, however, this potential is suffocated under layers of white garments 
and utterly dissolved by indifferent Sir Lancelot.  
 
5.3. All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go: Here Comes the Bride 
On her last journey towards Camelot, and, in a further sense, towards self-assertion, 
fulfilment and subjectivity that, though the laces of the Imaginary confinement have 
been cut, trigger the Lady’s inevitable (not to say necessary, for the patriarchal order) 
death; the poem reaches the height of its subversive potential that had been latently 
circulating around Shalott. While this fact is acknowledged by various critics, most of 
them do agree as well on the fact that this potential is insufficiently exploited by far. 
Merely exchanging roles and adapting to prescribed role models – like the one of the 
bride – seems simply not adequate in a solidly founded patriarchy and thus does not 
suffice to cause a noticeable change. So, it shall be claimed and proven in this chapter 
that the Lady’s attempt to transgress the space originally ascribed and allocated to 
women is ultimately punished with death. Crossing the soberly fixed lines that keep the 
spaces apart, then, proves to be the true crime97. The Lady’s visual transformation by 
means of clothes and accessories could indeed be called a symbolic resistance to 
conventionally hetero-normative gender constructions; a ritualistic challenge of the 
predominant, restrictive discourse; would she not copy and paste from exactly the same, 
patriarchally informed and narrow-mindedly patterned models she actually seeks to 
defy.  
 Finally escaping her prison, the Lady has entered on a speaking subject’s 
position, and, by going public, the duality of semiotic/private and symbolic/public is 
fleetingly dissolved. Considering the fact, however, that the Lady has to choose between 
two impossible positions – psychosis and death – truly entices one to question her 
agency and further leads to speculations about her being in fact interpellated into the 
                                                 
97 This very factum ultimately proves the poem firmly rooted in the conventionality it returns to at the 
end. In Plasa’s words, ‘[...] the narrative of the poem registers its own resistance to the transgression of 
gender divisions – and hence the possibility of political change – of which that crossing is the sign’ (250).   
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position she thinks she has chosen by herself. In an unpromising attempt to finally fix 
meaning and by extension, fix her identity to be part of the stable world she has entered, 
the Lady writes her name on the boat, thus having fully and irreversibly come into 
language. Drawing strongly upon Lacanian notions of language and loss, Colley views 
the act of naming as a crucial point: 
The written name brings with it hopes of continuity because it is a fixed 
designator; it also admits differences because the very act of naming 
acknowledges the presence of the Other and the necessity for that presence to 
break away from a metonymic relationship with her parent, the island of Shalott 
[...] and create her own identity. 374. 
 
In the same instant, Colley acknowledges the inextricable ties between naming and 
death98. Having escaped her limited existence within the chôra, the Lady is thrust into a 
world wherein she necessarily has to face ‘[...] the experience of loss [...]’ (Colley 375) 
and will strive to find the satisfactory completion she will only regain in death.  
 The opening lines of the fourth part appear to employ a universally conceded 
and uncommonly popular trope; landscape and femininity merge into a unity, a pattern 
that has been observed and discussed already in Poe’s “Eleonora” and “Morella”99. 
Tennyson’s description of an autumnally grey and dying landscape (‘In the stormy 
eastwind straining / The pale-yellow woods were waning / The broad stream in his 
banks complaining / Heavily the low sky raining / Over towered Camelot’ (118-122)) 
foreshadows the Lady’s death as well as the terrifying awareness that is going to meet 
her. All her hopes revolving around attaining a better destiny, a life under the sunny sky 
of Camelot, have been built upon a fallacy: an escape, a crossing from Shalott to 
Camelot is indeed illusory, since the two worlds that have existed side by side within 
her mind turn out to be one and the same100. As the desired future becomes the despised 
                                                 
98 ‘Naming involves death also because it aspires to the ultimate, to fix the margin [...] Names name the 
death of oneness and are dependent upon representation’ (Colley 375).  
99 Contrary to “Morella”, however, nature is not at peace; under a dark sky, the water is surging and the 
winds are howling, probably tracing the Lady’s rebellion against Camelot and her subsequent downfall. 
100 Referring back to the impossibility of possible political change, Carl Plasa states that ‘This process 
[that the Lady has set in motion] works [...] to transform the future toward which the Lady travels into a 
repetition of the past she seeks to escape, thus creating the illusion that the patriarchally subversive 
crossing from Shalott to Camelot is itself illusory, since a future that repeats a past effectively erases the 
present that ordinarily facilitates the passage from one to the other’ (250). At one point, Plasa quotes 
Chadwick, who seems to have made similar findings: ‘Lancelot and Camelot seem to appear sunlit only 
from within the confining shelter of the privacy of Shalott, [...] [o]nce outside those walls, the Lady, 
unlike Plato’s freed prisoner [...] finds a world just as gray as the one she has left. The radiance and 
intelligibility of Camelot turn out to have been just as illusory as the mysterious privacy and autonomy of 
Shalott. A single climate, a single social atmosphere, govern both realms, even though each appears to the 
other as its opposite (27).  
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past, surfacing in the grey landscape being a faint echo of the tower’s grey walls, the 
Lady seems to be entrapped again, in a kind of time warp that ironically prohibits her 
from leading the life she has aspired. Mockingly, the Lady is doomed an outcast by the 
very society she has desperately but falsely hoped to be part of. Even her last attempt to 
participate in the community, consisting in appropriating the role of the bride, is bound 
to fail as alternative options of gender identities are revealed to be out of reach. 
 Part of the alleged female victory in “The Lady of Shalott” might stem from the 
notion of a woman leaving the narrow feminine paths laid out within patriarchal 
systems. Acknowledging the performative aspect of clothes as a way of constructing 
distinct gendered identities, it is easy to see, however, that the Lady ultimately does not 
dare going astray from conventional paths. Quite contrary to the mad bride Ophelia, the 
Lady emerges as a rather conformist bride: ‘[a] cloudwhite crown of pearl she dight / 
All ramented in snowy white / That loosely flew, (her zone in sight / Clasped with one 
blinding diamond bright [...]’ (Tennyson 1832 126). Thus dressed, the Lady prepares for 
her final journey, transforming herself into ‘[...] the culminating highlight of a fashion 
show [...]’ (Seidl 216), which indeed hints to the performative aspect of her appearance. 
The bridal gown replaces the Lady as protagonist and thus reduces her identity to the 
function of a “trophy” (Seidl 224) to be conquered by her husband-to-be. In this respect, 
the wedding dress fails to reward the heroine with ‘[...] unalloyed bliss [...]’, the dress 
‘[...] once symbolic of hope [...]’ becomes an uncanny ‘[...] herald now of death’ 
(Hughes 159). Labelled ‘queenly’ (Tennyson 1832 133), the Lady might indeed show 
up being fashionable and coherently dressed. The crown she has wrought synonymously 
stands for the veil, ‘[...] the one thing needful to make an elopement more bridal’ 
(Hughes 169). Fatally, the wedding cannot be completed: there is no groom, and no 
ceremony is undertaken. The Lady of Shalott remains like an abandoned bride at the 
altar, gradually understanding that the image she has created of herself is both 
inappropriate and too glamorous to be true. That she has chosen a bridal dress for her 
escape, however, points to the narrow range of available positions for female agency, 
which to test will prove fatal. Referring to the impossibility of entering the Symbolic 
Order as an autonomously speaking, self-assured woman or even artist, Linda Gill 
accounts for the Lady’s choice of the white robe: ‘The message seems to be that if a 
woman will enter into the public/masculine realm, she can only do so as an object 
whose worth and measure will be determined by the masculine subject who might (if he 
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chooses) possess her’ (115). That is, the Lady essentially has to sacrifice her art and her 
position as a woman-artist in order to be recognised by a predominantly male, 
phallocentric audience. For that reason she inserts herself into a readily available role 
(the bride) and completely exposes herself to the male gaze again. Utterly at the mercy 
of Camelot’s community, the Lady assumes the only acceptable social role a young 
maiden can fulfil; becoming the object, if not to say, possession, of her future husband. 
Impersonating ‘[...] the very bride – submissive and virginal, desired not desiring [...]’ 
(Plasa 259), the carefully laid out gender roles seem safely re-installed. Yet a certain 
ambiguity towards the institution of marriage as well as a critique of the woman’s role 
as possession of her husband, that goes along with it, is evoked via the Lady’s death, 
‘[...] suggesting that marriage, far from entailing the fulfillment of each sex through the 
other [...] is tantamount, for women, to a form of self-annihilation’ (Plasa 260). Thus the 
poem might hint to the fact that in marrying Lancelot and transforming herself into his 
art object, the Lady would suffer a symbolical social death. Her actual death, however, 
unmistakably denotes the futility of assuming prefabricated roles. Simply aspiring to 
turn binary oppositions upside down is unveiled to be not enough to cause a change, 
since categories are not questioned and left intact as they are101. Far from appropriating 
her white “uniform” as an armour of virginity102, the Lady resorts to white as the colour 
of absence and negation. The uniform becomes one of insubstantiality, a blank space 
waiting to be filled with patriarchal instructions and conventions. The bridal dress has 
become a means without an end:  
In its absence of colour, her childish white dress [that of the bride] is a blank 
page that asks to be written on just as her virginity asks to be “taken,” 
“despoiled,” “deflowered.” Thus her white dress implies that she exists only and 
completely for the man who will remove it. In her bridal costume she bears 
herself as a gift to her groom: her whiteness, vulnerability made palpable, 
presents itself to be stained, her intactness – her self-enclosure – to be broken, 
her veil to be rent. Gilbert and Gubar 616. 
 
                                                 
101As Linda Gill avers,  ‘[...] the gendered binary structures patriarchy produces and relies on are 
reiterated and confirmed as well, for they are merely flipped-flopped, inverted’ (119) and thus leave the 
model of the master-slave didactic intact. Laying emphasis on this hypothesis, Gill quotes Beth Newman 
saying that ‘[...] such an inversion may “register a protest against the gender conventions” but it does not 
“dismantle them” for patriarchal methods of empowerment and identity construction are repeated and 
reinscribed’ (119).  
102 ‘For such a snow maiden, virginity, signifying power instead of weakness, is not a gift she gives her 
groom but a boon she grants to herself: the boon of androgynous wholeness, autonomy, self-sufficiency’ 
(Gilbert and Gubar 617). 
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In the last instances of her life, it becomes apparent that the Lady’s fancy dress has 
worn out: the bridal robe, as much as the synecdochic landscape before, is utterly wrong 
and, ultimately, deathly. The Lady’s death – occurring even before her arrival in 
Camelot – seems to soberly confirm the dead end of her masquerade, proving that she 
was not able; or indeed not allowed, to draw subversive power out of her fashionable 
attire. Merely copying and pasting from established role models is eventually punished 
in a world where patriarchy is thoroughly intact. Perceiving how there is no escaping 
patriarchal constructions, the Lady of Shalott submits to her destiny and lies down in 
her boat to die – the snowy white bridal dress becoming her shroud – as the illusion of 
self-fashioning has worn thin.  
 
5.4. Powers of Horror, Horrors of Power: the Dead Body as Icon 
During her last passage on the metaphorical catwalk leading down to Camelot, the Lady 
reaches the height of her subversive powers before the vigilantly constructed order gains 
the upper hand for good. Foreseeing her near future with all the resignation of a ‘[...] 
steady, stony glance’ (Tennyson 1832 127), she nevertheless manages to cross barriers 
as she becomes the ‘[...] bold seer in a trance’ (Tennyson 128), which again invokes 
gender ambiguities that had been hidden under the poem’s seemingly conformist 
surface. Occupying an androgynous position103, the revolutionary force attains its 
greatest success, only to dwindle away a few lines later as the cracked mirror is 
uncannily restored as the Lady’s face (Plasa 258) turned towards Camelot with ‘[...] a 
glassy countenance’ (Tennyson 130). As it appears, the Lady has moved to a higher 
mental state, perceiving in an instance of preternatural insight104 how past, present and 
future have become one and the threads of her short life have untangled.  
 Anticipating her voyage to the Real in order to heal the wound that language and 
sexuality have torn open, the Lady is ‘[...] chanting her deathsong’ (Tennyson 1832 
143), ‘[...] a carol, mournful, holy / she chanted loudly, chanted lowly’ (Tennyson 145-
                                                 
103 Isobel Armstrong elaborates on the dilemma of the androgynous seer – hailed by most critics as a 
success in terms of reversed binaries – in the following manner: ‘Gender differentiation is dissolved or 
melts into androgyny as the priestess takes on a new form. Perhaps the priestess seems to be capable of 
entering a new form. On the other hand, she could simply melt into the form of the great Father, and the 
prime gender becomes the masculine gender’ (94). Essentially, this argument would connect to my 
assumption that a simple reversal of existing role patterns or appropriation of the masculine position does 
not automatically endow one with ample subversive powers.  
104 ‘As the simile [Like a bold seer] implies, besides perceptual clarity, she has gained prescience 
concerning her destiny’ (Shannon 218). 
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146) consisting of sounds as sensations inherent to the Imaginary she has forfeited. 
Probably in singing, which is both antecedent to and lacking all the fixed designation 
belonging to the world of language, the Lady attempts to return to the world of sensual 
immediacy where meaning is not fixed, but freely floating instead of imposed upon her. 
Despite the restoration of conventional patterns and the fact that the Lady is locked back 
into the duality she has struggled to escape from, the Lady might still possess the power 
to disrupt the Symbolic Order. Eerily and ghostly emerging from the margins where she 
had been expelled to, the Lady’s physical appearance in Camelot testifies to the cracks 
in the system as the semiotic relentlessly and inevitably bleeds into the symbolic. Her 
dead body signifies the very abject the Symbolic Order necessarily has to eject in order 
to keep going. In so far, clearly cut borders have become irreversibly blurred. The 
apparent disorder the Lady has caused becomes manifest as the knights at Camelot ‘[...] 
cross[‘d] themselves for fear’ (Tennyson 166) at the sight of the Lady’s corpse. The 
confusion arising in the aftermath of the Lady’s death cannot be rationally accounted for 
by the citizens; the picture of the dead Lady only faintly reminds them of the semiotic, 
pre-Oedipal bliss they have left behind long time ago105, and enables them to obtain a 
glimpse of a realm beyond representation. This fear shared by the community can be 
seen as grounding in the fact that the Lady is not graspable, and therefore neither her 
death nor her appearance can be satisfyingly explained. Ironically, the Lady has become 
the very mirror providing her with visions of Camelot; now, the roles have been 
changed – it is the Lady who mirrors lack and loss back at the bewildered community. 
Telling of her superiority is the fact that she, unlike them, comes from and returns to a 
‘[...] world which does not have to depend upon image and name’ (Colley 373). 
Ostensibly, the citizens of Camelot do; which now entraps them in the same sense of 
displacement and not-belonging the Lady had suffered in her ivory tower. All that is left 
of her is her dead body and the intangible token of her name, not sufficing for the 
citizens to make sense of the perverse spectacle they have helped to bring about. Only a 
little note the Lady has written before her death is found as possibly providing a 
solution to this riddle; the content, however, ‘[...] puzzled more than all the rest’ 
(Tennyson 1832 166) and thus escapes any distressed male attempts to unveil this 
mystery. As a woman, the Lady was not able to effect change, but still, the question 
                                                 
105 ‘When the citizens of Camelot regard her, understandably they are fearful because they fear to see a 
reflection of their own lack and emptiness’ (Colley 373).  
 100 
 
arises whether the Lady’s physical appearance within the Symbolic Order can be said to 
entail the end of Camelot106, as the symbiosis introduced in the beginning and vital for 
both parties has been dissolved. Following this supposition, the Lady would indeed 
finally have been able to celebrate a paradoxical triumph; disturbing the Symbolic Order 
in a rebellion at the expense of the utmost sacrifice. Her death, then, leaves the citizens 
of Camelot as disillusioned as she has been, poised between impossible alternatives, 
after breaking free from her prison into a world resembling the one she has just left. 
While in death, she is released from the illusory dependency upon representation and 
able to ‘[enter] a nameless, imageless realm which exists prior to the assumption of 
metaphor, name or the “symbolic”’ (Colley 376), the citizens are violently reminded of 
the ‘[...] limitations of the representational world [...]’ (Colley 376), left to simply 
suspect what might become of Camelot now that the counterpart of the binary has faded 
into thin air. If the poem can be called revolutionary indeed, it is due to its perplexing 
ending that leaves citizens and readers free to challenge rigidly fixed structures by 
anticipating a realm independent of, and therefore superior to, representation and 
naming.  
 What can indeed be claimed to bestow a whiff of revolutionary force upon the 
poem – the dissolution of public and private sphere, the threat a woman allegedly poses 
when assuming a subject position – unfortunately does not hold true for the second, 
revised version of “The Lady of Shalott”. Endowing the Lady’s journey with more 
sacramental (Alaya 286), mythical elements rather distracts the attention away from the 
deplorable female lot. Her appearance in Camelot is more spectacle than critique of the 
patriarchal system, as the citizens ask themselves ‘[w]ho is this? and what is here?’ 
(Tennyson 163), thereby displaying merely curiosity rather than fear and disorientation. 
Gone is the little enigmatic note, the Lady’s last token creating an even denser 
atmosphere of mystery and misunderstanding; instead of it emerges arrogantly unmoved 
Sir Lancelot, who, after ‘[musing] a little space’ (Tennyson 168), declares unreflectively 
with the stern voice of patriarchy, ‘She has a lovely face / God in his mercy lend her 
grace’107 (Tennyson 169-170), thereby fixing the Lady’s as yet mysterious position onto 
                                                 
106 ‘Her presence in Camelot signifies that a rupture between the two worlds or two realms, between the 
conscious and the unconscious, has occurred. Essentially, her presence indicates that Camelot, too, will 
end’ (Kruger 132).  
107 At this point I disagree strongly with Shannon, who has detected ‘[...] genuine concern for the Lady 
and her spiritual welfare [...]’ in Lancelot’s lazy comment, which he defines as ‘[...] words of reverence 
and faith [that] are appropriate to the occasion and a fitting benediction to the poem’ (222). In my 
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a static role. With his uncaringly uttered words, Lancelot has suffocated any potential 
fear or imbalance the Lady might have triggered when appearing physically. The 
temporarily confused patterns have been allocated their conventionally ascribed roles 
anew, the rupture mended again. By ‘[a]ssigning the Lady a public identity [...]’ 
(Chadwick 23) Lancelot makes sure to perpetuate ancient hetero-normative gender 
distinctions that do not allow for women to stray from their paths. The Lady’s dead 
body, then, seems to depend upon Lancelot’s easy blessing that seeks to continue 
patriarchal values deeply rooted within Camelot as he transports her ‘[...] back across 
the gender line, from “masculine” to “feminine” positions, subject to object of the gaze 
[...]’ (Plasa 259). Alas the “rite-de-passage” the Lady has enacted has been wiped out, 
her subversive powers allayed, the curse re-installed as she is attributed the 
characteristics of the feminine ideal – the lovely face – without agency. Wholly elevated 
to the iconic position of the beautiful corpse, the Lady ‘[...] is emphatically re-
assimilated to the criteria of the “femininity” she had previously violated [...]’ (Plasa 
259). Along with the patriarchal habit of turning women into two-dimensional, 
stereotypical pictures goes the increase in power discrepancy. While the Lady has 
proven her undying love for Lancelot by ‘[...] literally dying at his feet’ (Gill 118), 
Lancelot flaunts no discernible signs of interest in her as he ‘[...] evaluates her based 
upon her “lovely face” [...]’ (Gill 121), utterly oblivious to the fact that he proved to be 
the beauty’s downfall. However, it has to be admitted that Lancelot’s agency is limited 
in a similar way to the Lady’s as he ostentatiously adheres to a near-mythical script 
disseminating the ‘[...] mechanisms of subjugation within the symbolic order [...]’ as 
‘[...] both men and women are trapped in the power-structure supporting this order [and] 
both adopt the roles of either objects or dominators’ (Müller 55). In this respect it can be 
suspected that also Lancelot is pawn to eternal structures that foresee his supremacy 
over the Lady whom he will never be able to appreciate but for her “lovely face”. His all 
too lazy comment and employment of stock phrases ultimately prove him entangled – if 
probably not as deeply – in the same power structures as the Lady had been, 
diminishing both of them to ‘[...] eternal victims, playthings of a man-made fate’ 
(Müller 55). Unfortunately it seems that the only way the Lady will ever be able to gain 
public recognition is to surrender to the dominant discourse arranged in terms of 
                                                                                                                                               
opinion, Lancelot’s words show neither regret nor sadness, but mere indifference as he uses a formulaic, 
pre-fabricated phrase suiting the event.  
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dominance and subordination. She literally castrates herself by becoming the object of 
the gaze again, and contrary to producing art, displays her dead body as the art object 
par excellence (Gilbert and Gubar 43).  
This trope of the “beautiful corpse”; ‘[...] a memento mori of female 
helplessness, aesthetic isolation, and virginal vulnerability carried to deadly extremes’ 
(Gilbert and Gubar 618, emphasis in the original) indeed ‘[...] fueled something like a 
craze [...]’ (Hassett and Richardson 287) among the Victorians, and in particular, the 
members of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, who proved frantically eager to provide 
illustrations to the 1857 Moxon edition of Tennyson’s poems. Paintings by William 
Holman Hunt, John William Waterhouse and Dante Gabriel Rossetti tracing the Lady’s 
journey into adolescence, sexuality and death shall be introduced in the next chapter as 
masculine means of literary killing women into art, thereby preserving her in an 
everlasting state of availability for consumption as the timeless object of the male gaze. 
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6. The Beautification of Death – Images of the Femme Fatale and the 
Beautiful Corpse in William Holman Hunt, John William Waterhouse and Dante 
Gabriel Rossetti 
 
Considering the Victorian iconography and the prevailing maiden cult of the 19th 
century, one will notice that there seems to exist a horrifyingly deathly hagiography of 
women and girls as art objects, ‘[…] slim, pale, passive beings whose “charms” eerily 
recalled the snowy, porcelain immobility of the dead’ (Gilbert and Gubar). Epitomes of 
the ‘[...] pale, passive, sickly, sexually objectified, broken, bereft, dying, dead [...]’ 
(Orlando 615) girls in their most richly arranged forms exceptionally densely populate 
the paintings of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. This group of ambitious as well as 
accomplished young artists, founded in 1848, fervently aspired to ‘[...] creat[ing] a new 
style of painting inspired by Gothic and late-medieval art’ (Orlando 617); little 
surprisingly, since the Brotherhood’s attribute, “Pre-Raphaelite” already hints to their 
firm conviction that art declined after Raphael108. The ways wherein the Pre-Raphaelites 
were looking backwards to a lost, albeit imagined and romantically distorted past, 
manifested themselves in an abandonment of mimesis – or ‘[...] “truth to nature” [...] in 
favor of a pursuit of a highly unnatural ideal’ (Orlando 618), which held likewise true 
for their means of representing women. Renowned painters like John William 
Waterhouse, William Holman Hunt, John Everett Millais, Ford Madox Brown or Dante 
Gabriel Rossetti conjured up a gigantic panoptic (Rohde-Dachser 101) of possible 
versions of femininity – albeit possible only in the male imagination and never in real 
life. Falling back upon archetypal schemata, Pre-Raphaelite artistry in most cases 
portrays women as either eerily fragile fairy maidens or archaically sexualised 
temptresses; sometimes as figures oscillating between these states as if quite unsure 
which category to slip into. Even the morbid craze fostered around virginity does not 
upgrade women’s, but eventually men’s value – as creator, that is, painter, or husband-
to-be of an intact maiden – thereby speaking ‘[...] first and foremost of masculine 
power’ (Müller 68). Virginity thus becomes not a desiring characteristic of women’s 
potency, but a financial exchange value, leaving the virgin only economically relevant 
to male society. Thus even this aspect of hetero-normative gender constructions is 
                                                 
108 ‘Singling out the art of Raphael as the site where things went astray in visual art, they wanted to retreat 
to the style of painting produced before him (or “pre-Raphael”)’ (Orlando 618, emphasis in the original).  
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deeply intertwined with economical power struggles which surfaces in the labelling of 
woman as “possession” or “good” (Ehrenreich, Hess and Jacobs 530). 
Either way, the women remain nameless ‘anonymous types’ (Orlando 619), far 
too ‘waxen’ and ‘over-the-top’ (Orlando 618) to be realistic. Indeed, the Brotherhood 
fanned feminine fantasies to a new obsession: the celebration of the faint woman 
produced an excess of clichés, a role larger than life, too big, too much to occupy for 
any real woman. Pre-Raphaelite women were literally ‘[...] killed into art [...]’ (Hassett 
and Richardson 288), stylised as male ‘[...] fever dreams of doomed yearning or erotic 
luxuriousness’ (Hassett and Richardson 287) they could not possibly measure up to. 
Whether it be Shakespeare’s Ophelia or Tennyson’s “Lady of Shalott”, male artists 
made ‘[...] of the legends containers for passions too large, too violent, and too strange 
for the Victorian parlor, for the novel, and for realism in general [...]’ (Hassett and 
Richardson 287). Tentatively, it can be claimed that this excessive stylisation of the 
female body ultimately silenced the real woman behind, as male minds fascinatedly 
grabbed hold of the schemata, oblivious to the fact that the physically present woman 
was already slowly slipping away. Presumably, the longing gaze replaced all other 
sensory impressions with the realisation that the maiden in the picture already perfectly 
fulfilled any role potentially allocated to her.  
 Discussing several Pre-Raphaelite paintings featuring Tennyson’s Lady in 
greater detail, I wish to delineate the strategies whereby women are transfixed into 
images and thereby become the living dead. What details a painter chooses to highlight, 
what to neglect, what bits and pieces to distort and add, is vastly telling of the socio-
cultural background and the Victorian zeitgeist where painterly versions of female 
identity were outlined so yearningly sharply and excessively manifold as to lead both 
men and women into believing that these mute, anachronistic ‘pin-up girl[s]’ (Orlando 
619) were indeed desirable figures. Anyhow, the silenced woman served to function as 
‘[...] a visual sign of the masculine genius’ (Hassett and Richardson 289), a fetishised 
icon testifying to male creativity and potency and likewise an immobile, omnipresent 
token to satisfy scopophiliac pleasures. 
 As regards the Lady of Shalott, I want to discuss two pictures by William 
Holman Hunt, one by John William Waterhouse and finally one by Dante Gabriel 
Rossetti. These pictures are indeed not chosen accidentally, but visually retrace the 
Lady’s journey undergone in Tennyson’s poem from traditionally femininely connoted 
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yet relatively autonomous Shalott, where one would find the Lady’s potentially 
subversive powers still intact, to the fullness of the Symbolic Order she conquers but in 
death when melting with the promise of the Real. A problematic crack in the literal 
picture occurs when assessing the distinct ways wherein Pre-Raphaelite artists sought to 
solve the dilemma of portraying women as artists and social subjects in the same 
instant: the Lady is almost always sexualised as a consequence to the artists’ distancing 
themselves from her. Thus, the manifold art works produced by male painters do not 
depict the Lady as the poem’s subject she has initially been, but as object of the male 
gaze. In this respect, authority is exerted over her as she disconnected from her 
generative, artistic and productive powers only to be doubly framed; first, by the artist 
who casts her into the role he wishes to allot to her, and secondly, by the painting itself 
that arrests her by its very nature in a state of enforced silence and tragically helpless 
inability. 
 
6.1. “Emptiness and Violation, Terror and Charm, Archetypal and Existential” 
– the Face of Hunt’s Lady of Shalott109 
“Tragically helpless” does designate a modifier certainly applicable to Waterhouse’s 
and Rossetti’s envisionings of the Lady; however, an association of this phrase with 
Hunt’s illustration and oil painting proves to be disappointingly fruitless. Hunt’s 
illustration for the 1857 Moxon edition and the infinitely more elaborate and spectacular 
successor, the oil painting begun in 1886 and finished in 1905, both deeply drenched in 
Biblical symbolism, ancient mythology and moral allegory, depict the Lady in her most 
powerful state, the sexual awakening. Thus one could claim that the two portrayals 
created by Hunt constitute the first stage of the Lady’s “Pre-Raphaelite journey” 
towards self-determinacy and eventually death, wherein she is still in possession of her 
charms and powers and hence still located within the semiotic realm or the maternal 
chôra, as the 1857 picture will testify to. 
 Truly, the illustration for the Moxon edition forms an antithesis to the 
insubstantial fairy-girl, whose identity cannot be firmly attested, portrayed in 
                                                 
109 Anja Müller uses this phrase relating to ‘[t]he symbolic, dehumanised face of Greta Garbo [...]’ (71) 
whom Roland Barthes identifies as ‘[...] one of the central modern icons [...]’ (70). I chose this 
description as headline for the chapter dealing with Hunt’s Lady of Shalott as her face seems to emanate 
precisely those contradictory characteristics. Her attitude towards her position is ambivalent, and caught 
in this moment of deep ambiguity, she has attained an iconographic status, almost transcending human 
limits in her struggle against the inevitable. 
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Tennyson’s poem. Medieval idylls and picturesque, pastoral stillness have been 
replaced by motion, self-conscious sexuality and violent energy, fully unleashed as the 
woman’s hair is blown all across the room. The look on her face is frightening, even 
murderous, as the Lady has become the monster-woman whose sexual energy threatens 
to break open her prison. Head bent downwards, her terrifyingly dark eyes seem fixated 
upon an unspecified point in the room which only heightens the frenzy in her gaze. Not 
only the Lady, but her newly acquired subversive powers appear gigantic; this 
monstrous woman is trapped in her room like in a womb, a cocoon, her metamorphosis 
fulfilled, only waiting to break free: ‘[...] a caryatid whose head would burst through the 
picture’s edge were she to look up’ (Udall 36). Indeed, this rendering of the once “fairy 
Lady” bestows the greatest amount of revolutionary force upon her in so far as she 
occupies the most physical space. As if attempting to break the membrane of the 
placenta, she is waiting to be born, or re-born with the prospect of joining – or 
destroying, as her gaze suggests – the outside world. Her chôra is undeniably a feminine 
place and space, wholly governed by fluidity and movement. Imaginary structures are 
invoked in that one could forward the claim that the frame of the web that surrounds the 
Lady might signify a physical manifestation of the thetic barrier that the Lady has to 
step over in order to come into life, language and sexuality. Still embedded within 
semiotic structures, the Lady might also be considered subtly dangerous, as her ‘[...] 
imaginary is inexhaustible [...] [her] stream of phantasms is incredible’ (Cixous Medusa 
347). As regards the proportions employed in this sketch, the Lady unmistakably recalls 
Cixous’ Medusa; the surging female force within her bosom might indeed instigate her 
‘[...] to smash everything, to shatter the framework of institutions, to blow up the law 
[...]’ (Cixous Medusa 357). A colossal Lady with angrily glowering looks, ‘[...] a 
woman who represents the dark side, the obverse of men’s idealisation of women [...]’ 
(Udall 36), Hunt’s second work observably testifies to male fears of female sexuality. 
The sexual energy is almost over-accentuated as the Lady’s body, boasting voluptuous, 
womanly curves that have found no mentioning in the poem, is clothed with a flowing 
dress that nestles up to her hips and legs as the threads of the loom have completely 
ensnared her. With a calm, stoic self-confidence she reaches with bare arms and hands 
to free herself, slowly, almost gracefully as she seems positive to break open her “poetic 
cocoon” (Udall 36). The painting’s most striking feature, however, is comprised by 
wavy masses of dark hair that completely ‘[...] fills the upper picture space [...] and best 
 107 
 
imparts the release of feminine energy’ (Udall 36). The “unleashed” female hair serves 
to ‘[...] create a sense of abandonment to sensuality and of sudden, violent shock and 
crisis’ (Poulson 177) as ‘[o]rder explodes into chaos [...]’ (Udall 36). Given the fact that 
Hunt was a stern moralist, sincerely devoted to the upholding of Christian values, one 
could conclude that Hunt uses the Lady’s hair to condemn unruly sexuality in women:  
 
 
 Fig. 2: “The Lady of Shalott” by William Holman Hunt, illustration for the 1857 Moxon 
edition of Tennyson’s poems 
 
The social encoding of hair imagery and symbolism, as well as its specific 
manifestation as a “Victorian cultural obsession” with women’s hair, vividly 
come into view in William Holman Hunt’s numerous illustrations of the Lady of 
Shalott [...] Her abundant hair vibrates with libidinous energy. It is like a 
vigorous brood of snakes, not like shriveling pinworms. In this imaging of the 
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Lady of Shalott, Hunt makes an unequivocal statement about her disobedience 
and loss of virtue. He uses the Lady’s material possessions, such as the loom and 
its cognate, her hair, to provide indices to her moral condition. Barzilai Lovely 
Face 240, 242 
 
As regards the wildly blown about hair, the Lady can be seen to be situated within the 
eye of the storm, at the very epicentre of a revolution she is to bring about. However 
frightful and determined Hunt’s 1857 Lady of Shalott may be rendered, she has still 
little chance to stand against the forces of patriarchy since the powers she is about to let 
loose necessarily will turn against her. The moral message, then, inevitably embraces 
the notion that a woman following her own sexual desires and passions needs to be 
punished, if not cast out from society, by a morally superior male represented by both 
the painter and the institution of patriarchy seeking to perpetuate the hetero-normative 
discourse, for the threat she poses to the orderly established barriers between semiotic 
and symbolic, sanity and madness, masculinity and femininity. 
 Holman Hunt’s last rendering of the Lady, an oil painting begun in 1887 and 
finished by 1905, seems extraordinarily more thorough and lavishly adorned than its 
predecessors, an epic allegory immersed in Biblical and mythological symbolism 
wherein Hunt has undeniably perfected his manner of skilfully grasping the dialectic 
between arousal and virginity, captivity and release, inner and outer space (Sullivan 
Kruger 117-8). Admittedly, this last and richest illustration cannot be reasonably 
assessed without having previously acquired a basic knowledge of both context and co-
text in order to decipher Hunt’s arbitrarily established, highly symbolical encoding. An 
extensive engagement on behalf of the spectator was presupposed; still, for the sake of a 
better understanding, Hunt issued pamphlets accompanying the paintings that were ‘[...] 
half commentary, half manifesto’ wherein he ‘[...] handled his theological and aesthetic 
ideas with amateurish zest, if not with school-worthy authority’ (Jeffers 243). Although 
originally meant as a supplement to Tennyson’s poem, the oil painting has been 
regarded as a work containing a story and a structure of its own. The ‘[...] wheel-like 
structure [...]’ (Udall 34) has been observably appropriated by Hunt as the Lady is 
standing amidst her loom like a giant spider caught in her own web, posture as well as 
gestures reminiscent of the 1857 portrayal. However, the brutal look and the harsh facial 
features have gone, her head is still bent downwards, but bears no monstrous 
characteristics. Instead, the Lady’s face resembles that of a Greek marble sculpture, 
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perfectly shaped with straight nose and prominent forefront. Her androgyny is what 
equips her with nobility and authority: ‘[h]er face [...] is molded like that of an Athena, 
a caryatid, or a stela figure – this last analogy combining strength with grief over her 
impending death’ (Jeffers 244). She is indeed a strong woman, no half-present, elusive 
fairy princess, but an artist endowed with ‘[...] the severe piety of a German Nazarene’ 
(Jeffers 244). Contrary to the rather masculine attire just described, her hair is still wavy 
and of extraordinary quantity, flying all about her head and the room; yet the space has 
been expanded so the Lady seems no longer trapped, but able to move and look up 
within her snare. The dress has retained its flowing lines and conventionally feminine 
cut. Having adapted the Lady’s size to suit the room, the interior is now extensively 
decorated and almost overcrowded with accessories of truly distinct backgrounds. Hunt 
painstakingly blends ancient sources, like Christian and Greek mythology, so as to add 
extra layers of meaning destined to lead the audience’s thoughts to speculations about 
the Lady’s fate. The tapestry is itself structured into sections and subsections110, 
juxtaposed with tokens of various origins, almost always referring to biblical, 
mythological or universal tropes, such as the perennial struggle of mankind or the 
surrender to temptation hinting to the protagonist’s own fate. However rich and 
fervently equipped the picture may be, the Lady still remains strangely static and sadly 
aware of the fact that she inhabits a ‘[...] world without a future [...]’ (Udall 34); 
forming a stark contrast to the woman in a painting Hunt labelled “The Awakening 
Conscience”. In it, a “fallen” woman rises with open eyes and hopefully shining face as 
she ‘[...] experiences a sudden flash of illumination’ (Udall 37). She and the Lady are 
antipodes, undergoing reverse movements as the “awakening” woman does not depend 
on a world beyond the window since she has found her own source of inspiration. The 
Lady on the other hand depends on Camelot, a world where Lancelot is riding away 
instead towards her, which condemns her to imprisonment, escape and death111. Hunt’s 
                                                 
110 As regards the tapestry, Hunt has creatively assembled symbolically charged scenes so as to indicate 
the Lady’s artistic autonomy and (self)-reflexivity: ‘Like an artist with a lively imagination – the artist I 
would argue the Lady in the poem wants to become – she has arranged whatever figures have unwittingly 
modelled for her into [...] a representation of virtuous Sir Galahad offering his King the Holy Grail [...] 
and [...] the not-so-virtuous Lancelot kissing his fingers, an allusion to his adultery with Guinevere, which 
occasions the King’s downfall. To the back of the tapestry are [...] figures of Truth and Justice, which 
Galahad and Arthur fight for, and [...] one of Charity, which, we may infer, should towards Lancelot and 
Guinevere be mixed with Justice’ (Jeffers 245). 
111 ‘The moral allegory still centers on the calamity of yielding to the devil’s own world and flesh: the 
textile artist, like any other, has the duty of staying chaste inside her studio and ignoring come-ons from 
people like the playboy-knight of the Round Table’ (Jeffers 237).  
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moral conviction, then, is evident: a woman who figuratively rises after her fall, turning 
away from the man’s lap, unwilling to respond to his advances, may be given a second 
chance to redeem her faults. The Lady however, both antagonist and literal sister to this 
woman, as both are split into ‘[...] multiple avatars [...]’ of ‘[...] monster, fallen woman, 
redeemed saint [...]’ (Udall 38) succumbs to her own personal longings without placing 
them within a greater frame and thus needs to be punished. Although the duality 
embodied by the woman found in “The Awakening Conscience” and Hunt’s Lady might 
‘[...] mirror a moral duality he [Hunt] found at work in the Victorian psyche [...]’ Udall 
still claims that despite the deeper meanings inherent to Hunt’s paintings, ‘[t]he issues 
of identity, power, and gender remain frustratingly arcane, even confused’ (38), a point 
that I can only second. Ultimately, it has become evident that Hunt’s paintings 
constitute epitomes of far too rigidly and narrow-mindedly drawn versions of femininity 
that have been propagated feverishly during the Victorian Age. Still, one might want to 
make concessions to Hunt, admitting that his versions of the Lady most faithfully depict 
a creatively generating woman artist, an androgynous “bold seer” striving to break free 
from the enclosing womb, unluckily falsely believing she might assert herself within a 
patriarchally ruled society. 
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 Fig. 3: “The Lady of Shalott” by William Holman Hunt, oil painting 1887-1905 
 
 
 
6.2. Visions of Impossible Romance – Waterhouse’s Sorrowful Maiden in 
Virginal White 
While William Holman Hunt’s rendering of the Lady comprises the first and firmest 
stage in the Lady’s journey, John William Waterhouse’s painting necessarily continues 
this fatal movement by picturing Tennyson’s protagonist poised between the life she has 
left behind and the future she cannot yet imagine and will inevitably never reach. Thus 
Waterhouse’s picture, providing a link between Imaginary and Symbolic Order, goes 
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hand in hand with a diminution of female power that has been sacrificed in order to 
grasp at least a glimpse of freedom. Furthermore, this entails a weakening of the Lady, 
reflected in posture and facial expression, as she is trespassing on male territory and 
therefore not in a realm she feels securely comfortable with. Ultimately, Waterhouse’s 
Lady may be claimed to embody the ideal of Victorian femininity, ‘[...] an 
indestructible, ever-ready innocence paired with unearthly beauty and, if possible, 
renewable virginity [...]’ (Müller 66), an icon of a girl reflecting disempowering 
passivity and regret as she is overpowered by patriarchy even as she attempts to escape 
it.  
Waterhouse’s contribution to illustrating Tennyson’s poem represents the Lady 
sitting on a carefully decorated blanket – which obviously represents the tapestry she 
has been weaving and on a deeper level denotes the loss of art and autonomy – in her 
boat as she heads towards Camelot. This Lady somehow seems to emanate an eerie, 
ghostly aura as she returns the viewer’s gaze with oddly self-reflexive, but half-closed 
eyes, as if being fully aware of the future she is travelling towards. Waterhouse’s Lady 
bears nothing of the characteristics of Hunt’s ‘[...] femme fatale witchery [...]’ but is 
exposed to the audience as ‘[...] a sorrowful maiden in virginal white [...]’ (Jeffers 246). 
Indeed sadness, regret and the awareness of a fated inevitability is manifest in her 
dreamy gaze; still, as has been suggested, a certain amount of sensuality cannot be 
overlooked. Lips parted, long red hair swaying about her body and her breasts in 
particular, this Lady truly represents the dying, deathly maiden that was fetishised by 
the Victorian society. The dress she is wearing undoubtedly can be recognised as her 
uncanny wedding dress, clinging tightly to her body in order to accentuate the curves of 
hips and breasts. Her outfit is undeniably conspicuous in so far as it features what would 
nowadays be called fossilised attributes of romance - such as a long skirt, tight bodice 
and girlish ornaments round the neck and on the upper arms – present in wedding 
dresses that have transformed into near-uniforms (Hughes 175). The band she is 
wearing around her head could be claimed to synonymously replace the indispensable 
accessory of the veil. Disturbingly, a black belt is tied around her waist, probably a 
harbinger of death and doom that alarmingly disrupts the blank surface of the pure white 
dress. The very fact that Waterhouse wished to portray the Lady in a bridal dress 
heightens the erotic, sensual appeal, even if one may speak of a ‘[...] necrophiliac 
sensuality [...] linking beauty and death [...]’ (Jeffers 247-8). 
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Fig. 4: “The Lady of Shalott” by John William Waterhouse, 1888 
 
Put into connection with the bridal gown, her eyes appear to divulge a deeply desperate 
yearning for impossibly illusionary romance, a ‘[...] wistful regret that she never had a 
lover’ (Jeffers 248) and at the same time the already unshakable knowledge that her 
dreams will all too soon fade into thin air. Inserted into natural surroundings – river, 
plants and mountains – the Lady has obviously left her mother’s lap, deceived by the 
mirror’s magically distorted sights of wholeness, and is now forced to come to terms 
with the alienation and loss, the disintegrated self she is facing. This newly experienced 
insecurity and helplessness is written in her eyes which makes the Lady all the more 
vulnerable.  
The same care with which the Lady has been painted has as well been applied to 
the background. The tapestry she is sitting on – gloomily meant to become her shroud 
(Sullivan Kruger 126) – shows roundels featuring scenes taken from the poem itself. As 
one of the roundels shows the Lady travelling in her canoe it becomes strikingly evident 
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that she has been ‘[...] caught in this “web of illusion” and is eventually destroyed by 
the illusion she had been weaving all along – an eerie reversal that presents the artist 
enmeshed in her own art, killing rather than sustaining her’ (Sullivan Kruger 127). Not 
only the tapestry, but also nature echoes the Lady’s fate, dimly foreshadowing the 
fusion of past and future as the horizon offers a glimpse of an apocalyptic grey 
landscape, a “nowhere” reminiscent of the castle’s grey walls. The “memento mori” 
atmosphere forwarded by nature is underscored by the three candles, two of which have 
been blown out already, the last one about to be extinguished by the wind.  
  One might be tempted to argue that Waterhouse has delicately interwoven 
pieces of criticism in response to possibly available female roles. In order to account for 
this hypothesis, Kathryn Sullivan Kruger can be cited saying that the ‘[...] vulnerability 
of the Lady’s gaze [...]’ metaphorically parallels the ‘[...] vulnerability of women who 
step out of their appointed sphere, and the judgement and punishment to which they are 
then exposed’ (183). Considering the tale from a Lacanian angle, one could conclude 
that the Lady has left the Imaginary structures behind, experienced the Mirror Stage and 
is travelling irretrievably towards the Symbolic Order, represented by Camelot, which 
does not grant her the life she wishes to lead. Consequently, her dreams and hopes 
might be transferred and projected onto the Real, a realm promising safety and 
completion, attainable only at the expense of death. 
 
6.3. Killed into Art – Rossetti’s Lady Lizzie 
Since both William Holman Hunt and John William Waterhouse have endowed their 
characterisations of Tennyson’s Lady with their very own artistic specificities, thereby 
unconsciously yet unmistakably portraying their Ladies uniquely embedded within 
psychoanalytic structures, it does not surprise to hear that Dante Gabriel Rossetti has 
probably created the most distinctive illustration for Tennyson’s poem. Given Rossetti’s 
fascination – or should one say, obsession – with death and beauty, it seems obvious 
that Rossetti has chosen to elaborate on the moment of the Lady’s death, thereby 
providing the last missing piece of the puzzle that in this chapter figuratively retells the 
Lady’s ill-starred journey. Perfectly in line with the afore mentioned and discussed art 
works, this last picture chillingly frames the Lady after her arrival in Camelot, having 
seemingly peacefully died in her barge.  
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 On the one hand, Rossetti’s drawing, a wood engraving dating from 1857, 
differs from the ones produced by his fellows in so far as Rossetti dismissed the thought 
of deriving arty inspiration from Tennyson’s poem and looked out to find his own 
source of stimulation. Indeed he modelled his illustration for the Moxon edition on a 
14th century miniature, provided for Lancelot du Lac, which he found in the British 
Museum (Jeffers 233). Hence, both the necrophiliac touch and the awe the inexplicably 
mysterious Lady instils in the spectator even after her death are infinitely stronger than 
in most other graphic enrichments to the poem. Rossetti’s image is sincerely steeped in 
darkness and mystery, smacking of a ‘[...] weird medievalism [...]’ that could only 
origin in the peculiar imaginative depths of this artist’s mind (Smyser 514). No traces of 
Hunt’s ‘[...] enchanted regions of faery, unlocalized in time or place [...]’ (Smyser 514) 
or Waterhouse’s tenderly fragile maiden are to be found here in this ‘[...] most 
enigmatic of all the portraits discussed’ (Sullivan Kruger (127). It seems almost as if the 
picture was ambivalent towards interpretation; on the one hand, the emphasis can be 
said to be shifted away from the Lady, on the other hand, she is doubly framed by the 
male gaze. Firstly, she is blatantly stared at by Sir Lancelot, and secondly, her posture 
and the whole composition of the picture itself suggest that ‘[s]he is presented to the 
spectator, who is cast in the role of voyeur’ (Poulson 185). Thus, the Lady is doubly 
deprived of her agency as both audience and the picture’s male protagonist enact power 
over her that she can neither ward off nor yield. Like a trophy that has been long and 
desperately yearned for, she has been hunted and finally exposed to the audience to 
commemorate and celebrate the victory of man over woman, symbolic over semiotic. 
Justly speaking, the Symbolic character is not be overlooked here as the picture features 
more men than women – and admittedly, the only woman it features is already dead. 
According to Elisabeth Bronfen, the gender configuration of active male and passive 
(dead) female is inevitable as the surviving person is rewarded with feelings of triumph 
and relief at the realisation of not being dead: the dead body is presented as carefully, 
horizontally placed and absolutely still, while the survivor stands upright, emanating a 
sense of superiority and power. Thus it seems only too logical that the corpse must be 
female, and the survivor male (98). Ultimately, it becomes unmistakably evident that 
the engraving echoes the Symbolic Order disguised as Camelot’s hierarchical, 
patriarchal order revolving around representative Lancelot in the foreground and less 
important knights in the shady background. Lancelot’s gaze probably mirrors Rossetti’s 
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conviction that ‘[s]uch beauty [...] should be eternalized’ (Jeffers 234) and, as if having 
entered into dialogue with Sir Lancelot as representative of patriarchy, Rossetti has his 
Lady literally “killed into art”. Her tranquil dead body bespeaks a societal need for 
conspicuous consumption in so far as her femininity and beauty are wholly fashioned 
for man’s pleasure (Hassett and Richardson 289), which Rossetti has made possible by 
distorting Tennyson’s medieval poem to fit 19th century demands. Unlike Hunt and 
Waterhouse, who have decidedly (and justifiably, as she is the eponymous poem’s 
protagonist) placed the Lady of Shalott at the centre of action, Rossetti grants his Lady 
‘[...] the least amount of physical space [...]’, rather giving emphasis to ‘[...] those 
leaning over her boat to peer by torchlight upon her body [...] particularly Lancelot, who 
scutinizes the curious cipher of her dead face’ (Sullivan Kruger 128). Truly, judging by 
the spatial composition, Lancelot could be the legitimate protagonist: the Lady is 
pictured lying at the bottom of the picture, factually at Lancelot’s feet, whereas the 
spectators are squeezed about the upper top, their faces cut off by the picture’s edge. 
Apart from a beautifully drawn, but almost overshadowed face revealing little but ‘[...] 
beauty and silence [...]’ (Sullivan Kruger 128) and her cautiously placed body – 
sexualised as the folds of her dress recall the shape of a vagina – little prognoses can be 
made about the Lady herself. As has been mentioned earlier, there is no particular stress 
placed upon her as she is presented as a disembodied artist, the only position offered to 
her within the Symbolic Order. Given that the portrait’s primary concerns are beauty 
and death, the Lady is disconnected from her past as an artist and therefore denied to 
ever have assumed the status of an autonomous being112. To some extent, Rossetti has 
even erased the co-text, the original poem, a large part of which does centre on the 
Lady’s lifetime. A second factor that separates the Lady from her creator and the text 
she was embedded in is the fact that the Lady’s face possibly has been modelled on the 
face of Elizabeth Siddal (Orlando 632). Thus, the Lady of Shalott and Lancelot have 
become disguised real-life persons, puppets to the historical couple Rossetti and Siddal. 
The story to be told is no longer Tennyson’s, but explicitly revolves around the 
relationship between the painter and his muse (Sullivan Kruger 128). Lancelot’s face 
allegedly represents that of Rossetti, bemoaning the death of his beloved Lady/Lizzie 
with mixed feelings of grief, love and fascination that would give way to more profound 
                                                 
112 ‘The illustration refrains from linking her to a particular past, as if she had no existence before this 
moment when she floats into Camelot, to lie beneath the gaze of Lancelot. It as if [sic] the entire action of 
the poem before this moment were effaced’ (Sullivan Kruger 128).  
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speculations about the ‘[...] relationships between body and soul, sexuality and 
destruction, death and immortality [...]’ (Bentley 847).  
 Having intensively engaged with Rossetti’s rendering of the Lady of Shalott, 
many questions as to the extreme popularity of the motif of a young, dead maiden can 
be answered. As has been pointed out already in the introduction to this section, the 
bonds uniting Lancelot and the Lady in Rossetti’s picture seem to characterize ‘[...] an 
ideal relationship and the highest form of Romantic love’ (Sullivan Kruger 129). This 
love will always remain vivid and highly celebrated in the minds of the spectator, since 
it has never been consummated and therefore never been “spoilt”, the mutual feelings 
can never be undone: ‘[w]hatever feelings her beauty evokes in him, they will always 
remain idealized because her ability to act, move, live, speak, or change has been 
arrested; therefore, she is incapable of altering his feelings for her’ (Sullivan Kruger 
129). The medievalism originally determining Tennyson’s poem has been palpably 
faithfully taken up by Rossetti since the poem has been appreciated especially for its  
[...] elements of the purest and highest romance, the fine presentment in perfect 
imagery of strange enchantments, the alluring sense of a deeper meaning lurking 
beneath the image but refusing to be conjured forth, and the weird spell that 
human emotion throws over the world of nature until its realism is transformed 
into an ideal beauty more rare than is seen by fleshly eye. Smyser 510. 
 
Ultimately it appears as if Rossetti, by ingeniously intertwining the powers of death and 
beauty into a hauntingly mythical emblem of eternally faithful love, has found the 
means to satisfy people’s innermost needs for romance and offered them a perfect 
opportunity for the contemplation of an ‘[...] endlessly virginal, [...] endlessly available’ 
(Poulson 191) young bride having conquered the forces of decay. Yet by placing his 
version of the courtly romance of Lancelot and the Lady within an obscurely medieval 
frame, a safe distance has been established, allowing for the audience to enjoy art 
without being ‘[...] conscious of precisely where the complex fascination of these 
images lay’ (Poulson 191). Indeed, all of the artists discussed above have sincerely 
managed to eternalise Tennyson’s poem by making its protagonist an icon of 
Victorianism’s thwarted passions and values; Rossetti, however, daring to deviate from 
the poetic frame, achieved to extricate and ceaselessly preserve the key elements of 
what constituted the poem’s irresistibly thrilling appeal. While the “art object” of the 
Lady’s dead body must have been a warning that such frantically glorified Romantic 
quests must inevitably end in death, the Lady’s youthfully innocent face wipes away 
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fears of death and doom by soothingly and silently assuring that still, the quest was 
worth of continuing (Sullivan Kruger 129).  
In this respect, women’s defeat by the Symbolic Order has been played down 
and presented as a natural, even appealing phenomenon that has been repeated for 
centuries and would continue to be repeated over and over again as if the whole order 
was caught in a morbidly invariable time warp without escape. By the same token, 
woman’s role is narrowed down to an archetypal schema, which designates a rigorous 
division between interior and exterior as correlates of Imaginary and Symbolic housing 
women and men, respectively. Alas a transgression of these spaces must end in 
disillusionment and eventually death as a way of punishing women rebelling against the 
conventional order of things. These bitterly unfair circumstances are in the same way 
experienced by the Lady whose metaphorical painterly journey testifies to the eternally 
impossible struggle to preserve the stage of the Real as a viable space of female 
autonomy and liberation. 
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Fig. 5: The Lady of Shalott by Dante Gabriel Rossetti, wood engraving as illustration for the 1857 
Moxon edition 
 
6.4 Resisting the Symbolic Order – Painting a Female Symbolic 
Considering the abundance of books and scholarly articles devoted to Rossetti, Millais 
or Waterhouse, one is easily seduced to conclude that women must have been marginal 
to the Pre-Raphaelite group; a view that has been passionately defended by the artists 
themselves. Indeed, they considered their muses as mistresses attempting to produce art, 
but only ever being able to manufacture products being pale echoes of their own work. 
The fact that all too often, the creators chose to wed their models proved to be both the 
end of the woman’s career – if it had ever been initiated at all – and a sad confirmation 
of the prevalent view that women served as decorum to their masters. Yet recently, 
attempts to research into and re-appreciate the artistry of Siddal, emblem of the 
Victorian angel-woman fading into death, immortalised only via numerous Pre-
Raphaelite paintings (Bronfen 247), and her metaphorical sisters have been gaining 
solid ground. Elizabeth Siddal can no longer be conceived of in terms of Rossetti’s 
silenced muse and sweet, faint angel in the house, but shall be presented to the public as 
a capable, willing, even slightly revolutionary woman artist in a time when women were 
almost wholly confined to the domestic sphere. 
 
6.4.1. Voices From the Grave: Elizabeth Siddal(l)’s Answer to Dante Gabriel 
Rossetti 
The most striking feature anyone engaged in research about Elizabeth Eleanor Siddal, 
muse and wife of the Pre-Raphaelite artist Dante Gabriel Rossetti, will be confronted 
with is the highly patterned, excessive mythmaking connected to the enigmatic 
historical person. Most critics dealt with, though they subsequently seek to deconstruct 
prevailing myths in order to bring the “real” person behind to the surface, employ the 
same almost prefabricated phrases and resort to those pieces of language that foster the 
cult around “Lizzie” that has been cherished for centuries. 
 Laurel Bradley for instance begins and ends his article by pondering about 
Siddal’s ‘[...] elusive personality’ (137) that fuels the myth, but poses an obstacle for 
anyone eager to make known the unattainable, unearthly muse of the Pre-Raphaelite 
circle. Elaine Shefer joins in by depicting Siddal as a woman ‘[...] shrouded in mystery 
[...]’ (21), repeating the lexeme “myth” when talking about her discovery as well as her 
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status as “stunner”. In general, one catches the impression that Shefer paints an 
archetypal picture of Siddal, characterising her as a mysteriously intangible person, 
outstandingly gifted and desperately trying to process her coming-of-age in art, only to 
be ultimately broken by cruelly oblivious patriarchy. The legend of the “Pre-Raphaelite 
stunner” is taken up by Emily Orlando (614), who pictures Siddal as a kind of 
anachronistic supermodel, laying the foundations for the popularity of later celebrities 
like Marilyn Monroe (627). Likewise, Jan Marsh assesses this aspect as he aptly 
classifies the “legendary Elizabeth Siddal” (64) as belonging to those tragically 
glamorous heroines, whose ‘[...] myth rehearsed the archetype of the beautiful, gifted, 
reckless, vulnerable woman who was destroyed by her own beauty but thereby saved 
from the slow decay of middle age’ (Marsh 78).  
 The most popular story entwined around the young milliner’s daughter 
undoubtedly seems to be that of her discovery. Quoting a passage stylised in completely 
overdrawn, almost over-the-top melodramatical language, Marsh refers to the incident 
when Walter Deverell, as if struck by epiphany, discovered Lizzie in a shop and 
immediately fell in love with the thought of painting this exceptional young woman (68-
9). In Orlando, this highly charged subject only deserves short mentioning; instead, 
Siddal’s extraordinary talent is focused upon (626). Contrarily, Shefer, particularly 
eager to apply the word “myth”, unveils the ‘[...] myth of her [Siddal’s] entry into the 
Pre-Raphaelite group’ (21) to have been a discovery common with sitters for painters, 
as in fact, Deverell was never struck by Siddal’s beauty, simply considering her apt for 
a painting he was about to create.  
 In this respect it appears as if Siddal’s discovery – an act not at all influenced or 
controlled by herself – and her mysterious death113 truly seem to be of greater interest 
than her lifetime as poet and painter. Exhuming Lizzie’s grave after several years in 
order to regain manuscripts that had been buried with his beloved, Rossetti remarked 
that the corpse had been as intact as one the day of her death, and that her hair has kept 
on growing ‘[...] until it filled the coffin, retaining all its glowing colour’ (Marsh 67). 
This indeed more than ‘[...] macabre event [...]’ not only added up to Rossetti’s self-
fashioning as a Romantic poet ‘[...] alongside Keats, Byron and Shelley [...]’ (Marsh 
66), but necessarily enhanced the mythmaking around and celebration of the undying 
                                                 
113 Presumably, after having experienced severe depressions and a miscarriage, Siddal died of an overdose 
of Laudanum to which she had been addicted for several years (Bradley 141).  
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love between Rossetti and Siddal. The picture of the desperate, bereft lover was 
especially appealing in an age glorifying death and the maiden cult; and the up to now 
relatively neutrally regarded Elizabeth Siddal came to be stylised as an icon whose ‘[...] 
death [was] more meaningful than her life [...]’, reduced to but yet adored as a ‘[...] lost 
love object, visible only as the vanished ghost of the pictures, or as a corpse in its 
coffin’ (Marsh 67). In the following decades, this Poe-like narrative was still further and 
fancily embellished, always preserving its ‘[...] distinct sexual charge, as of necrophilia 
[...] as in the invocation of ‘the love that is consummated in death’’ (Marsh 67). Little 
surprisingly, it was Rossetti who eagerly fostered the cult around his departed love, 
keeping on framing her role for years after her death. Elisabeth Bronfen even argues 
that Rossetti depended upon Siddal’s death, as he was obsessed with the idea of a dead 
lover, thus claiming, ‘[s]ie mußte demnach sterben, um die Rolle zu übernehmen, die er 
ihr in seiner Vorstellung zugewiesen hatte’ (250-251)114. One might be tempted to issue 
the claim that Rossetti re-made Siddal in his very own image of her115, preparing 
portfolios of her artwork, but burning letters and photographs (Orlando 628). Thus it 
seems indeed impossible to obtain a truthful picture of the woman Elizabeth Siddal 
really was, as she got to be represented through Rossetti’s filter, and, by deciding what 
to make known and what to conceal, Rossetti achieved to render an eternally 
incomplete, highly objective, unilaterally distorted picture of Siddal. Possibly Siddal’s 
response to her role during her lifetime can be found in drawings of Hamlet and Ophelia 
and Lady Clare, respectively which look as if they have entered into a dialogue. Most 
obviously, Rossetti imagined himself as Hamlet and Lizzie as Ophelia, which not only 
increases the myth of their relationship, assembling it to a tragically twisted legend 
wherein Siddal ‘[...] ruptur[es] the barriers between art and life and life and death [...]’ 
(Rhodes 101), but also reveals personal feelings that somewhat contradict the public 
picture of the turtle doves. In the archetypically informed “Hamlet and Ophelia”, 
Rossetti is both lamenting and laying bare the fallen, corrupted nature of women, 
thereby processing his frustration, anger and grief orbiting his own relationship. As a 
                                                 
114 ‘Therefore, she had to die, in order to assume the role he had allotted her in his imagination’ (my 
translation). 
115 It should be forwarded at this point that Rossetti used to employ certain characteristics to most women 
he painted, appropriating them to popular types with ‘[...] long neck, sorrowful eyes, heavy tresses, and 
impossibly rosy lips’ (Orlando 642). As regards Elisabeth Siddal, it is argued that he “de-animated” 
Lizzie by painting her over and over again, almost always sitting, reclining, with half-shut eyes and weary 
face, the sheer embodiment of a melancholy Lady, balanced on the threshold between life and death 
(Bronfen 249).  
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counterstatement to Rossetti’s ‘[...] gynophobia or misogyny’ (Rhodes 105) and a 
boldly openly answer to contemporary views about womanhood, Elizabeth Siddal 
created a portrait of an honest, strong, morally independent “Lady Clare”, furnishing the 
picture with tokens of her ‘[...] very different conclusions about the fidelity and morality 
of women’ (Rhodes 107). In the same way, Siddal’s Lady of Shalott constitutes a loudly 
protesting response to male envisioning of femininity: diverging from common visual 
translations of the Lady as ‘[...] an exquisite corpse to be gazed upon and mourned’ 
(Orlando 632), Siddal’s Lady is alive and alert in the first place. Her sketch envisions 
the Lady interrupted during her work at the loom, hands still at the web, head bent 
towards the window116, and, most interestingly, away from Sir Lancelot who appears as 
a simple reflection (and not as an actual person or even protagonist) in the cracked 
mirror. The look on her face is not startled, frightened, seductive or monstrous, but calm 
and concentrated, if a little girlishly timid. Neither is she encased within a 
claustrophobically cocoonish womb, but sitting upright in a purist room bathed in light. 
The only decorum to be found is a little chest of drawers whereon a cross is placed, 
bearing witness to her modest and depriving life as a woman artist. Like her face that 
does reveal no traces of sexual temptation or awakening, her attire is simple and chaste; 
hair neatly tied back, dress plainly innocent and without ornaments. By envisaging this 
female artist who is concerned about her work and not occupied with her looks, Siddal 
has called into life a sketch that ‘[...] functions as a progressive act of self-portraiture’ 
(Orlando 633); far more progressive, I would propose, than her small “Self-Portrait” of 
1854. Staring out from this rather darkish picture is a sickly pale, hollow-eyed and worn 
out woman without future that has resigned to her fate as eternal muse and mistress. The 
Lady of Shalott, conversely, portrays as a positive statement both ‘[...] Siddal the artist 
and Siddal the woman [...]’ (Shefer 27) and can thus be frankly read as way of coming 
to terms with life as a woman artist in an antiquated society that encouraged women to 
paint in a ‘[...] soft-spoken, “feminine” manner [...]’ and to ‘[...] confine themselves to 
landscapes, still lifes, domestic scenes [...]’ (Orlando 634). 
 
                                                 
116 The window the Lady gazes to is ‘[...] suggestive of windows of possibility’, a trope more elaborately 
employed in the work of Marie Spartali (Orlando 632). 
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Fig. 6: Lady of Shalott by Elizabeth Siddal, sketch from 1853 
 
Eventually, Siddal’s Lady of Shalott does not quite illustrate Tennyson’s poem, but tells 
her own story, imprisoned not within a tower, but patronised by Ruskin and unable to 
step out of Rossetti’s shadow. Although Siddal’s potential may not have been amply 
recognised during her lifetime, it can still be speculated that via her drawings, she 
bluntly sought to escape patriarchal constructions. While Siddal herself ‘[...] spiritually 
[...] remained a prisoner, still dressing to please a man’ (Shefer 28), her Lady survives 
as an emblem of her thwarted feelings toward and slightly subversive responses to the 
Victorian spirit. 
 Correspondingly, Marie Spartali, another member of the Pre-Raphaelite circle 
whose artistry has not received due respect yet, constantly strove to initiate a new, 
reformed picture of femininity by way of re-assessing the stories of Tennyson’s ‘[...] 
world-weary, bereft, and yearning for death [...]’ (Orlando 638) “Mariana” or Dante’s 
“Beatrice”, who in Rossetti’s portrait – notably, the last portrait of Elisabeth Siddal 
(Bronfen 256) – is summoned to Heaven via a sexually charged rapture. Facing a 
similar fate like Elizabeth Siddal, Marie Spartali was reduced to her allegedly unearthly 
beautiful face, which was praised so excessively that a diminution of character and 
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talent was the natural consequence. However, by creating effectively truthful versions 
of femininity and womanhood in the 19th century, Marie Spartali, much like Elizabeth 
Siddal, accomplished to generate powerful tokens of emancipation serving as challenges 
to patriarchal hegemony, thereby writing herself out of the fairy tale world she was 
supposed to inhabit. Instead, both women bequeathed to posterity a body of work 
wherein they managed to evoke feasible spaces of opposition, promising versions of a 
Symbolic Order wherein women could assert themselves as artists looking forward to a 
bright future, which proved them undoubtedly far ahead of their time (Orlando 644). 
While they may not have – or only too late – enjoyed the recognition they deserved, 
these two and others proved that there were indeed women who looked beyond 
prefabricated roles in order to affirm their capability of envisioning alternative ways of 
living.  
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7. Tales of Sex and Terror – Angela Carter’s Werewolf Trilogy 
 
Notwithstanding various benefits of French feminism and deconstruction to be 
discussed in the sections below, the English novelist Angela Carter attempts to go one 
step further. Often imagined and hailed as a priestess or witch of the Gothic Age 
(Makinen 20-21), she boldly endeavors to transgress even the limits of theory, 
imagining a ‘[…] near-prophetic […]’ (Müller 33), Utopian vision of gender and 
sexuality independent of already existing theories. Defying prevalent notions of 
mythmaking, feminism and gender, she vividly draws the picture of an alternative 
universe, wherein ‘[…] both sexes, though inevitable as such, have the ability to 
transcend the borderlines that separate them’ in order to merge in an oneiric synthesis 
that ‘[…] escapes the limits of sexuality and reality […]’ (Müller 33) and allows them 
to disentangle from the densely woven web of ‘[…] sex and love, freedom and bondage, 
prey and predation […]’ (Atwood 132). Crossing boundaries, Angela Carter 
incorporates in her text the notion of the abject; that which is repressed, expelled and 
despised in our society is embraced and acknowledged as an integer part of the human 
psyche. Accepting that which is inacceptable, Carter’s heroine Wolf-Alice represents 
progressively revised conceptions about identity and selfhood picturing self and body as 
‘[…] permeable, instable, and performative […]’ (Gutenberg 178) and thus proves to be 
the most autonomous and successful literary figure portrayed in this thesis.  
For now, I will return to the ideas brought forward by Cixous and Irigaray, 
which both center on the problems and ambiguities encountered when attempting to 
define models of “female sexuality” that Angela Carter dismisses in her work; indeed a 
polymorphous, elusive quality as has already been shown and will be demonstrated 
when assessing “Wolf-Alice”. Notions and suppositions provided by Cixous and 
Irigaray do prove to be a useful tool in order to provide steadfast counterarguments to 
patriarchal hetero-normativism by initiating an alternative discourse wherein the two 
sexes can engage. Though these theories may appear effective and refreshing at first 
sight, they do smack of essentialism and ultimately only reveal a stale reversal of 
binaries that does not liberate and empower woman, but eventually leaves her entrapped 
in the same old paternal machinery. 
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7.4. Models of Female Sexuality 
Hélène Cixous’ proposition of a constantly changing, bisexual human nature indeed 
seems to provide for the dawn of the longed for independence of traditional patterns, 
e.g. the tendency to think in oppositions such as man/woman and the related pairs of 
‘Activity/Passivity […] Culture/Nature […] Head/Heart […] Logos/Pathos’ (Sorties 
101). Her notion of bisexuality understands itself as an acceptance of the other sex as a 
deep-seated element within oneself, the refusal to conservatively repress any 
homosexual element; it is ‘[…] multiple, variable and ever-changing […]’ (Moi Politics 
109). Femininity and bisexuality therefore go hand in hand; men, on the other hand, 
have been ‘[…] trained to aim for glorious phallic monosexuality’ (Cixous Sorties 104). 
This all-embracing bisexuality as defined by Cixous derives its power from the fact that 
it endows the subject with the extremely liberating possibility to shift between 
masculinity and femininity without having to decide which position to occupy (Moi 
Politics 120): ‘Liberation from phallocentrism would not negate these differences 
[between men and women], but would place them into an equal relationship by 
reestablishing bisexuality (Griffin Crowder 137). Cixous voices her optimism by 
euphorically announcing, ‘[…] today, writing is woman’s’ (Sorties 105), which is made 
more accessible in Moi, who pictures Cixous as proclaiming 
[…] woman as the source of life, power and energy and [hailing] the advent of a 
new, feminine language that ceaselessly subverts these patriarchal binary 
schemes where logocentrism colludes with phallocentrism in an effort to oppress 
and silence women. Politics 105. 
 
Cixous’ positive image of woman as a creative and potent entity and her way of subtly 
yet thoroughly connecting text, body and femininity (Babka 202) directly opposes the 
subsidiary status conventionally ascribed to women within society. Feminist concepts 
like masquerade or écriture feminine consciously draw upon this marginal position, 
‘[…] in order to celebrate that marginality’ (Mills Conclusion 233); a decisive step that 
can be read as potentially subversive. Cixous’ notion of écriture feminine can be seen as 
rescuing women from silence and absence via the use of the libido as a vehicle for 
writing (Griffin Crowder 135). Truly, Cixous’ proclamations may appear liberating at 
first sight, however when subjected to closer scrutiny, as undertaken by Ann Rosalind 
Jones or Toril Moi, Cixous’ patterns themselves do not fully escape the trap of 
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essentialism117. Cixous’ invocation of women’s ‘[…] mystically superior […]’ sexuality 
does stand in a stark contrast to the male ‘[…] phallic single-mindedness […]’ (Jones 
365) it is supposed to overthrow and disempower. The criticism Jones utters grounds 
itself on the fact that Cixous on the one hand accuses psychoanalysis to blindly 
presuppose an ‘[…] anatomical determination of sexual difference-opposition […]’ 
(Jones 365), but on the other hand herself stridently distinguishes female sexuality from 
the male one. Similarly, Cixous heavily criticizes Lacanian psychoanalysis that insists 
on the primacy of the “phallus” within the Symbolic Order, yet retains a ‘[…] maternal 
(usually heterosexual) […]’ and thus conformist family model to explain her notion of 
desire (Griffin Crowder 124). Joining in the criticism, Jones rightly asks, ‘[I]s women’s 
sexuality so monolithic that a notion of a shared, typical femininity does justice to it?’ 
(369), deliberately dismissing the idea of conceptualizing women’s writing as a sheer 
outpouring of bodily impulses. This sharp focus on the female body and its libidinal 
drives as represented by Cixous is to some extent shared by Luce Irigaray, who 
specifically sheds light on female sexuality. Starting by condemning the archaic 
paradigm that has female sexuality defined in relation to the male one, Irigaray in The 
sex which is not one offers empowering ways of thinking about the female sex genitals. 
Irigaray assumes the vulva’s two lips as bearing the potential to let women experience 
the infinitely diffuse and subtle sexuality they possess: 
So ist zum Beispiel die Auto-Erotik der Frau von der des Mannes sehr 
verschieden. Dieser hat, um sich zu berühren, ein Instrument nötig […] Die Frau 
aber berührt sich durch sich selbst und an sich selbst […] Die Frau „berührt 
sich“ immerzu […] da ihr Geschlecht aus zwei Lippenbesteht, die sich 
unaufhörlich aneinander schmiegen. Geschlecht 23. 118 
 
Only by recognising and asserting their pleasure can women subvert the phallocentric 
order that negates their sexuality. What Irigaray fails to do, most importantly, is to 
regard both sexes – and sexual organs, in this specific case – with equal value. The 
                                                 
117 See ‘[…] I’m speaking of woman in her inevitable struggle against conventional man […]‘ (Medusa 
347); ‘More so than men who are coaxed toward social success, toward sublimation, women are body‘ 
(Medusa 356). Moreover, Cixous might be accused of conflating men with reason – as done in the 
quotation above – and women with nature, mystery, fluidity: ‘Women’s imaginary is inexhaustible, like 
music, painting, writing: their stream of phantasms is incredible’ (Medusa 347), ‘Her libido is cosmic, 
just as her unconscious is worldwide [...] we are ourselves sea, sand, coral, seaweed, beaches, tides, 
swimmers, children, waves [...]’ (Medusa 358). 
118 ‘Thus, woman’s autoeroticism differs substantially from man’s. He needs an instrument to touch 
himself [...] Woman, however, touches herself through and with her body [...] Woman “touches herself” 
all the time [...] as her sexual organ is comprised of two lips, that relentlessly snuggle up to one another’ 
(my translation).  
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penis in her writing is transformed into a brutal aggressor, “raping” the vulva by parting 
the two lips by force; whereas the vagina is degraded to a hole only existent to stimulate 
the penis (Irigaray Geschlecht 22-23). The images of sexual intercourse as necessarily 
amounting to an act of violence conjured up by Irigaray can thus be said to unilaterally 
distorted. Eventually, Irigaray’s attempt to empower women has backfired, she falls into 
the very patterns of defining woman she had initially set out to avoid (Moi Politics 142). 
Irigaray has been regarded as a ‘[...] patriarchal wolf in sheep’s clothing’ (Moi Politics 
146) by colleagues; not only for the fact of reducing woman to her “two lips”, but also 
language-wise. Always contrasting “woman” with an anonymous audience in her 
writing119, she introduces a discourse completely informed by oppositions that 
ultimately smacks of essentialism. Moi is hence forced to conclude that Irigaray’s ‘[...] 
superb critique of patriarchal thought is partly undercut by her attempt to name the 
feminine’ (Politics 148, emphasis in the original). As both Cixous and Irigaray fail in 
certain respects to overcome patriarchal discourses, a potential way out of the 
essentialist straitjacket is suggested in the next chapter, which seeks to do away with 
categories on the whole.  
Truly, this approach will prove to be helpful as regards the sexual desires and 
identities of the heroines that have been introduced in previous chapters. Oscillating 
between femininity and masculinity, divinity and horror, madness and sanity, the figures 
under consideration could never be assigned a concretely shaped and logically 
assessable role or identity – which is why the concept of deconstruction seemed to play 
a pivotal role in the organisation of this chapter. 
 
7.5. Deconstruction  
As has been aptly proven beforehand, the women introduced – Eleonora, Morella or 
Ophelia – have evaded explicit labeling and thereby challenged antiquated notions of 
femininity as provided by patriarchal hegemony. As befits the topic, French Feminism 
boldly questions the basis of language alongside with the institution of subjectivity per 
se, thereby necessitating the debate about “woman” being ‘[…] a fictional construct of 
patriarchal discourse’ (Millard 156) that can neither be based on essence nor on 
                                                 
119 Irigaray constantly uses generalisations like ‘they’, ‘them’, or talks about ‘Die Frau’ (as if ‘Die Frau’ 
existed as an essence), as can be seen in the passage quoted above. Thus it seems not unfair to accuse 
Irigaray of using the same patriarchal organisational categories she wants to undo. Further, her 
understanding of female sexuality reads like a broad simplification, implying that all women derive 
pleasure from the fact that their ‘two lips’ relentlessly touch one another. 
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experience (Mills Intro 4). Taking this assumption as a starting point, the concept 
“woman” as well as such notions as “the natural”, “the real” or “the human”, need to be 
deconstructed in order to break with the order that subjugates women (Eagleton Intro 
11). Feminist theory opposes restrictive constructions of the category “woman”, 
maintaining that a subject cannot be conceived of in steady terms. Apart from that fact, 
it is undeniably questionable as to what qualities or traits should be subsumed under the 
heading “woman”, which has, in Judith Butler’s terms, ‘[…] become a troublesome 
term, a site of contest, a cause for anxiety” (Gender 3). Likewise, Butler dismisses the 
existence of a heterogeneous institution one could label “patriarchy”, since such an 
assumption by necessity entails a common oppression experienced by all women alike. 
Feminism would truly backfire, were it to presuppose the existence of patriarchy as 
diametrically opposed to subjugated women. Instead, Butler calls for challenging those 
categories that ‘[…] contemporary juridical structures engender, naturalize, and 
immobilize’ (Gender 5).  
 As a matter of fact, it seems that a certain degree of eclecticism has been applied 
within feminist theory. One of the key figures feminists, especially those representing 
the French line, are indebted to is Jacques Derrida, whose theory of deconstruction ‘[…] 
defies ready-made categories and clear-cut characterizations’, and in so doing ‘[…] 
provides a way of rethinking our common conceptions […]’ (Grosz Ontology 75). What 
renders deconstruction that appealing is the claim that women ‘[…] do not exist as such 
[…] because essence and determinate meanings have gone the way of Man and God’ 
(Holland Intro 6, emphasis in the original). Deconstruction thus offers itself as a useful 
tool in order to do away with binary oppositions. 
 Admittedly, dichotomies and normative gender roles are resented and 
successfully deconstructed in “Wolf-Alice”; the most progressive concept to be 
introduced, however, is Kristeva’s notion of the abject, the incorporation of which 
renders the short story a significantly progressive and revolutionary one. 
 
7.6. I spit myself out – Abject & Abjection 
Julia Kristeva’s concept of abjection, carefully outlined in Powers of Horror, has 
already been tentatively touched upon in the chapter revolving around Poe’s heroines 
Eleonora and Morella. For now, the notions of abjection and the abject shall be 
subjected to closer scrutiny since they assume a key role in Carter’s “Wolf-Alice”. By 
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forwarding a thoroughly concise synopsis of Kristeva’s theory, Wolf-Alice’s almost 
transcendental powers as regards the boundaries between the sexes and the infinitely 
delicate division between sexuality and perversion shall be made evident in order to 
evoke a revolutionary picture of what could be possible were we to question established 
and antiquated norms and constructions.  
 As has already been pointed out, the abject denotes that which crosses clearly 
drawn boundaries, especially those separating inside from outside. Konstanze Kutzbach 
and Monika Mueller see this necessity of expulsion and the fear of decay that shall be 
prevented with exactly this expulsion as grounding in the experience of the ‘[…] initial 
abjection of the maternal body that the subject has to perform in order to acquire 
language and to establish the border between self and (m)other’ (8). As this quotation 
already implies, the human body (and the maternal one in particular) in all its primal 
untidiness and repulsive ambiguity constitutes a borderline per se in establishing a ‘[…] 
physical frontier between inside and outside, between internal drives and desires and 
fears and outside regulations’ (Müller 114). The term abject comprises all that which 
needs to be expelled – from the body in a concrete sense or from society on a more 
symbolical level – in order to ensure a safe continuation of the subject status and its 
participation in society. As regards the body, it is the fluids that conjure up the most 
affective notions of horror and disgust since there seems to be ‘[…] something 
inherently disgusting about the incorporative, immersing properties of fluid […]’ (Grosz 
Bodies 194). Fluids can, by their very nature, not be contained within boundaries; they 
will perpetually seep and infiltrate without control. Probably this is what evokes this 
primal fear towards the abject, that it cannot be restricted in ‘[…] its refusal to conform 
to the laws governing the clean and proper, the solid and the self-identical […]’ (Grosz 
Bodies 195); it is always and necessarily already other, and needs to be detached from 
the subject in order not to threaten the subject’s integrity itself. Kristeva identifies three 
major areas of abjection, namely ‘[f]ood, corporeal waste (excrement and blood) and 
sexuality […]’ (Müller 115) that encompass a darkly looming ‘[…] threat that seems to 
emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, 
the tolerable, the thinkable’ (Kristeva Horror 1). The fluids that threaten to disrupt 
patriarchal organisation by polluting or contaminating the Symbolic Order, are, to be 
more precise, ‘[b]lood, vomit, saliva, phlegm, pus, sweat, tears, menstrual blood, 
seminal flows […]’ that are again inserted into a ‘[…] hierarchy of propriety […]’ 
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(Grosz Bodies 195). While there seem no notions of disgust being attached to tears due 
to their poetically purifying function, matters are different with regard to those fluids 
that menace to dirty the body. Indeed there appears to be a discrepancy in value as far as 
men’s and women’s bodily flows are concerned: while men’s ‘[s]eminal fluid is 
understood primarily as what it makes, what it achieves, a causal agent and thus a thing, 
a solid […]’ (Grosz Bodies 199) and is thus related to its possibly procreative function, 
women’s fluids, that is, the menstrual blood, is put into the category of those things that 
defile and hence juxtaposed with excrement (Grosz Bodies 206). Once again, man is 
charged with positive values as his fluids are metonymically connected ‘[…] to a 
corporeal pleasure and metaphorically with a desired object […]’, woman is coded quite 
distinctively; ‘[…] menstruation, associated as it is with blood, with injury and the 
wound […]’ (Grosz Bodies 205) becomes immediately juxtaposed with something ‘[…] 
regarded not only with shame and embarrassment but with disgust and the powers of 
contaminating’ (Grosz Bodies 206). Notably, the image of blood as source of abjection 
is so strongly connected to the female body – and even more so, the maternal body120, 
‘[…] a monstrous, pulsating, wet, fleshly, and abject spectacle […]’ (Gear 323) – that 
woman, especially in her birth-giving function, becomes the abject per se. It is the 
woman’s genital organ, the vagina, that is, according to Rachel Gear, posited as the very 
source of abjection: ‘The vagina, in particular, is identified as monstrous mainly 
because it bleeds, and therefore messes up the boundary between inside and outside a 
woman’s body’ (328). In this respect, Gear forwards the image of the “vagina dentata” 
as an archaic image of man’s existential fears as the ‘[…] vagina dentata suggest[s] a 
dangerous entrance, a devouring creature, and the fear of castration’ (328). 
 Carter’s Wolf-Alice smartly and smoothly eludes her position as abject body as 
she is kept bluntly oblivious to the organization governing the patriarchal order. Carter 
deconstructs dichotomies of purity and dirt, propriety and impropriety by having Wolf-
Alice embrace the abject as a value-free aspect of human life. Acknowledging dirt and 
filth and thereby escaping rigidly drawn limitations, Wolf-Alice fully unfolds her 
subversive potential in so far as ‘[…] filth is a metaphor for disrespect of authority and 
rules, for structural chaos and thus carries a political potential’ (Müller 123). Contrary 
to the heroines introduced and discussed before, Wolf-Alice appropriates her innocent 
                                                 
120 ‘The maternal body perpetually alludes to the powerfully subversive ambivalence of abjection: before 
the submission to the symbolic and its prohibitive force, before their positioning in a rigid inside-outside 
distinction, mother and child exist in joyful, incestuous, forbidden unity’ (Müller 126). 
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unawareness to her own meaningful purposes; gaining knowledge about her own, as yet 
unsexed body, which ‘[…] in turn, produces interpretive frameworks for understanding 
the body’ (Gear 329). By increasing her insights about bodily representation, Wolf-
Alice thus achieves reconciliation with the potential dangers of abjection that appears 
tremendously powerful.  
 
7.7. Little Red Riding Hood and the Wolf in Bed – Carter’s Werewolf Trilogy 
In 1979, the English novelist Angela Carter published The Bloody Chamber and other 
Stories, a remarkable anthology surpassing feminist ideology121, which comprises ten 
short stories latently circulating around tropes and topoi extracted from popular fairy 
tales such as “Little Red Riding Hood”, “The Beauty and the Beast” or “Snow White”. 
Essentially, Carter’s stories feed from Charles Perrault’s 1697 fairy tale collection that 
she translated prior to writing The Bloody Chamber. However, Carter openly voices her 
dissatisfaction with pseudo-mythic or kitschy traces dominating archaic tales and thus 
rewrites her tales in what could be called a Utopian setting of post-feminism122. Her 
protagonists, as much archetypal, innocent beauties as in Perrault’s times, escape 
domination via the Symbolic Order by rejecting male dominance and/or appropriating 
patriarchal power themselves. Outstandingly, the Red Riding Hoods and Snow Whites 
she ingeniously envisions are not the poor, whimsy maiden of our childhood memories, 
but strong, sexually active girls who partake in enjoying sexuality and partnership. The 
stories considered to be most relevant for the purpose of this paper certainly is “Wolf-
Alice”; however, “The Werewolf” and “The Company of Wolves” deserve – if only 
                                                 
121 ‘However, rather than further reinscribe dominant male fantasies [...] women writing erotic tales call 
attention to the dominant cultural fetishization of young girls and the sexualization of women according 
to such tropes in order to rewrite desire such that it prioritizes women’s sexual agency as they see it. The 
genre itself thus becomes essential to the feminist project of dismantling patriarchal understandings of 
women’s sexuality [...] The question, of course, is whether such erotic reimaginings of classic fairy tales 
exceed patriarchal definitions of the erotic or whether these women are producing a sexual agency that 
exists alongside, and perhaps operates with and through, a dominant erotic. [...] I would suggest that, for 
the most part, even as these women contest the cultural fetishization of sexually precocious young girls 
and their own status as adult women within such a hegemonic sexual system, they also reproduce fairly 
traditional patriarchal definitions of the erotic as related to sexual arousal and desire’ (Lau 80). With this 
respect I agree with Lau that a mere inversion of dichotomies which allots the active role to the woman is 
not enough to challenge the hegemonic order; rather, it blindly leaves patriarchal constructions intact and 
unquestioned. 
122 ‘[T]he wolf trilogy is a set of Little Red Riding Hood [...] stories borne of unfaithful readings, marked 
by multiple rewritings, full of intricate and intimate betrayals, not only of Charles Perrault’s patriarchal 
“Little Red Riding Hood” but also of the feminist desire to “eroticize” the classic tales, of Carter’s own 
restagings even – infidelities upon infidelities, a luxurious promiscuity’ (Lau 78). 
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brief – mentioning as well since those three stories together form the “werewolf-trilogy” 
that constitutes the climax of Carter’s Bloody Chamber.  
 Carter deliberately chooses the werewolf as incarnation of unruly sexuality as 
match for the girl’s awakening sexuality and womanhood. The wolf as initial antagonist 
embodies a much more deep-seated, ‘[...] stranger, more alienated otherness [...]’ 
(Makinen 30) than any partner suitable for the protagonists ever might; the animal 
challenges the girls’ innate desires and thus enables them to embrace their libido as an 
autonomously yearning subject. That the wolves prove to be the perfect counterparts to 
Carter’s Red Riding Hoods is evident as the wolves first epitomise the girls’ libido, only 
to ultimately ‘[...] become exactly that autonomous desire which the female characters 
need to recognise and reappropriate as a part of themselves (denied by the phallocentric 
culture)’ (Makinen 31).  
 A second pivotal aspect pertaining to the trope of the werewolf is his fashioning 
as “abject” that has already been explained above. By definition, the werewolf is, as the 
morphology of his name (“man-wolf”) already designates, a hybrid life form, belonging 
to neither Imaginary nor Symbolic Order and therefore forever situated at the margins 
of society. Whereas his everyday appearance as man might classify him as citizen of a 
conventional hetero-normative culture, his nocturnal immoderation, such as ‘[...] 
cannibalism, uncontrolled violence and/or sexual excess [...]’ (Gutenberg 149) renders 
him a potential threat to the integrity of any civilised phallocentric society. Thus it 
seems almost too logical that the werewolf should be inserted into the role of the abject 
since this figure ‘[...] necessarily disturbs any clear-cut notions of identity [...]’ 
(Gutenberg 149) and therefore cannot be allocated a safely contained existence. The 
werewolf continuously transgresses and disrespects established boundaries insofar as he 
dismisses the repression of primal desires and drives, a trait regarded normal in cultured 
beings. Additionally, he seems to be inseparably and irresistibly linked to sexual 
perversion and excess, as well as to libidinous identification with the oral stage in 
psychosexual development constituting an earlier stage in human development, which 
allows for the werewolf to be regarded as a developmentally regressive figure, or 
“subhuman” (Gutenberg 150). Furthermore, the ‘[...] violent corporeal transformation 
[...]’ indeed situates the werewolf as abject figure as this metamorphosis witnesses the 
total collapse of boundaries between inside and outside, human and animal (Crofts 118) 
alongside with an overall deconstruction of the human body. While the brutality and 
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aggressive sexuality ascribed to the werewolf traditionally identify him as undisputedly 
masculine (as does his name), a further misdemeanour of boundaries occurs as regards 
his unmistakably feminine traits, such as ‘[...] cunning, uncontrollability, non-
containment and irrationality’, as well as the transformation during full moon, followed 
by an irrepressible thirst for blood (Gutenberg 151-2). The metamorphosis as collapse 
of boundaries allots the werewolf the role of the grotesque body, one traditionally linked 
to women. What most definitely connects the werewolf to the feminine, however, is the 
‘[...] violent incorporation of victims [...]’ metaphorically read as a reversal of childbirth 
(Gutenberg 152). This eerily captivating act of absorption, diametrically opposed to the 
expulsion of birth, directly links the wolf with the abject image of a birth giving woman 
and thus achieves a breakdown of gender differences by foregrounding ‘[...] the fragility 
of culturally constructed gender roles as opposed to essentialist accounts of gender’ 
(Crofts 120). Ultimately, the werewolf is cast into the role of the ‘[...] borderliner denied 
entry into the symbolic order [...]’ (Gutenberg 153), a fate typically shared by women 
reluctant to submit and adapt to male fantasies and projections, as previous chapters 
have shown. This is not to claim that both women and werewolves share a restrictively 
subsidiary position forestalling any possibilities of self-realization, on the contrary, it 
can be asserted that ‘[...] the abject can be the site of a more sustained resistance to the 
symbolic order’ (Crofts 118). In this respect, werewolves might be seen as revolutionary 
figures oscillating between semiotic and symbolic, yet able to survive at the 
patriarchally outlined limits of existence. Especially the twentieth century witnesses a 
long-awaited upgrading of the socio-psychological position of such outsiders, since 
werewolves, particularly in the tales of Angela Carter, ‘[...] are not only typical 
survivors but could be claimed to advance to the status of icons of identity politics for 
those who feel marginalized and discriminated against’ (Gutenberg 178). In what 
follows as a psychoanalytical and postfeminist/postgender account of Carter’s tales, it 
shall be made evident how Carter both plays with ‘[...] bodily and textual 
transformation, in order to challenge the dominant ideology of the unified self [...]’ 
(Crofts 120) and to battle outdated notions of female sexuality and jouissance.  
 
7.7.1. Castrating the Castrator 
At first sight, the opening paragraphs of “The Werewolf” seem to unravel a genre quite 
different from the folk tales one uses to know by association with the Brothers Grimm; 
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a setting profoundly steeped in mysteriously sinister Northern mythology, legend and 
peasant superstition unfolds itself as the backbone of Carter’s text. A switch to the 
authoritative version of “Little Red Riding Hood” then suddenly takes place as the 
virginal protagonist is told to visit her grandmother. Contrary to Red Riding Hood, this 
girl sticks to the reality principle and thus fearlessly proves not to be susceptible to 
superstition. Ultimately, this power enables her to fight her oppressor, the wolf, by 
asserting her own power against his. She even goes so far as to appropriate the ‘[…] 
tools of patriarchy […]’ (Cranny-Francis 91), her father’s phallic hunting knife, to her 
own use and figuratively castrates the sexual predator (Cranny-Francis 92). The ending 
surprisingly reveals the grandmother to be the werewolf having attempted to feast on 
her own offspring. This device testifies to Carter’s affinity for blurring boundaries and 
the deconstruction of popular myths by simultaneously framing the grandmother as ‘[...] 
werewolf, witch, and woman [...]’ (Lau 83). Her oscillation between these categories 
eventually betrays the grandmother: ‘[...] she cannot be contained by the singularity of 
any given category. Instead, her constant slipping between werewolf, witch, woman, 
from male to female, offers a glimpse into the cracks that belie the myth of an 
omnipotent language, the myth of total signification’ (Lau 83). Red Riding Hood 
exhibits no signs of empathy as she denounces her grandmother who is subsequently 
identified as witch, driven away and stoned to death. The girl has obviously most 
successfully adapted to the conditions of the Symbolic Order by finding a way to 
embody the phallic power, which secures her a stable position in an otherwise paternally 
dominated universe. With this opener of the wolf trilogy, Carter has both deconstructed 
the myth of the phallus’ primacy and thus unhinged the phallus from its apparently God-
given connection with father and man (Lau 83), thereby opening up possibilities for 
young girls and woman to thrive within the patriarchal order.  
 
7.7.2. Outwolfing the Wolf 
Carter’s second werewolf tale, “The Company of Wolves”, deviously epitomises that 
which Carter herself labels moral pornography123, a concept devoted to alternative 
                                                 
123 ‘The moral pornographer would be an artist who uses pornographic material as part of the acceptance 
of the logic of a world of absolute sexual licence for all the genders, and projects a model of the way such 
a world might work. A moral pornographer might use pornography as a critique of current relations 
between the sexes. His business would be the total demystification of the flesh and the subsequent 
revelation, through the infinite modulations of the sexual act, of the real relations of man and his kind. 
Such a pornographer would not be the enemy of women, perhaps because he might begin to penetrate to 
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erotic practices ‘[...] motivated by amoral sexual drives’ (Lau 84). This peculiar Red 
Riding Hood version features a protagonist similar to the one discussed above; virginal 
and desirable, yet bold and sly124. Freely acknowledging her awakening sexuality, it is 
the girl who outwits the wolf as she refuses to be his “meat” and thereby erases any 
possible notions of rape attached to older versions of the fairy tale125. As if familiar with 
the Sadeian model claiming that ‘[...] women can escape lambhood [...] only by 
adopting tigerhood [...]’ (Atwood 119), the girl unties from her role as victim as she is 
fully aware of the fact that she is ‘[...] nobody’s meat’ (Carter 118)126. As her libido 
meets his, their sexual desires, perverted or not, meet on equal height in order to form a 
perfect synthesis that transforms folk culture’s beastly werewolf into a ‘[...] tender wolf’ 
(Carter 118), holding the girl safely between his paws. Indeed, Carter initially seems 
willing to introduce the conventional fairy tale discourse, complete with woman as 
object of the gaze, woman as male fantasy and traditionally coded dialogues127. 
Applying patriarchal constructs only in order to mock and wittily destroy them, Carter 
then turns around her own constructions, twists and perverts them as the man-wolf 
becomes the object of the female gaze, minutely and faithfully, albeit subtly ironically 
described as he strips off his clothes128. As Red Riding Hood opts for the beast instead 
of the man, she artfully withdraws from the narrowly constructed patriarchal frame by 
assuming authority and agency located beyond the borders of the order she has grown 
up in. The love scene that follows finally ‘[...] unveils the hegemonic order of 
heterosexual relations, offering in its stead [...] a sexual moment no longer chained to a 
dominant erotic that limits the sexual possibilities of men and women but one that 
emerges from our deepest drives’ (Lau 88). The girl is no longer the desired object, but 
                                                                                                                                               
the heart of the contempt for women that distorts our culture even as he entered the realms of true 
obscenity as he describes it’ (Carter Sadeian Woman 19-20). 
124 ‘Her breasts have just begun to swell; her hair is like lint, so fair it hardly makes a shadow on her pale 
forehead; her cheeks are an emblematic scarlet and white and she has just started her woman’s bleeding 
[...] She stands and moves within the invisible pentacle of her own virginity. She is an unbroken egg; she 
is a sealed vessel; she has inside her a magic space the entrance to which is shut tight with a plug of 
membrane; she is a closed system; she does not know how to shiver. She has her knife and she is afraid of 
nothing’ (Carter 113-4). 
125 ‘The girl burst out laughing; she knew she was nobody’s meat. She laughed at him full in the face, she 
ripped off his shirt for him and flung it into the fire, in the fiery wake of her own discarded clothing’ 
(Carter 118). 
126 References to Carter, Angela. The Bloody Chamber will henceforth be quoted as ‘Carter’. 
127 ‘What would you like? She asked disingenuously. A kiss. Commonplaces of a rustic seduction; she 
lowered her eyes and blushed’ (Carter 115). 
128 ‘A crisp stripe of hair runs down his belly, his nipples are ripe and dark as poison fruit but he’s so thin 
you could count the ribs under his skin if only he gave you the time. He strips off his trousers and she can 
see how hairy his legs are. His genitals, huge. Ah! huge’ (Carter 116). 
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desiring subject herself, her desire is, as well as his, amoral and amorphous, free from 
prohibitions and restraints that might diminish the scope of sexual pleasure(s) to be 
enjoyed129. 
 
7.7.3. Through the Looking-Glass, and what Wolf-Alice Found There 
The oddly unruly animal desire strongly surfacing in “The Werewolf”, “The Company 
of Wolves” and basically all other stories taken from the Bloody Chamber collection 
literally becomes a leading character in “Wolf-Alice” as the titular heroine 
metonymically represents and embodies this “animal desire” (Lau 88) due to her half-
human, half-animal nature. In this last tale of her fairy tale anthology, Carter draws 
together all previously developed strands of female psychosexuality and conventionally 
perverse, amorphous desires to paint in vivid strokes a parable of a Utopian, 
prelapsarian universe freed from constructions constraining human life, thought and 
ideology. Wolf-Alice ingeniously epitomises the in-between, the abject, fluctuating 
between human and animal as ‘[n]othing about her is human except that she is not a 
wolf [...]’ (Carter 119, emphasis in the original) that ultimately confirms her superiority 
over the human race. 
 Wolf-Alice is a feral child, who, quite like Romulus and Remus, has been raised 
by wolves in the woods and thus kept oblivious to the organisation of human reality. 
Situated outside established patriarchal hegemony and hetero-normativism, this darkly 
futuristic yet almost Gothic fairy tale130 features a protagonist completely immersed in 
the provisional, elusive structures of the Real that heroines like Eleonora, Ophelia or the 
Lady of Shalott have been desperately striving to attain. Of Wolf-Alice, it is reported 
that ‘[l]ike the wild beasts, she lives without a future. She inhabits only the present 
tense, a fugue of the continuous, a world of sensual immediacy as without hope as it is 
without despair’ (Carter 119). Carter’s romantically allusive prose achieves the 
impossible in evoking precisely that which escapes definition and description as the 
dreamily blissful structures of the Imaginary are gathering shape without being 
determinedly fixed. Wolf-Alice does not seem to exist, but to float within a pre-
                                                 
129 ‘She will lay his fearful head on her lap and she will pick out the lice from his pelt and perhaps she 
will put the lice into her mouth and eat them, as he will bid her, as she would do in a savage marriage 
ceremony’ (Carter 118). 
130 I chose to label this fairy tale “Gothic” as this term repeatedly props up in connection with Angela 
Carter. As has been already pointed out, Merja Makinen has called her a priestess of the Gothic Age, and 
in a book review, Isabella van Elferen refers to a statement given by Carter about ‘[...] the “Gothic times” 
that Angela Carter stated we live in’ (134). 
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Symbolic, irrepresentable arrangement that knows as yet nothing of time, space or 
immaterial human concepts like hope or despair. Within this prelapsarian niche, there is 
no lack or desire, only notions of drives and sensory impulses without shape that are 
captured as “sensual immediacy”. Wolf-Alice’s Imaginary is immediate since the 
knowledge about linear structures and the organisation of time into bits and pieces has 
not yet dawned on her, which enables her to continue without care or sorrow by relying 
on her senses as the only tokens relating her to the outside world. Hence it probably 
would be more justified to claim that Wolf-Alice initially lives in a continuum rather 
than attempting to describe the particular qualities of her state. A second factor 
detaching Wolf-Alice from humanity is her inability to master the human tongue131, 
which locates her outside the Lacanian paradigm of speech, connecting her more closely 
to “semiotic babble” and the olfactory sense that Freud positions in a chain of 
associations with sexuality and the feminine. As these connections do seem to smack of 
essentialism – linking woman with the olfactory and man with the visual again entraps 
the two sexes in antiquated dichotomies – it shall be pointed out and explained more 
carefully later on that Wolf-Alice does not flatly submit to the aforementioned polar 
opposition, but constructs her own order via empirical experiments (Schanoes 12). That 
her nose indeed guides her and proves to be more reliable than her eyes might be traced 
back to the reality that she has been raised by animals, but is not necessarily tied to the 
fact that she is a biological woman. Contrary to dominant beliefs or anxieties, Carter 
opens up a space where women’s smell does not threaten the paternal discourse ruling 
the Symbolic Order, but prompts the erection of a counterworld of freedom and pleasure 
wherein both Wolf-Alice and the Duke are rescued from human brutality and able to 
lead an unhindered existence (Lau 89-90).  
 When Wolf-Alice is found in her den beside the corpse of her foster-mother, she 
is brought to a convent where ‘[...] nuns poured water over her, poked her with sticks to 
rouse her’ (Carter 120) led by Mother Superior who insists on teaching Wolf-Alice 
human behaviour in order to have her show thankfulness. By creating the idea of a 
convent where “Mother Superior” rules as the Phallic Mother, threatening to 
figuratively castrate Wolf-Alice by eradicating her blissfully pre-Oedipal innocence and 
                                                 
131 ‘Could this ragged girl with brindled lugs have spoken like we do she would have called herself a 
wolf, but she cannot speak, although she howls because she is lonely – yet ‘howl’ is not the right word for 
it, since she is young enough to make the noise that pups do, bubbling, delicious, like that of a panful of 
fat on the fire’ (Carter 119). 
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introducing her to the realm of paternal language, Carter renders obvious the dangers of 
matriarchy and thereby resents the restrictive notion of purely overturning the hierarchy 
of binary oppositions. A maternal society might be as insistently and narrow-mindedly 
caught within the dense web of societal constructions as any patriarchy can be. 
Representatives of the dominant – and thus metaphorically patriarchal – discourse, the 
nuns under the “command” of Mother Superior embody those instances ‘[...] that 
pathologically affirm conservative family values and chastise those who flout or 
disobey the norms’ (Seet 143). As a last resort, Wolf-Alice seemingly retreats wholly to 
her natural animalistic behaviour: ‘[...] when the Mother Superior tried to teach her to 
give thanks for her recovery from the wolves, she arched her back, pawed the floor, 
retreated to a far corner of the chapel, crouched, trembled, urinated, defecated [...]’ 
(Carter 120) as if deliberately resisting attempts of humanisation by breaking taboos 
connected to infantile perverse pleasures (Creed intro 13). By openly expressing 
disrespect, even a deep-seated contempt, Wolf-Alice in this scene ‘[...] evokes abject 
terror [...]’ (Müller 123) by dissolving the boundaries that have been cautiously set up 
for her. Witnessing the girl’s archaic deference to what appear to be the most primitive 
of instincts, the nuns – thereby assuming the position of the Father – shockingly 
experience the full unfolding of the ‘[...] powerfully subversive ambivalence of 
abjection’ (Müller 126) via the female body in all its splendour before the submission to 
the Symbolic Order. Terrified at the thought of what might happen were rigid 
distinction between inside and outside, Imaginary and Symbolic to be dissolved, the 
nuns exert their paternal power and deliver Wolf-Alice to the merciless Duke, an ‘[...] 
undead ghoulish werewolf [...]’ (Atwood 131)132. Thus, Wolf-Alice has cleverly 
managed to ‘[...] symbolically circumvent[...] the restrictions exerted on female identity’ 
and ‘[...] so escape[d] the narrow categories of myth and superstition’ (Atwood 131) by 
using her as yet free and limitless body as a weapon against patriarchal prohibitions. 
 At the point where Wolf-Alice is left at the Duke’s mercy, Carter introduces a 
second narrative from then on inseparably intertwined with the first one. While Wolf-
Alice fearlessly explores her new surroundings, the Gothic Castle she now inhabits, a 
‘[...] fundamentally repressed, unspeakable and tabooed site’ (Berressem 32), and 
                                                 
132 Rational reasoning would naturally demand Wolf-Alice’s expulsion, since – as has already been 
explained – filth shows disrespect for authorities and ‘[t]he rites that dismiss filth as dangerous and 
destructive do this also by excluding the agent with which this danger is associated: the mother – the 
woman’ (Müller 126). 
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continues her existence as one exempt from time and space133, her actions are paralleled 
with those of the Duke, another social misfit unable to adapt to his environment. Living 
on the reverse order of things (Schanoes 10), the Duke is as much, if not more, abject 
than Wolf-Alice; rejected by the wolves, he neither can join the not-human because 
undead vampires with whom he is associated as he ‘[...] ceased to cast an image in the 
mirror’ (Carter 120). The Duke shares with the new inhabitant of his castle the lot of 
linguistic inability, which effeminises him and thus doubly links him to the abject body. 
Whereas Wolf-Alice slowly but surely forms acquaintances with her newly awakening 
sexuality and womanhood and her companion in the mirror, the Duke seems to inhabit a 
niche without time himself; the only exception being that Wolf-Alice has no ‘[...] direct 
notion of past, or of future, or of duration, only of a dimensionless, immediate moment’ 
(Carter 122) and therefore embraces newly acquired information with innocently naive 
curiosity. The Duke, on the other hand, has led his unhappily damned existence for such 
a long time that he appears to have forgotten all notions of time or other human terms of 
measurement at all, thereby having estranged himself more and more from the world he 
once inhabited until the reverse order has completely absorbed him.  
 Matters change for good as Wolf-Alice experiences her first menstruation with a 
mixture of amazement and alienation. Out of shame, she uses the little amount of ‘[...] 
elementary hygiene [...]’ (Carter 122) she has learned at the convent, which implies that 
she must have some strangely innate, faint knowledge of abjection. Hand in hand with 
her first menses goes the inevitable arrival of the Mirror Stage. The developmentally 
decisive, violently disruptive momentum occurs as Wolf-Alice accidentally bumps 
against the surface of the mirror, thereby noticing her own reflection (although not 
recognising it as such) for the very first time. Dissimilar to the Lacanian discourse that 
foresees the initiation into language and the patriarchal order, along with alienation and 
lack134, Wolf-Alice is born into her own Symbolic Order, unhinged from notions of 
                                                 
133 ‘In the lapse of time, the trance of being of that exiled place, this girl grew amongst things she could 
neither name nor perceive. How did she think, how did she feel, this perennial stranger with her furred 
thoughts and her primal sentience that existed in a flux of shifting impressions; there are no words to 
describe the way she negotiated the abyss between her dreams, those wakings strange as her sleepings. 
The wolves had tended her because they knew she was an imperfect wolf; we secluded her in animal 
privacy out of fear of her imperfection because it showed us what we might have been, and so time 
passed, although she scarcely knew it’ (Carter 122). 
134 ‘The idea that a ‘Gestalt’ or ‘imago’ is imposed on the individual by the outside and adopted in a 
mimetic act, reduces identity-creation from an expression of individual choice to a mere reflection of the 
web of power in which the self is entangled’ (Müller 43). As Wolf-Alice is not enmeshed in the myths 
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language, separateness or hierarchy and hence does not participate in the ‘[...] 
pessimistic enacting of the cultural creation of identity [...]’ (Müller 44) in the way that 
for instance the Lady of Shalott does as her mirror cracks and she urgently seeks to 
adopt a readily available version of femininity. Even as Wolf-Alice identifies the 
companion in the mirror to be a mere reflection of her own person, this albeit 
disappointing discovery does not give way to traumatically yearning feelings of loss and 
the regretful recognition of her own imperfection. Quite on the contrary, ‘[...] her 
relation with the mirror was now far more intimate since she knew she saw herself 
within it’ (Carter 124, emphasis mine). Carter hereby unfolds an alternative tale reciting 
the familiar experience of coming of age without being entrapped within the Symbolic 
Order; subtly yet determinedly, she criticises the Lacanian paradigm of speech and 
orderly language as she lets her protagonist uncover the mirror’s mysteries: ‘[s]he 
rubbed her head against her reflected face, to show that she felt friendly towards it, and 
felt a cool, solid, immovable surface between herself and she [...]’ (Carter 123, 
emphasis mine). The confusion of syntax, as well as the application of inappropriate 
grammar hints to the liberating possibility of constructing one’s own Symbolic Order 
outside the dominant discourse135: ‘Wolf-Alice recognizes herself in the mirror not as 
the ideal coherent self of Lacan’s Mirror Stage [...] but rather as shadow, as reflection, 
and it is this different recognition that keeps her from entering into the symbolic, 
maintains her subjectivity outside of language’ (Lau 91). Carter thus counters 
established views that picture the mirror as tool for oppressing women, and re-reads it 
as an enabling token that marks Wolf-Alice’s ‘[...] entrance into knowledge, self-
awareness, and humanity [...]’, a powerful weapon that ‘[...] catalyses and signifies 
Alice’s emergence into human consciousness after which she is able to bring the Duke 
into humanity as well, an achievement signified by his reflection finally appearing in the 
mirror on his bedroom wall’ (Schanoes 10). It is precisely this self-recognition, 
triggered by the first drops of blood announcing the advent of her impending 
womanhood that plunges Wolf-Alice into full awareness of her surroundings. Evidently, 
she labels and understands her environment by contrasting it with and measuring it 
                                                                                                                                               
constructed around masculinities and femininities, there is no role she can be ascribed or inserted into, 
and is therefore free to create her own identity as an “expression of individual choice”. 
135 Following Berressem’s line of argument, one could argue that Carter’s confusion of syntax ‘[...] 
explores ways of speaking the unspeakable and thus confronts culture with its abject other(s)’. By doing 
so, she ‘[...] gives a voice|space to the abject [...]’ and thus disrupts not only the text, but the culture from 
deeply within (31). 
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against her body, as the periodical return of her menstrual cycle wakes her up to an 
exceptional possibility of assessing the irrationally elusive concept of time136. Having 
previously managed to continue without notions of space and time, both Wolf-Alice and 
the Duke must feel a certain latent need for measurement as the story unconsciously 
calls for the necessity of introducing time. Whereas the passages revolving around 
Wolf-Alice’s gradually developing sexuality and perception are tied to a specific 
developmental stage, the interruptions describing actions and life of the Duke seem 
somehow timeless and universal, yet broken, fragmented, out of place; so that 
ultimately both of them partake in a bizarre ‘[...] movement in space outside the familiar 
time-continuum [...]’ wherein the ‘[...] foundations of self and reality [...]’ appear to 
have been dissolved completely (Müller 157). Admittedly, abandonment of linear logic 
might exert a somewhat liberating fascination at first sight, since the deconstruction of 
chronology is in feminist terms closely linked to the challenging of the patriarchal order 
that relies on orderly constructions such as “time” and “space” in order to preserve the 
carefully erected hierarchical system. On the other hand, however, a total rejection of 
time causes terror and disorder in Carter’s eyes: ‘[y]et where there is no time and 
history, there is no future and no possibility of action – neither for women nor men. This 
lack is seen by Carter [...] as a loss of self-determination and agency’ (Müller 160). This 
is why Carter ultimately combats the feminist enterprise of deserting time altogether and 
‘[...] sarcastically challenges the sense of idolatry that maims much contemporary 
feminism [...] maternal space ‘kills’ as much as does paternal time [...]’ (Müller 161) 
which has been rendered explicit at the convent dominated by Mother Superior. As 
Wolf-Alice starts to create her own temporality, she cleverly circumvents the dangers of 
patriarchal as well as feminist essentialism by focusing on her body and its relation to 
the outside world to experience and call into life an alternatively thriving synthesis.  
 Following the astonishing discovery of time and space, Wolf-Alice is gradually 
thrown into self-recognition as her womanly sexuality tenderly begins to bud (Lau 
90)137. The recognition of her humanity and womanhood might be claimed to have 
                                                 
136 ‘Soon the flow ceased. She forgot it. The moon vanished; but, little by little, reappeared. When it again 
visited her kitchen at full strength, Wolf-Alice was surprised into bleeding again and so it went on, with a 
punctuality that transformed her vague grip on time [...] so that you might say she discovered the very 
action of time by means of this returning cycle’ (Carter 123). 
137 ‘[…] for now the world around her was assuming form. She perceived an essential difference between 
herself and her surroundings that you might say she could put her finger on […] She saw herself upon it 
and her eyes, with their sombre clarity, took on a veiled, introspective look. She would spend hours 
examining the new skin that had been born, it seemed to her, of her bleeding […] She examined her new 
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triggered the separation from her past with the wolves and cut the umbilical cord 
connecting her to the animality shared by her foster-mother; but what follows this 
division is not lack, but completion and psychologically healthy self-awareness. Wolf-
Alice might have lost the unselfconscious unity with the world and figuratively left her 
mother’s womb, but is indeed not led into a teleogically informed patriarchy since she is 
constructing her own order that is both Symbolic and Real. Similar to the perception 
that her mate in the mirror is a mere reflection of her own self, the possibility of 
experiencing the Symbolic Order without the father appears extremely liberating: 
‘There is no essential, patriarchal authority to dictate what form the self so constituted 
must take. Wolf-Alice’s emergent subjectivity precipitates her into the realm of subject-
object relations that characterises the human condition’ (Day 165). Wolf-Alice finds 
herself in the process of becoming whatever she chooses to become; and in this respect, 
the humanity that is gathering shape on her is not a loss, but a discovery independent 
‘[…] of all the structuring of identity that comes with human socialisation’ (Day 162) 
opaquely adumbrated by Lacan or Kristeva. Wolf-Alice herself is the measure: ‘She 
goes out at night more often now; the landscape assembles itself about her, she informs 
it with her presence. She is its significance’ (Carter 125, emphasis mine). Carter’s 
progressive ascertainment of Wolf-Alice’s relationship to nature is indeed a far cry from 
passages taken from Poe’s narratives or Tennyson’s “The Lady of Shalott” wherein 
nature mournfully heralds the death of the female protagonist. Freed from the master-
slave didactic, Wolf-Alice tumbles into the nocturnal surroundings of the Duke, thereby 
penetrating his private space wherein she becomes his saviour. This total overturn of 
binaries, hierarchies and established truths further detaches “Wolf-Alice” from the 
stories, poems and paintings previously considered and offers a powerful ‘[…] 
alternative to the dominant myth of singularity’ (Lau 92). Shifting from feral child to 
abject body to the highly controversial role of the bride, Wolf-Alice never occupies a 
fixed position and nonetheless manages to secure her place in a vastly contested world. 
The bridal gown tucked behind the mirror – as if only waiting to be discovered by 
someone worth wearing it – opens up a wholly new dimension to Wolf-Alice as she 
sees ‘[…] how this white dress made her shine’ (Carter 125). In assuming the role of the 
bride, Wolf-Alice adorns herself wilfully and decidedly with the marker of difference; 
                                                                                                                                               
breasts with curiosity […] but then, to her astonishment, she found a little diadem of fresh hairs tufting 
between her thighs’ (Carter 124). 
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‘[…] like a débutante from the castle […]’, she is ‘[…] singing to the wolves with a 
kind of wistful triumph, because now she knew how to wear clothes and so had put on 
the visible sign of her difference from them’ (Carter 125). Carter’s description recalls 
ideas of gender and femininity as performative; Wolf-Alice chooses to be bride, but 
persistently refuses to be someone’s bride, a deliberate choice bestowing upon her an 
amount of agency that Ophelia or Eleonora might only have dreamed of. Keeping her 
integrity ultimately saves not only Wolf-Alice herself, but also the Duke that has 
become a half-presence and is restored to the Symbolic Order only via the revolutionary 
powers of the bride. Wolf-Alice’s bridal attire bears highly symbolical, even biblical 
traces as the wearing of clothes alludes to the acquisition of knowledge and self-
perception by evoking the momentum of original sin138. However, Wolf-Alice escapes 
the trap laid out in prelapsarian Eden by dissociating herself from Eve in what 
constitutes the tale’s pivotal scene. With the creation of Wolf-Alice, Carter unravels an 
allegory of Eden and its fall, anticipating an impossible past-in-the-present as she 
reveals Wolf-Alice to be the rough diamond of mankind: 
She grew up with wild beasts. If you could transport her, in her filth, rags and 
feral disorder, to the Eden of our first beginnings where Eve and grunting Adam 
squat on a daisy bank, picking the lice from one another’s pelts, then she might 
prove to be the wise child who leads them all and her silence and her howling a 
language as authentic as any language of nature. In a world of talking beasts and 
flowers, she would be the bud of flesh in the kind lion’s mouth: but how can the 
bitten apple flesh out its scar again? Carter 121. 
 
This ‘[…] dream of the unbitten apple […]’ offers itself as a gruesome critique, directed 
against patriarchy as much as against feminism as Carter unfolds to us a future that 
might have been conceivable, ‘[…] had humanity not fallen into the construction of 
itself and of reality that it did fall into’ (Day 164). Paradoxically, the “future” Carter 
envisions utterly depends upon a past that has never been, encapsulated by the 
remorseful perception that the apple, once bitten, can never be whole again. Thus the 
scenario imagined to have been possible proves to be a Utopian one; the only way for 
Wolf-Alice to ever escape patriarchal constructions is to transform current relations in 
order to enable a viable future; if not for mankind, at least for her and the Duke.  
 As Wolf-Alice fills the empty natural surroundings with the beacons of hope 
emanating from the shiny white dress, the first step towards recovery for the Duke is 
                                                 
138 ‘Adam and Eve fashion clothing for themselves after eating fruit from the Tree of Knowledge of Good 
and Evil’ (Schanoes 11). 
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initiated. Since there have hardly been any common moments between the two social 
misfits – apart from one bizarre scene featuring a brief encounter as Wolf-Alice catches 
the Duke returning from one of his nocturnal feasts, neither appalled nor moved by the 
mutilated, grotesque body and the scene of abjection – the tale’s ending is as 
unemotional as it is awkward. Andrea Gutenberg maintains that Wolf-Alice’s ‘[...] 
masquerade as a woman fails to work [...]’ as a marker of difference, but however ‘[...] 
turns out to be a rescuing device [...]’ (169) as she frightens the villagers frantically 
hunting the Duke. While the white gown certainly prompts the Duke’s rescue as well as 
his and Wolf-Alice’s entrance into a more human Symbolic Order, the claim that her 
“masquerade” ultimately fails cannot be wholly acknowledged. It is precisely this 
oscillation between being bride and reverting to the wolfish state (Gutenberg 163) that 
saves Wolf-Alice from falling into the rigidly framed constructions of mankind. Neither 
mad bride nor abandoned maid, Wolf-Alice appropriates her human/bridal attire as the 
‘[...] boon of androgynous wholeness, autonomy, self-sufficiency’ (Gilbert and Gubar 
617), thus succeeding where the Lady of Shalott in the splendour of her virginal amour 
has utterly failed. Wolf-Alice does not enter the stage as an object to be possessed or a 
spectacle to be gazed at, but uses her virginity as a weapon against patriarchy that is 
denied access to the temple that is her body. Not waiting to be taken, or to be led to the 
altar as a good to be exchanged between father and bridegroom, Wolf-Alice effectively 
transports the image of the bride across the line separating passivity from activity. 
Frightening the frenetic villagers out of their wits as they are led into believing that a 
dead bride has resurrected to enact ‘[...] ghostly vengeance [...]’ (Carter 126), Wolf-
Alice runs from the noise and the smell of bullets with the injured Duke desperately 
stumbling after her. The image of the wedding is neither deathly, nor broken, but 
vigorously complete as bride and groom head towards a future that will be valued as 
‘[...] a realm of archaic, healthy instincts and tender intimacy [...]’, forming a stark 
contrast to the ‘[...] human world characterized by brutality and hate’ (Gutenberg 163). 
Thus, an amorphous, animal sexuality is effectively measured against the human world 
dividing female from male sexuality wherein polymorphous pleasures are labelled 
perversions so as to relentlessly ensure the triumphant perpetuation of heterosexuality. 
Finally, Wolf-Alice redeems the abject body of the Duke139 in an act of female birthing 
                                                 
139 ‘Poor wounded thing ... locked half and half between such strange states, an aborted transformation, an 
incomplete mystery [...]’ (Carter 126). 
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that has him being metamorphosed back into the state of humanity. Cautiously 
approaching the injured Duke, Wolf-Alice identifies his wound via the smell of blood, a 
marker of difference as she notices that ‘[...] his wound [...] does not smell like her 
wound’ (Carter 126), thus repeatedly undoing the bodily hierarchy. Without exhibiting 
any traces of loathing or repulsion possibly triggered by the view of the abject, Wolf-
Alice, the bride and saviour, leaps upon his bed to ‘[...] lick, without hesitation, without 
disgust, with a quick, tender gravity, the blood and dirt from his cheeks and forehead’ 
(Carter 126). Fully accepting and embracing the Duke’s otherness, Wolf-Alice 
figuratively gives birth to the Duke, whose newly gained humanity surfaces in the final 
appearance of his face in the mirror140. As the story ends on this transformation, the 
revolutionary potential is left in a void; as if Carter wished to suggest that now, it is our 
turn to use the power that resides within us. Carter takes up the thread of Adam and Eve 
again as it becomes clear that Wolf-Alice’s animal sexuality and pity, far from human 
constructions, have saved the Duke from his ‘[...] unbearable interim state of “wolf, not-
wolf”’ (Gutenberg 169), thereby posing the hazy question whether it might at last be 
possible to redeem the allegory of the unbitten apple. Partly in line with models outlined 
in The Sadeian Woman, Carter sketches the victory of ‘[...] triumphant perversity and an 
exuberant sexuality’ (Evans Fashion 151) that neither judges nor asks, but simply 
accepts. Animal sexuality becomes a weapon directed against hetero-normative 
categories demanding the expulsion of the abject and the strict maintenance of pre-
fabricated, acceptable models of human sexuality in a world that condemns women to 
victimisation and eternal submission without prospect. Caroline Evans justifiably states 
in an article slightly touching upon Angela Carter’s views about sexuality and 
perversion, ‘[...] the woman as aggressor is no freer from the trammels of gender 
relations than her dialectical sister, the woman as victim. If one is pawn and the other a 
queen, free to go where she will, nevertheless there is always a king elsewhere on the 
board, a Lord of the Game’ (Evans Fashion 157). In the same way, Angela Carter’s 
fiction and character constellations are ‘[...] neither picturesque nor romantic’ (Evans 
Fashion 157); and Wolf-Alice is neither victim nor queen. The Duke is not her husband, 
her king, her “Lord of the Game”, but an equal partner she has brought into being by 
                                                 
140 ‘Little by little, there appeared within it [the mirror], like the image on photographic paper that 
emerges, first, a formless web of tracery, the prey caught in its own fishing net, then in firmer yet still 
shadowed outline until at last as vivid as real life itself, as if brought into being by her soft, moist, gentle 
tongue, finally, the face of the Duke’ (Carter 126). 
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way of dismissing – or is it rather by being oblivious towards? – culturally imposed 
ideologies and despairingly restrictive norms. Truly, Wolf-Alice has given birth to the 
Duke, introduced him to the Symbolic; ‘[...] but it is her symbolic, a world outside of 
language though still shaped by the tongue’ (Lau 91). 
In the end, Carter’s tale is not disenchanted at the impossibility of reverting to 
prelapsarian Eden, but rather heralding a future that might be conceivable were we to 
question everyday constructions and morals. Anne Cranny-Francis aptly grasps the 
nascent potential of Carter’s demystified fairy tales when saying, ‘[...] Carter transforms 
a tale which dramatizes the brutal subjugation of women by a patriarchal order, and the 
expression of male fears of assertive female sexuality, into a story of the sexual 
maturation and potency of a woman who rejects male domination’ (93). Even more so, 
Carter hints to the fruitlessness of efforts attempting an overturn of binaries by having 
Wolf-Alice completely rewrite and rearrange the existing structures around her. Her 
power to challenge the Symbolic Order lies in her acceptance of the abject that proves 
her superior to the allegorical figures of Adam and Eve, particularly manifest in the 
story’s ending as the exceptional encounter with the imagery of abjection adds to Wolf-
Alice’s dissident powers and agency. Finally, the titular heroine achieves ‘[...] a 
successful and subversive consolidation with abjection’ (Müller 122); a development 
that challenges the foundations whereon both patriarchy and matriarchy are built upon 
and thus dismisses the thought of binary oppositions for good, as the boundaries 
between Imaginary, Real and Symbolic begin to blur and fuse and the masks of 
masculinity and femininity are taken off. 
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8. Conclusion 
In retrospect, I do believe to be able to claim that women’s interaction with the 
patriarchal, Symbolic Order throughout history and various genres has always been a far 
more thwarted, twisted and inexpressible process than has been assumed within the 
strands of theories I have applied as epistemological lenses, as discontinuities and 
silences within the texts multiplied and thus gave rise to a plurality of interpretations 
(Saporta 89) regarding (female) subversive strategies and (male) attempts of silencing. 
Though having chosen distinct verbal and non-verbal texts from various traditions, 
common motifs such as the association of woman with nature, the image of the (mad) 
bride or woman’s expulsion from the Symbolic Order could be detected.  
 Taking Edgar Allan Poe’s darkish tales of love, beauty and obsession, steeped in 
a sinister symbolism ‘[…] at once technique and theme’ (Feidelson 43), as a starting 
point seemed to be a fairly logical decision as it enabled the initiation of antithetical 
conceptions of femininity as constructed by patriarchy by means of phallogocentric 
language. Notably, the concept of the abject has been furthered in order to account for 
the necessity of woman’s expulsion from the patriarchal order in order to ban any ‘[...] 
potent threat to male power’, a force possibly likened to ‘[...] the perpetual status of the 
semiotic chora and its capacity for disruption’ (Seet 151, emphasis in the original). 
 The two following chapters, sketching the fate of Shakespeare’s Ophelia and 
Tennyson’s Lady of Shalott, revolve around the highly charged topos of death in water 
as a means of gently dissolving life and thus providing the regaining of the lost unity 
with the Real. Furthermore, both texts feature the decidedly ambiguous motif of the 
bride: dressed in virginal white, the colour of absence and negation, both Ophelia and 
the Lady resort to a passivity wherein they are sheer ‘[...] object of desire and a mutual 
bond [...]’ (Müller 99) that defines them utterly in relation to their husbands. Thus it 
becomes evident that the “bride” is no more than ‘[...] a mythical sign [...]’ within the 
community she seeks to establish herself in, the promise of her fashionable attire ‘[...] 
representing a verbal contract between persons other than herself [...]’ as she becomes 
‘[...] the passive mediatrix through which male society is achieved’ (Müller 99). Yet the 
marriage imagined by Ophelia and the Lady must necessarily ‘[...] become a farce, the 
wedding ceremony a comedy of manners and ‘money’ [...] rather than the spiritual bond 
as which it is generally celebrated’ (Müller 99). One partner being absent, the other ‘[...] 
reduced to a sign [...]’ (Müller 99), the dream of happiness in marriage crumbles at the 
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realisation of how the long-awaited promise of wholeness proves to be no more than 
‘[...] a figment of the mythical imagination which only serves to underscore the 
oppression of women’ (Müller 99). 
 The topos of woman as object of conspicuous consumption is taken up in the 
chapter dealing with Pre-Raphaelite paintings providing illustrations to Tennyson’s 
poem. That the Lady of Shalott in the paintings by Holman Hunt, Waterhouse and 
Rossetti is literally “killed into art” manifests itself as a male strategy of erasing 
woman’s subversive potential, offering in its stead the ‘[...] primary pleasure [...] 
derived from peering into a private world [...]’ (Seet 150) where woman is forever 
available as object of the male gaze. Elizabeth Siddal(l) however has offered an 
alternative envisioning of the Lady’s world as a viable space of opposition wherein 
woman can live and prosper. 
 A Lacanian, post-feminist study of Angela Carter’s “Wolf-Alice” aptly rounds 
up the investigation as finally, ‘[...] animal drives, sexual drives, free from the 
sex/gender system [...]’ are re-imagined in a slightly Utopian universe wherein the 
eponymous protagonist ‘[...] begins to dismantle the phallocentric underpinnings of both 
sex and language’, thus offering ‘[...] an alternative to the dominant myth of singularity’ 
(Lau 92). Contrary to Eleonora, Morella, Ophelia and the Lady of Shalott, Wolf-Alice 
succeeds in re-structuring her environment until it becomes her own Symbolic Order 
unhinged from notions of hierarchy, oppositions and the paradigm of paternal language. 
Ultimately, ‘[...] the tongues of Carter’s women and wolves move us away from 
language, speech, articulation and into a more sensory realm [...]’, ‘[...] an erotic outside 
of language as we know it [...]’ (Lau 92). The revolutionary aspect to this realm situated 
outside of language, however, is that Wolf-Alice does not attempt to desert language at 
all: ‘[t]o abandon language because it presently reflects masculinist structures is to 
abandon transformation of all sexist structures in favour of a marginal women’s culture’ 
(Griffin Crowder 127). Thus one could claim that Wolf-Alice does not seek to detach 
herself from “masculine” notions of speech, but transforms and appropriates those to 
‘[...] reflect a new social order’ (Griffin Crowder 127). On a metonymical level, Carter’s 
fairy tale simultaneously represents the last chapter and the conclusion of the enterprise 
I have set myself. With “Wolf-Alice”, it has become evident that the only way out of 
cultural constructions and the rigidly drawn patriarchal order lies in the deconstruction 
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and re-arrangement of categories that have existed for such a long time that they have 
become “natural” to us. 
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10. Abstract 
Meine Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob Julia Kristevas semiotische 
chôra, eine Adaption des von Jacques Lacan entwickelten Konzept des Imaginären, als 
eine alternative Welt weiblicher Opposition – im Gegensatz zur hegemonischen, 
männlich konnotierten Symbolischen Ordnung – gesehen werden kann. Somit 
hinterfragt die vorliegende Arbeit die Art und Weise, in welcher Frauen mit der 
Symbolischen Ordnung interagieren, sie aufzubrechen versuchen oder letztendlich an 
ihr zugrunde gehen. Um diesem Vorhaben gerecht zu werden, wird zuerst der 
theoretische Teil abgehandelt, der sich hauptsächlich auf feministische Theorien, 
Psychoanalyse und Kristevas Adaption von Lacans Theorien stützt.  
 Im ersten Teil meiner Diplomarbeit werden daher theoretische Modelle und 
Konzepte dargestellt. Den Anfang bildet eine kurze Zusammenfassung der 
feministischen Agenda, wie die Offenlegung von Diskriminierung gegen Frauen im 
Patriarchat. Zentral für die Fragestellung, die diese Diplomarbeit behandelt, ist vor 
allem jener Zweig feministischer Theorien, der allgemein als der „französische“ 
bekannt ist. Da die Repräsentanten  dieser Linie Elemente des Poststrukturalismus und 
der Psychoanalyse inkorporieren, kann ein gewisser Grad an Eklektizismus (auch 
innerhalb dieser Arbeit) nicht abgestritten werden. Das Ziel dieser feministischen Kritik 
ist es, die oben genannte Diskriminierung darzulegen, indem naturalisierten 
Dichotomien – die etwa Mann mit Kultur und Vernunft, Frau mit Natur und Emotion in 
Verbindung bringen – entgegenzuwirken versucht wird. Das zweite Kapitel des 
theoretischen Teils skizziert ein paar wenige fundamentale Konzepte Sigmund Freuds, 
wie etwa die Traumdeutung und den psychischen Apparat, und richtet den Fokus 
schließlich auf Jacques Lacan und dessen Abhandlungen über das Imaginäre, das 
Spiegelstadium und die Symbolische Ordnung. Um einen kurzen Überblick zu 
gewähren, muss festgehalten werden, dass Lacans Spiegelstadium die Sozialisierung 
des Menschen und dessen Eintritt in die väterliche Ordnung (Nom-de-père) initiiert, 
indem die Mutter-Kind Dyade gewaltsam aufgebrochen und das Kind somit 
buchstäblich aus dem „Schoß“ der Mutter gerissen wird. Von nun an wird das Kind – 
und hier ist speziell das weibliche gemeint – für immer verzweifelt versuchen, den 
idyllischen, harmonischen Urzustand wiederherzustellen, was aber nur im Tod gelingen 
kann. Eine Verweigerung der Symbolischen Ordnung und ihrer Gesetze führt laut Lacan 
unwiderruflich zu Psychose und Wahnsinn, was sich unter anderem in desintegrierter 
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und/oder kindlicher Sprache manifestiert. Kristeva adaptiert das Präödipale und 
entwickelt das Konzept des Semiotischen, welches, im Gegensatz zum Symbolischen, 
das mit väterlicher Autorität und Kontrolle verbunden wird, eine weiblich informierte 
Sphäre, frei von Regeln und restriktiven Kategorisierungen, betitelt. Die semiotische 
chôra (hier bedient sich Kristeva eines von Platon entwickelten Konzepts, siehe 
Timaios) versteht sich als mütterliches Raum-Zeit-Kontinuum, das sich jeglicher 
Definition entzieht. Einzig und allein kann festgestellt werden, dass die chôra vor der 
linearen Zeitordnung und der phallogozentrischen Sprache existiert und sich somit als 
latent subversives Konzept (auch für mein vorgestelltes Vorhaben) anbietet.  
 Der theoretischen Abhandlung folgen Analysen und Interpretationen 
verschiedenster Texte. Da Medialität in dieser Diplomarbeit keine Rolle spielt, wird das 
Verständnis von „Text“ erweitert, um so auch eine im Bereich der Cultural Studies 
durchaus gängige Analyse von Bildern als „Text“ zu ermöglichen. Außerdem soll 
darauf hingewiesen werden, dass mein Ansatz universal und nicht historisch angelegt 
ist, weshalb auf etwaige Darstellungen historischer Kontexte größtenteils verzichtet 
wird.  
 Kapitel 3 legt Augenmerk auf die antithetische Konzeption weiblicher Rollen – 
illustriert anhand von Edgar Allan Poes Kurzgeschichten „Eleonora“ und „Morella“ – 
die es der patriarchalen Gesellschaft erlauben, die Frau von der Symbolischen Ordnung 
auszuschließen. In dieser Interpretation verkörpern Eleonora und Morella die äußerst 
populäre Dichotomie „Heilige und Hure“; beiden werden essentialistische Rollen 
zugewiesen, an denen die Frauen schlussendlich zerbrechen (müssen), nicht jedoch 
ohne vorher auf Lücken und Inkonsistenzen innerhalb der Symbolischen Ordnung 
aufmerksam zu machen. 
 Kapitel 4 skizziert das Schicksal von William Shakespeares Ophelia, deren Rolle 
als „mad bride“ und Wahnsinnige ihr aufgrund ihres impliziten revolutionären 
Potentials (welches sich beispielsweise auf sozio-linguistischer Ebene manifestiert), 
welches ihr erlaubt, die (Symbolische) Ordnung von Elsinore in Frage zu stellen, 
zugewiesen wird. 
 Kapitel 5 betont die – um den Fortbestand der Symbolischen Ordnung zu sichern 
– unumgängliche Notwendigkeit stereotyper Genderzuschreibungen, die sich auf der 
Ebene der Korrelation Mann-Kultur/Frau-Natur manifestieren. In Alfred Lord 
Tennysons Gedicht „The Lady of Shalott“ muss die gleichnamige Titelheldin erkennen, 
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dass es schier unmöglich ist, diese binären Oppositionen durch eine reine Umkehr an 
Werten zu dekonstruieren. Die Übernahme gesellschaftlich approbierter, vorgefertigter 
Rollen, wie die der Braut, bestätigt das von ihr kritisierte Modell mehr, als es zu 
unterminieren, und lässt die klischeehaft anmutenden Rollenzuschreibungen letztendlich 
intakt.  
 Kapitel 6 schließlich indiziert die Diskussion visueller Repräsentationen der 
vorhin erwähnten Lady of Shalott, die ursprünglich als Illustration für die Moxon 
Ausgabe von Tennysons Gedichten dienten. Die hier vorgestellten prä-raphaelitischen 
Bilder (gefertigt von William Holman Hunt, John William Waterhouse und Dante 
Gabriel Rossetti) präsentieren die Frau als Spektakel, als Objekt, immer bereit, vom 
(männlichen) Publikum konsumiert zu werden. Die bewusst gewählte Anordnung der 
Bilder skizziert die Entwicklung der Lady of Shalott von ihrem Aufbruch aus der 
semiotischen chôra in die Symbolische Ordnung, wo sie, konfrontiert mit Liebe, 
Sexualität, Verzweiflung und Verlust, erkennen muss, dass es keinen Platz für sie gibt, 
und ihre Erwartungen – außer im Tode – niemals erfüllt werden können. Der Anhang 
dieses Kapitels beschäftigt sich mit Rossettis Muse Elizabeth Siddal (eigentlich Siddall) 
und deren höchst verstörender, wenn nicht morbider Beziehung zueinander. Zu 
Lebzeiten kaum als Künstlerin anerkannt oder gewürdigt, hat Siddal doch mehrere 
Werke – von denen hier jedoch nur „The Lady of Shalott“ besprochen wird – 
hinterlassen, die als laute Antwort einer konstant als passiv, kränklich, leidend 
stilisierten Frau „gelesen“ werden können.  
 Kapitel 7 rundet die Arbeit mit einer Analyse von Angela Carters 
Kurzgeschichte „Wolf-Alice“, einer modernen, post-feministischen Adaptation des 
Rotkäppchen-Mythos, ab. Als theoretische Grundlage dieser Interpretation bieten sich 
Dekonstruktion und Kristevas Konzept des Abjekt, des gesellschaftlich Ausgestoßenen, 
da immerwährend zwischen Grenzen fluktuierend und nie eine sichere Position 
annehmend, an. Carters Wolf-Alice demonstriert ihre moralische und soziale 
Überlegenheit, indem sie vorgefertigte Konstruktionen und Verhaltensmuster (teils auch 
aus Unkenntnis) kategorisch ablehnt und mithilfe ihres Körpers ihre Umwelt 
strukturiert. Frei von allen Zwängen (und nicht ganz ohne den Anschein einer Utopie zu 
erwecken) schildert „Wolf-Alice“, wie wir hätten leben können, hätte die Menschheit 
nicht jene Kategorien entwickelt, die unser aller Denken und Tun beherrschen sowie 
auch einschränken. Mit diesem Kapitel schließt die Arbeit ab, nachdem verschiedenste 
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Strategien, mit der Symbolischen Ordnung zu interagieren, vorgestellt und besprochen 
wurden, keine jedoch als wirklich realisierbar oder „lebbar“ befunden wurde, da jeder 
hier diskutierte Text letztendlich voll von Kontradiktionen scheint, die eine eindeutige 
Interpretation unmöglich und sicherlich auch wenig erstrebenswert erscheinen lassen.  
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